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1ABSTRACT
This study seeks to examine the impact of the EU on Turkish counter-terrorism
policies towards the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). It analyses what impact it
has had within three distinct periods: the pre-Helsinki European Council (1984-
1999) period, the post-Helsinki European Council (1999-2004) period, and the
post-Brussels European Council (2004-2013) period. It conceptualizes and
empirically investigates the EUs norm diffusion role by relying on the concept of
Rule Adoption, and by utilising two norm diffusion mechanisms: the
Conditionality and the Socialization mechanism, and their domestic and EU-
level determinants. The thesis argues that when the EU has promoted
democratisation in Turkey, it has also implicitly impacted on Turkeys counter-
terrorism policies. It argues for this thesis by generalizing from the following
empirical findings: When the EU has provided a credible membership prospect to
Turkey, and when the PKK attacks have been at a low-level, then the EU
conditionality mechanism has been influential on Turkeys adoption of EU
promoted norms. However, when there has been no membership prospect and
high levels of PKK violence, it has been the openness of Turkish political actors
that has resulted in rule adoption, in which the social learning of the Turkish
political actors has led to the adoption of EU promoted norms as an appropriate
way to solve existing terrorism problems.
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1. Introduction
Since the idea of creating a borderless and united Europe has preoccupied the
minds of European Union (EU) political actors, security has always been an
Achilles Heel of this project. It arose as a problem for European politicians,
bureaucrats, and citizens within the form of soft security problems such as
immigration, organised crime, drug and human trafficking. However, after the
devastating 9/11 attacks, terrorism has occupied the whole EU security agenda
and it was understood that seeking a remedy for terrorism within the EU is not
enough to eradicate this problem. Therefore, countering terrorism went beyond
the borders of the EU and it was incorporated with the states neighbouring the
Union.
Countering terrorism, however, has never only been a security matter
because of political motives of perpetrators. The groups involved in terrorist
attacks rely on this strategy since they are sometimes unable to find a legitimate
and efficient way for seeking their rightful demands. In this respect, in order to
prevent the radicalization of these people, liberal democratic norms such as
democracy, human rights, ethnic minority rights and rule of law became
important instruments for their voices to be heard.
In the democratic environment of the EU, whilst individuals may have a
chance to seek their political cause, in other countries and regions they may not
enjoy their basic political rights, due to absence of democratic governance. So,
the incompetence of other states generates the political conditions of
radicalization and these may be imported to the EU where the democratic
environment gives the opportunity of publicity for these groups political cause.
Therefore, in order to prevent such negative consequences of the internal
security problems of other countries, promotion of liberal democratic norms to
other states becomes an important aspect of EUs external dimension of
counter-terrorism policy.
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In the context of EUs foreign counter-terrorism policy, fighting terrorism
was mostly perceived a security issue both in political and academic circles. The
normative side of this problem such as promoting democracy, human rights,
ethnic minority rights, and rule of law to third countries remained behind the
security based policies and academic arguments. Furthermore, the EUs external
counter-terror engagements squeezed between EU-Transatlantic relations and
the EU-European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) countries. Within transatlantic
relations, the EU was described as a norm taker from the United States (US)
and it was accused of compromising some human rights in order to sign counter-
terror agreements (Argomaniz 2009a; Kaunert et al. 2012; Alex Mackenzie 2012;
Pawlak 2009b). Also, the EU was criticized for paying too much attention to
security cooperation and ignoring the promotion of liberal democratic norms to
the ENP countries in the context of countering terrorism (Baracani 2009;
Dannreuther 2006; Dover 2008; Eder 2011; Joffe 2008; Pace 2010). If looking at
these academic arguments, the EU, depicted as an international actor, disregards
the promotion of liberal democratic norms to third countries as a priority when
fighting terrorism.
Contrary to these accounts, however, the EU has a strong potential to
transform the counter-terrorism policies of other countries by normative means.
Although, this competence of the EU was not revealed in its relations with the
US and the ENP countries, there needs to be focus on other countries, where the
EUs normative influence is successful and negative consequences of terrorism
creates a problem for both the EU and target country.
In this respect, this study aims to shift the direction of EUs external
dimension of the counter-terror debate to a neglected area to the enlargement
countries. It provides an alternative explanation for the transformation of
counter-terrorism policy in a third country in the context of democratization and
enlargement. It is concerned with the normative dimension of this
transformation (e.g. with changes that relate to the promotion of human rights
14
and ethnic minority rights), rather than with issues relating to counter-terrorism
cooperation with the EU. It explicates the normative role of the EU in a special
case that such norm diffusion has played in transforming Turkeys counter-
terrorism policy towards the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).
Enlargement is one of the strategies used by the European Union to
stabilize countries in its vicinity. Since 1993, the strategy has been informed by
the EUs so-called Copenhagen Political Criteria, which defines the eligibility
requirements for those Enlargement countries that wish to accede to the EU.
The criteria requires that candidate countries achiev[e] stability of institutions
guaranteeing democracy, rule of law, human rights and respect for and
protection of minorities(European Council 1993), before granting them
membership status. The Enlargement strategy aims to prepare candidate
countries for EU membership by transforming their democracy, and solving their
domestic political problems, using EU methods. In return, it minimizes the risks
to the EU of internalizing the domestic political problems of candidate countries.
The EU requirements given by the Copenhagen Criteria give rise to a
controversial issue for those candidate countries in which ethnic separatist
terrorism is considered to be an existential threat. On the one hand, if they
adopt the liberal democratic norms promoted by the EU, such countries run the
risk that their citizens will perceive this as restraining the counter-terrorism
capabilities of their security forces, and so as undermining their territorial
integrity. On the other hand, if candidate countries sacrifice liberal democratic
norms for the sake of security, their relations with the EU could deteriorate.
Such a security versus liberty dilemma clearly reveals that there is a link
between the EUs efforts to establish liberal democratic norms within candidate
countries, and the transformation of those countries counter-terrorism policies.
In this connection, during accession negotiations, the membership
conditions laid down by the EU not only trigger a democratization process within
candidate countries, but they also influence substantial policies within those
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countries, such as their counter-terrorism policies. In an attempt to comply with
the human rights and ethnic minority norms promoted by the EU, candidate
countries transform their counter-terrorism policies in line with EU
requirements.
In the above respect, Turkey is a special example amongst the candidate
EU countries. It has been committed to acceding to the EU since 1987, and has
been struggling with the PKK, a terrorist organisation that has the separatist
agenda of establishing an independent state in Southeastern Anatolia, since
1984. Since that time large numbers of soldiers and resources have been
allocated to the Southeastern region and a state of emergency was declared in
the early 1980s. Turkish security forces have adopted harsh counter-terror
measures such as village evacuations, extra judicial killings, torture, arbitrary
arrest, and the internment without trial of PKK members and sympathizers, at
the expense of human and ethnic rights. Fearing separation, the ruling elite of
Turkey has repressed the demands of Kurdish citizens for their cultural rights.
Granting rights to Kurds has been considered dangerous, since doing so
increases the likelihood of calls for self-determination. These counter-terrorist
measures have led to the deterioration both of Turkeys human rights record and
of its relations with the EU.
Since the EU laid down the political conditions that candidate countries
must meet at the Copenhagen European Council in 1993, no candidate country
except Turkey has faced separatist terrorism in its territory. Even though some
candidate countries (e.g. Romania, Latvia, Hungary, and Slovenia) have faced
ethnic minority problems, none have experienced a terrorist problem on the
scale of Turkeys. Furthermore, although there were instances of ethnic violence
within the Western Balkan countries (such as the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia) after the Yugoslav War, these were not considered to be instances
of terrorist activities by the EU. Therefore, investigating the Turkish case has a
16
special importance in understanding the role of the EUs norm diffusion
strategies on candidate countries counter-terrorism policies.
In addition, since the 9/11 attacks, there has been less attention paid to
human rights issues on the global stage and more attention paid to security
based strategies in the domain of counter-terrorism. One main reason for this is
the perception that Western countries rely upon security based strategies, and
this has led other non-Western countries to follow suit (Hicks 2005: 216-17).
Many countries have implemented new national security laws, or have justified
their pre-existing legislation, by claiming that they are confronting terrorism
(Hicks 2005: 216-17). However, contrary to the global trend after 9/11, Turkey
has adopted human rights oriented counter-terrorism legislation. This is despite
the fact that ethnic separatist terrorism has been a major security problem for
Turkey (see chapter 6). It is often regarded as difficult to differentiate between
the impact that globalisation has had, and the impact that EU norm diffusion has
had, on domestic policy transformation (Radaelli and Pasquier 2007: 40).
Turkeys special situation indicates that, in fact, EU integration can itself play a
major role in the transformation of the counter-terrorism policies of third
countries. This is because Turkey has bucked the global trend, so it is implausible
that its policies have altered due to the influence of globalisation. Therefore,
taking a closer look at the Turkish case could reveal the EUs distinct norm
diffusion role in comparison to its counterparts in the counter-terror domain.
As will be seen in the literature review chapter (chapter 2), in recent
years there has been an increasing number of studies concerning the EUs
normative role in third countries. In these studies, this role has been discussed
within different contexts. One group of studies attempts to determine the EUs
position using international power concepts (Duchene 1973; Joffe 2008;
Manners 2002; Oz 2010; Van Reisen et al. 2004). Another group of studies are
concerned with the motivation that the EU has had in attempting to diffuse its
norms to third countries (Cottey 2007; Lavenex 2004; D. Peters and Wagner
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2005; Rees 2008; K. Smith 2003b; Tocci 2007). In a different strand of literature,
the EU impact on third countries has been conceptualized in the context of
Europeanization (Börzel 1999; Knill 2001; Radaelli 2002; Risse et al. 2001;
Wallace 2000). In another group of studies, the EU norm diffusion mechanisms
towards third countries is based on norm diffusion rationalities/logics at the
domestic and the EU level (Bauer et al. 2007; Börzel and Risse 2003, 2012; Diez
et al. 2006; Jacoby 2004; Kubicek 2003; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005).
In further studies, the EUs norm diffusion efforts have been categorized in terms
of the level of interactions the EU has had with its neighbouring countries (Börzel
et al. 2008; Börzel and Risse 2012; Lavenex and Uçarer 2004; Schimmelfennig
2012). However, within these strands of literature, no study specifically
examines the EUs normative impact (which is based on the promotion of human
rights and ethnic minority rights) on the transformation of candidate countries
counter-terrorism policies. Furthermore, no work has explored those norm
diffusion mechanisms that rely on domestic and EU level variables and that
transform candidate countries counter-terrorism policies.
In consideration of the literature on Turkey-EU relations, the EU impact
on Turkey has been analysed through the lenses of democratization (Dagi 2001;
Keyman and Düzgit 2007; Kubicek 2003; McLaren 2008; Usul 2011; Özer 2012),
human rights (Hale 2003; E. Hughes 2011; Sugden 2004), ethnic minority rights
 ?ĞŶŐŝǌ ĂŶĚ ,ŽĨĨŵĂŶŶ  ? ? ? ? ? ^ĂƌĂů  ? ? ? ? ? zŦůŵĂǌ  ? ? ? ?Ă Z ĂŶĚ ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ ƌĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶ
(Tocci 2007). Furthermore, another group of studies has been concerned with
the efficiency of the EUs norm diffusion strategies on Turkeys reform processes
(Arikan 2002; Baç 2005; Dimitrova 2011; Noutcheva and Aydin-Duzgit 2012;
Saatcioglu 2009, 2011; Schimmelfennig et al. 2003; Schimmelfennig 2008; Tocci
2005). Even though these studies consider the impact the EU has had on
Turkeys counter-terrorism policies towards the PKK, they explain reform
initiatives in the context of democratization, human rights, ethnic minority
rights, and conflict resolution. Therefore, a new research framework is needed to
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explicitly reveal the full impact that the EU has had on Turkeys counter-
terrorism policies.
Along with these studies, two exceptional studies have paid attention to
the interaction between the EU and Turkey, and its influence on policies towards
the PKK. In the first study, EU documents relating to Turkeys counter-terrorism
policy are subsumed without critical evaluation and in the absence of a
theoretical framework (Alexander et al. 2008). In the second study, the EU
impact on Turkeys Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) policies (i.e. those relating to
terrorism, organized crime, and drug trafficking) is examined by looking at threat
perceptions (Bakar 2011). However, the impact of the EU on Turkeys counter-
terrorism policies is evaluated by focussing on the cooperation dimension of
counter-terrorism, rather than on the EUs normative requirements, such as
improving human rights conditions.
In light of these studies, this research aims to bring a novel perspective to
both the literature on the role of the EU in promoting norm diffusion, and the
literature on Turkey-EU relations. In order to do so, it identifies a number of
distinct norm diffusion mechanisms that are used by the EU to transform the
counter-terrorism policies of third countries, and it empirically investigates the
use of these mechanisms in Turkey. Furthermore, it will conclude which EU norm
diffusion mechanism was the most successful in shaping Turkish counter-
terrorism policies. In order to achieve these research objectives, this study poses
the core research question:
Why and How have the EU promoted liberal democratic norms been
adopted by Turkish governments to transform its counter-terrorism policies
towards the PKK?.
The domestic impact of EU norm diffusion encompasses three major
areas: polity, politics and policies (Börzel and Risse 2003: 60). The polity
dimension concerns political institutions, intergovernmental relations, judicial
structures, public administration, state traditions, economic institutions, state-
19
society relations, and collective identities. Furthermore, the EU influence on
third country polities has a direct impact on the fundamental principles of liberal
democracy (Sedelmeier 2011: 17). Studies concerned with the EUs impact on
the democratization process of third countries, and changing human rights and
ethnic minority rights policies, are considered under the polity context
(Sedelmeier 2011: 18). The politics dimension, on the other hand, encompasses
interest formation, interest aggregation, interest representation, and public
discourses. Research related to political parties, party systems, parliamentary
agendas, and civil society, are considered as part of this literature (Sedelmeier
2011). Under the policy dimension, however, the EU influence has been
observed through changing standards, instruments, problem-solving approaches
and policy narratives and discourses. Empirical studies that consider regional
policy, social policy, and JHA policy, are part of the policy-related European norm
diffusion literature (Sedelmeier 2011: 23). In consideration of these policy areas,
counter-terrorism is generally framed under the JHA framework. However, the
security versus liberty dilemma links the counter-terrorism issue with the
polities of candidate countries as well. The promotion of liberal democratic
norms by the EU may be influential on candidate countries counter terrorism
policies if there is an on-going conflict in the candidate country with a terrorist
organisation. Therefore, the EU impact on domestic policy does not necessarily
have to be categorized under the policy dimension, but it can also be examined
under the polity framework. This research examines the EU impact on Turkish
counter-terrorism policies under the polity context rather than policy.
In relation to the research question, the influence of the EU on Turkey is
assessed through the adoption of EU promoted liberal democratic norms in the
counter-terror domain. As a dependent variable, rule adoption is a broad
concept when used to measure the influence of the EU on Turkey. In order to
narrow this concept to allow for a manageable analysis, the focus will be on
Formal Rule Adoption (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). Formal rule
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adoption constitutes three dimensions: (i) The ratification of EU promoted
human rights and ethnic minority rights conventions; (ii) The amendment of
existing domestic laws or the introduction of new laws; (iii) Institution-building
initiatives for the protection of human rights.
The conventions mentioned in the first dimension have had an influence
on counter-terrorism policies in Turkey, such as the prohibition of torture and
the granting of rights to Kurds speaking in their mother tongue. The conventions
are not only based on EU rules, but are also taken from the United Nations (UN),
the Council of Europe (CoE) and the Organisation for European Security (OSCE).
The EU closely monitors the ratification of these conventions as a precondition
for accession to the EU.
The amendments mentioned in the second dimension also have relations
to counter-terrorism policies in Turkey. The Anti-terror Law, the Criminal
Procedure Law, and the Law Banning Use of Kurdish are a few examples, which
fall within the scope of domestic legislative changes. The EU evaluates these
domestic legislative changes in assessing Turkeys progression for EU
membership.
With regard to the institution-building initiatives mentioned in the third
dimension, the EU requires the establishment of new institutions in candidate
countries, such as establishing an Ombudsman, or new human rights institutions,
which are tasked with protecting and monitoring human rights violations against
terror suspects. Therefore, institution-building initiatives need to be taken into
consideration when assessing the EU influence on reforms made for changing
counter-terrorism policy.
The EUs norm diffusion process has also been analysed as involving three
distinct processes, Top-Down, Bottom-Up and Cross Loading processes.
The Top-Down (Downloading) process involves the adoption of EU norms at the
domestic level. Viewed in this way, the EU impact emerges by the way of the
unilateral adoption of EU standards by non-member and member countries
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(Börzel 2002: 193). The Bottom-up (Uploading) process involves the active
construction of an EU system of governance in EU member countries (Börzel
2002: 193). In this process, member countries try to upload their policies in order
to achieve lower adoption costs at the domestic level. The Cross Loading process
involves the exchange and sharing of policies between European countries,
European institutions, and policy areas. Norm diffusion is shaped by the
interests, norms, and identity of countries involved in this mutual interaction
(Wong 2007: 325). The Top-Down process is used generally to explain the
European impact on non-EU countries. The EUs monitoring mechanism for non-
member countries is more intrusive and direct than in member countries.
Moreover, non-member countries do not have the power to set the rules or
negotiate changes in them. Therefore, a hierarchical power asymmetry between
the EU and non-member countries, which is in favour of the EU, has led to a Top-
down process for rule adoption (Sedelmeier 2011: 6).
However, the EUs approach towards third countries may not always be
explicable in terms of the top-down approach. The EU also has softer norm
diffusion mechanisms, such as the persuasion and the social learning
mechanism, used to promote the adoption of EU norms in non-member
countries, which are entirely dependent on the decisions of domestic political
actors in target countries (the decision to adopt the EU norms is made
autonomously, considering the domestic needs), and so can be categorized as
being a bottom-up process. So, the use of top-down and bottom-up processes
can complement each other, and lead to more successful norm diffusion in third
countries (Dimitrova and Pridham 2004). Therefore, in this research, both top-
down and bottom-up approaches are used to explain the EU impact on Turkish
counter-terrorism policies.
In relation to top-down and bottom-up approaches, this study considers
two norm diffusion mechanisms, viz. Conditionality and Socialization, in
investigating the impact of the EU on Turkeys counter-terrorism policies. Doing
22
so increases the value of the wider findings of this research. As these norm
diffusion patters will be shown to hold in Turkey (in chapters 5, 6, and 7), the
international community (international organisations and countries) could
benefit by using them to shape the counter-terrorism policies of countries other
than Turkey. A detailed conceptualization of the two mechanisms will be
presented in the theoretical chapter (chapter 3), but they may be usefully
summarized here in the following way:
The Conditionality mechanism is the mechanism used by the EU when
they lay down political conditions that candidate countries must meet in order to
become a member of the EU. These conditions are such that: if the candidate
state fulfils these normative requirements, it is granted membership status, and;
if it fails, the EU withholds accession to the Union. Stated in terms of this
mechanism, the first hypothesis of this research is:
The use of the conditionality strategy by the EU increases the adoption of EU
promoted norms by the Turkish Government in the counter-terrorism domain.
This research will argue that when the EU has presented Turkey with
credible membership prospects, and when the benefits of compliance to EU
promoted norms has outweighed the domestic political adoption costs, Turkish
political actors have adopted human rights norms, which has resulted in the
softening of the counter-terrorism approach towards the PKK. And when the EU
has failed to provide Turkey with an adequate membership incentive, Turkish
political actors have continued to implement hard-line counter-terrorism policies
towards the PKK, in order to avoid domestic opposition and the criticism of those
from nationalist circles.
The main purpose of this study is to explain how EU actions can influence
Turkeys counter-terrorism policies. One explanation will be given in terms of the
conditionality strategy mentioned above. However, under certain political
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conditions, compliance with EU promoted norms can happen without a
membership incentive and high adoption costs. Under such circumstances, an
alternative argument is needed to explain norm-adoption behaviour. Here, the
alternative explanation will be provided by an appeal to the Socialization
mechanism.
The Socialization mechanism operates when a social interaction between
the EU and a candidate country results in domestic political actors of a candidate
country learning that EU promoted rules are effective in solving their domestic
political problems, and adopt them even when the EU does not provide them
with the prospect of EU membership. Thus, the second hypothesis of this
research will be:
The appropriateness of EU promoted norms in solving domestic political
problems increases the adoption of these norms by the Turkish Government in
the counter-terrorism domain.
This research will argue that when the Turkish government is in social
interaction with EU institutions, and when Turkeys membership prospects are
uncertain, Turkey may still comply with EU promoted norms to transform Turkish
counter-terrorism policies in line with EU rules. This policy change is based on a
learning process and Turkish domestic actors may realize that the adoption of EU
promoted norms are an effective way to solve existing PKK terrorism by peaceful
means. In this regard, the quality and legitimacy of the EU promoted norms and
the openness of Turkish political actors to adopt the EU promoted norms are
influential on norm-adopting behaviour, rather than the EU providing the
prospects of material benefits to Turkey.
These two mechanisms provide a basis for the logic of the EUs influence
on Turkey, but this research also uses two theoretical models to concretely
conceptualize the conditionality and socialisation mechanisms: the External
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Incentives Model (EIM) and the Social Learning Model (SLM). Schimmelfennig
and Sedelmeier develop these two models to explain the impact the EU has had
on Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs). They also provide
expository mediating factors to explain the EU impact on non-member countries
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005).
A detailed explanation of these two theoretical models will be given in
chapter three, but they can be usefully summarised here as follows. The former
model, EIM, gives a conceptualization of the EUs conditionality mechanism. This
model is based on a cost-benefit calculation, or bargaining process. It proposes
that candidate countries adopt the EU promoted norms if the potential benefits
of EU-provided incentives exceed the domestic costs of adopting these norms.
The latter model, SLM, on the other hand, offers a conceptualization of the
Socialization mechanism. This model is based on a learning processes and social
influence, which explains norm-adopting behaviour in third countries. According
to this model, the candidate countries adopt the EU promoted norms if they
assume that these rules provide an effective solution to their domestic
problems.
In an attempt to understand the EU influence on Turkish counter-
terrorism policies, formal rule adoption does not entirely reveal the EUs
transformative power. There are also other internal and external mediating
factors, which can increase (or decrease) the influence of the EU on candidate
countries. Four mediating factors will be utilized in this research to explain the
EU impact on Turkish counter-terrorism policy: (i) credibility of conditionality, (ii)
adoption costs (derived from EIM), (iii) legitimacy of EU requirements and (iv)
domestic resonance (derived from SLM). Their details will be explicated in the
theory chapter (chapter 3), but it is useful to note now that these indicators are
classified into two groups, namely, the domestic-level and the EU-level. The
domestic-level factors ((ii) and (iv)) depend on the internal dynamics of the
candidate country in adopting the EU promoted norms. The EU-level indicators
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((i) and (iii)) depend on the EUs capability to convince a candidate country to
adopt its norms.
In brief, a necessary condition of the conditionality mechanism is that the
EU has the capability to fulfil its promises of rewards and punitive actions
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 13-16). The EU can make promises of
financial and technical assistance, or, crucially, promises regarding membership
prospects. It is the latter promise that will be focussed upon in this research
because, if the EU fails to provide a credible membership prospect to Turkey, the
conditionality mechanism will fail. This will be explained more fully in chapter 3.
The adoption costs correspond to the price of the adoption of EU
promoted norms by domestic political actors (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier
2005: 16-17). In this context, this study will assess the adoption costs by
analysing whether the EU requirements for Turkish political actors were feasible
in consideration of PKK attacks. The number of fatalities that occurred due to
PKK terrorist attacks, and the reduction due to the ceasefire of the PKK, will be
indicators to evaluate adoption costs in the counter-terror domain.
The legitimacy of the EU requirements refers to the quality of the EU
demands (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 18-19). This will be evaluated
by looking at their clarity (whether they are clearly defined by the EU),
consistency (whether the EU requirements are consistent with the behaviour of
EU institutions and member countries) and whether they are laid down solely by
the EU, or are shared requirements laid down by the EU in conjunction with
other international organisations.
Domestic resonance relates to the cognitive openness of political actors
to adopt EU promoted norms (Franck 1992: 50). This research will evaluate
domestic resonance by taking into consideration the positive and negative
stances that Turkish political actors have taken towards the EU promoted
reforms. The views of the Turkish Government, the Turkish Army, the Turkish
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Judiciary, and General Public Opinion will be evaluated to determine the level of
domestic resonance.
1.1. Methodology
As Robert Yin emphasizes in his milestone study, determining ones research
strategy depends mostly on ones research question. He argues that if how and
why questions are asked about a contemporary set of events, over which the
investigator has little or no control, the most appropriate research design is the
case study (Yin 2003: 9). As indicated earlier, this study seeks to answer the
why and how questions about the EU influence on Turkish counter-terrorism
policies. Furthermore, this researcher has no power to intervene in the
phenomenon that will be investigated. So, in this dissertation, a case study
strategy is implemented to conduct the research.
As indicated in the previous section, since the Copenhagen Political
Criteria has been laid down, Turkey has been an atypical case amongst the
previous and existing candidate countries (the CEECs and Western Balkan
Countries), where the confrontation with ethnic separatist terrorism through
harsh counter-terrorism measures constitutes a major problem for its
integration with the EU. Therefore, there is no candidate country that is
comparable with Turkey in this respect. So this research will rely on a Single
Case research strategy to make valid causal inferences.
As De Vaus indicates, without a theoretical framework, a case study will
have little value for wider generalization, which is one of the goals of social
science research(De Vaus 2001: 221). To enhance the external validity of this
research, both EIM and SLM are used as theoretical frameworks to generalize
the empirical findings and causal explanations. The explanatory role of this case
study is also based on a nomothetic approach (De Vaus 2001: 233-34), in which
analysing the Turkish case will give rise to general theoretical propositions that
will apply to other country-based cases, if they satisfy similar criteria to Turkey.
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Furthermore, this dissertation does not aim to test or refute these
two models; rather it employs both theoretical frameworks to illustrate how the
EU has influenced counter-terrorism policy transformation in Turkey. In other
words, these theoretical models are used to understand the case, and are not
used for the purpose of theory building or theory testing. This research is thus
best thought of as a clinical case study or a case centred study(De Vaus
2001: 223).
Due to the absence of candidate countries to compare with Turkey, this
case study is structured as an in-depth empirical investigation of Turkish counter-
terrorism policy. In order to observe as many theoretical implications in a single-
country design, within-unit analysis is employed in this research (King et al. 1994:
117-18). As Della Porta notes, in a single-country design, to observe the relevant
changes and see the transition phases, periodization or diachronic (longitudinal)
analysis is needed to multiply cases (Della Porta 2008: 217). So, in order to
increase the units of observation, this single case study design is split into three
distinct periods. This yields enough information to support valid causal
inferences. These periods are the pre-Helsinki period, the post-Helsinki period,
and the post-Brussels period.
The pre-Helsinki period, covers the time from the first PKK attacks in
1984 to the Helsinki European Council in 1999, when Turkey was admitted as a
candidate state. During this period, PKK attacks against the security forces and
civilians were at their peak, and Turkish political actors preferred the adoption of
hard-line counter-terrorism policies against the PKK, which resulted in the
violation of the civil rights of many Kurdish citizens. Also during this period, the
EU was in transition from an economic community to a political union, and the
EUs norm diffusion mechanisms and tools were in the early stages of
development. This period thus represents an initial stage for the EU influence on
Turkish counter-terrorism policies.
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The post-Helsinki period starts with the 1999 Helsinki European Council,
when Turkey was recognized as being on equal footing with other candidate
countries with regard to the accession process. It ends with the 2004 Brussels
European Council, in which Turkey was regarded as having sufficiently fulfilled
the Copenhagen Political Criteria to start accession negotiations. During these
years, the PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire due to the capture of its leader
Abdullah Ocalan, and withdrew its militants to Northern Iraq. It was thus a
peaceful period in comparison to the other periods. In addition, contrary to the
previous period, Turkish authorities did not challenge the succession reforms
required by the EU.
The post-Brussels period is the last phase. It starts with the 2004 Brussels
European Council and ends in 2013, when negotiations for a peaceful settlement
between the PKK and the Turkish government had started. The most notable
aspects of this phase are that EU-Turkey relations had reached a stalemate in
relation to the issue of Cyprus, and the PKK had resumed its attacks (starting in
2004) which continued until the reconciliation negotiations in 2013.
Furthermore, EU countries (such as United Kingdom (UK) and Spain) were
targeted by Al-Qaeda linked terrorist organisations, which prioritized security
concerns in the Union, rather than the promotion of human rights and
democracy in third countries.
In order to see the variation on the policy outcomes, this study relies on
process tracing to analyse the empirical data. According to George and
Bennett, process tracing is a procedure for identifying steps in a causal process
leading to the outcome of a given dependent variable of a particular case in a
particular historical context (George and Bennett 2005: 176). As part of this
analysis, in each time period, firstly, the counter-terror measures implemented
by Turkey towards the PKK are brought into view before making a causal link
with the EUs norm diffusion role in Turkey. Secondly, the EU efforts to promote
liberal democratic norms in Turkey will be illustrated by drawing attention to the
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EUs increasing or declining influence on Turkish counter-terrorism policy.
Thirdly, evidence of rule adoption, such as the ratification of international
conventions, domestic legislative changes, and institution building initiatives, will
be revealed to indicate the level of EU influence on Turkish counter-terrorism
policies. Finally, EU-level and domestic-level factors, which have an influence on
rule adoption, are expounded under the pre-determined independent variables
to illustrate the existence of a causal link between fact and theory. These four
stages of the process tracing procedure are replicated for each time period. In
the final analysis, the causal effect of EU integration on Turkish counter-
terrorism policy in each time period is compared with each other to draw a final
conclusion.
As for data collection, this research employs a qualitative method to
gather the empirical data. Primary documents, secondary sources, and semi-
structured interviews are consulted and drawn upon. The data gleaned from
multiple sources are triangulated to complement one another. This data
triangulation ensures relevant information is crosschecked from different
sources and helps to prove the reliability of the data (Della Porta and Keating
2008: 34-38; Yin 2003: 97-99).
The first resource, primary documents, largely involves the review of
official documents related to EU-Turkey relations. They are gathered from both
EU and Turkish Governmental resources. The EU level primary sources drawn
upon are: European Parliament (EP) Resolutions, European Council Decisions,
European Commission Strategy Papers, the EU Progression Reports, and the EU
Accession Partnerships. The domestic-level documentary sources drawn upon
are: the Turkish National Programmes Adoption of EU Rules (NPAA), Political
Party Programmes, Turkish National Assembly Inquiry Reports, the Turkish
Ministry of EU Affairs Report, Judicial Proceedings and Hearings. Even though
primary documents are of vital importance in case studies, and are unlikely to be
biased (Yin 2003: 87), it is possible that the ones utilised might not provide
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enough evidence to understand the motivational factors of political actors on
rule adoption. Therefore, they are corroborated with other sources.
The second source of evidence, which complements the primary
documents, are secondary sources such as books, articles, media news, think-
thank reports, and academic theses. These sources will support the project by
explaining the conceptual and theoretical concepts, which are not at the focus of
this study. Furthermore, they will contribute to this research by providing data
that has not been obtained by the researcher. As such, quantitative data is also
gathered from the following secondary sources: Human Rights Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs), research companies, and independent
think-thanks. Each highlights human rights violations, public support for Turkeys
membership in the EU, and the changing public perception of finding a peaceful
solution to PKK terrorism.
The last qualitative method used in this study for collecting empirical
data is semi-structured elite interviews. The semi-structured interview technique
provides a more flexible interview process by relying on general topics and
questions rather than detailed ones (Barlow 2010: 496). As for elite interviews,
they are often considered as the most effective method for collecting empirical
data about policy makers and their decision making processes (Burnham et al.
2008: 231). Information about the topics the questions are on, and the general
structure of the interviews, were sent to participants before conducting the
interviews. In addition, they were notified about the Code of Practice on Ethical
Standards, and they were provided the right to review, edit, place restrictions,
and specify conditions for interview material. Except for a few interviewees,
most of the participant did not request the transcribed interview data. For those
who wanted to see transcriptions, the copies were provided within a few weeks,
and their consent was sought before the interview data was utilised in this
research.
31
With regards to fieldwork interviews, within three rounds of fieldwork
trips between 2012 and 2013, twenty-seven interviews were held with members
of the political elite (senior officials and former politicians) in Turkey and with
senior EU officials in Brussels. Six of these interviews were conducted with senior
EU officials from the External Action Service, the Directorate General for
Enlargement, the Directorate General for Home Affairs, the Counter-terrorism
Coordinator Office, the EU Turkish Delegate, and the Directorate General for
Justice. Seventeen interviews were held with Turkish senior officials serving in
the Ministry of the Interior (Including the Turkish National Police), the Ministry
of Justice, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry for EU Affairs, the
Turkish Human Rights Institution, and the Turkish Ombudsman. The remaining
four interviews were conducted with two former Ministers of the Interior, one
former Minister of Human Rights, and one former Minister of Foreign Affairs in
Turkey.
During the interviews, the majority of interviewees consented to the
digital recording of the interviews. In the absence of their approval, permission
was taken for note taking. As for mentioning the names of interviewees, they
generally required their names not to be shared in the research. Therefore, in
order to be consistent, the names of all interview participants have been
anonymized. In terms of fulfilling expectations, these semi-structured elite
interviews have some strengths and weaknesses.
The most important strength of these interviews is that they give a
wealth of informal data about Turkeys counter-terrorism policies, and the EUs
impact on its transformation. In particular, the data obtained for earlier periods
is very useful, and provides information that is contained in neither the Turkish
nor the EU literature. Furthermore, these interviews support the data revealing
the motivations of both Turkish and EU authorities, which is something that
cannot be found in the primary and secondary sources. However, the interviews
also have some shortcomings. In a few of the interviews held in Brussels and
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Ankara, the participants answers give a sense that they are reflecting the official
discourse of their respective institutions, rather than representing an objective
assessment. Therefore, in consideration of problems of bias, poor recall, and the
subjectivity of interview data, these interviews have been corroborated with
primary and secondary sources.
Last but not least, the qualitative data derived from independent and
dependent variables needed to be transformed into simple scalable values.
Because of the qualitative nature of the evidence obtained from the sources
consulted, it is difficult to set non-arbitrary parameters in order to achieve this.
In order to counteract this the parameters were set as low and high, and
setting a medium value was avoided. The measurement of all variables used in
this study can be schematized as follows (see overleaf):
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Table 1- Variables and Measurement Parameters
Variables
Independent/Dependent
Measurement Parameters
Low High
Credibility of
Conditionality
x Uncertain Membership
Prospect
x Definite Membership
Prospect
Adoption Costs
x Reduction in Fatalities
x Ceasefire
x Increase in Fatalities
x Intense Conflict
Legitimacy of the EU
Requirements
x Ambiguity
x Inconsistency
x Ownership Problem
(The requirements of other
International Organisations are
taken extremely seriously)
x Clarity
x Consistency
x Overlapping Demands with
Other International
Organisations
Domestic Resonance
x Disapproval of EU Norms by
Domestic Political Actors
(Government-Army-Judiciary-
Public Opinion)
x Approval of EU Norms by
Domestic Political Actors
(Government-Army-Judiciary-
Public Opinion)
Adoption of EU Promoted
Norms
(Dependent Variable)
x Ignoring or Slightly Fulfilling
EU Promoted Norms
x Full Codification of EU
Promoted Norms or With Little
Exception.
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As for the limitations of this study, the first weakness is its inability to find
another candidate state to compare with Turkey in the field of counter-
terrorism. In other words, there is lack of a control group to eliminate alternative
explanations regarding the EU influence on the counter-terrorism policies of
candidate countries. Therefore, in order to dissipate the criticism of producing a
single country case study, the research is designed by being split into three cases
from three different time periods.
Secondly, the number of interviews conducted with EU officials was not
at a comparable level to the interviews conducted with members of the Turkish
political elite. Prior to the fieldwork visit to Brussels, more than thirty interview
request were sent to various EU institutions, but only five responded
affirmatively. A similar problem was also experienced with interview requests
made to the Turkish Army. As the details given in the theory chapter (chapter 3)
reveal, the Turkish Army has a vital role in counter-terrorism policy making, and
it also has a generally recognised but unofficial independence from the
government. As such, it is one of the most influential political actors on EU
integration. However, despite great effort on the part of the researcher, it was
not possible to convince senior army officials to participate. Even when informed
of the interview questions in advance, they declined to participate in interviews,
due to the sensitivity of the answers with regard to the issue of terrorism.
1.2. What is Meant by Terrorism?
In a study attempting to discuss the EU influence on Turkish counter-terrorism
policies, a definition of terrorism is needed. However, different parties (those
identified as terrorists groups, governments, and third parties who play a
mediating role to end violence) disagree about the meaning of this concept. If
the meaning of the term terrorism cannot be properly explicated, or the
concept is framed incorrectly, this may lead to a misconceptualization of the EU
impact on Turkey, which creates a risk for the main objectives of this research.
Therefore, in this part of the study, the concept of terrorism will be discussed to
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indicate why the PKK should be regarded as a terrorist organisation, and why the
EU impact on Turkish domestic policy adjustments should be evaluated in the
counter-terror domain.
The words terror and terrorism originate from the Latin Words terrere
and deterre that mean to tremble and to be frightened of respectively
(Wilkinson 2008: 72). With the suffix ism terror gains the meaning of a
systematic act. According to Wardlaw there is a distinction between the two
words and using terror in itself does not constitute terrorism. In fact, criminals
may employ terror for personal reasons, which is different from using it as a
weapon of psychological warfare for political ends (Wardlaw 1989: 9). However,
in day-to-day language, the differences between these two words has vanished.
The major problem regarding the concept of terrorism is its ambiguous
nature. According to Schmid and Jongman, there are more than one-hundred
definitions of terrorism in the literature (Schmid and Jongman 2005: 5-6). With
such a huge number of definitions available, reaching an exact definition of
terrorism that covers all cases is neither possible nor worthwhile (Hoffman 2006:
33-34). However, all that will matter for this research is whether the PKK can be
correctly categorized as being a terrorist group, and it will be argued that this is
the case.
Uncertainty over the definition of terrorism creates subjectivity, where
some classes of political violence are justified, whereas others are not (Wardlaw
1989: 4). For instance, if the harm caused to the victims of a violent act are
focussed upon, it is more likely to be classified as terrorism than if the motives of
the perpetrator is focussed upon, as in the latter case, it is possible to regard the
violent act with sympathy or in a positive light. In this respect labelling an
organisation as terrorist is often a subjective issue, depending on a persons
sympathies. (Hoffman 2006: 23).
Despite the fact that any definition will not eliminate ambiguities in the
concept of terrorism, this research will utilize Horgans definition. Horgan
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defines terrorism as; A conscious, deliberate strategic use of force or violence
against a specific type of target to affect the political climate(Horgan 2005: 22).
Whether the PKKs violent actions satisfy this definition will be determined by
looking at three characteristics of terrorism; violence, political motive, and the
specific type of target.
Violence is an important element of terrorism. According to a well-
known example, which indicates the impact of violence on public perception,
every year more people die in traffic accidents than terrorist attacks. However,
people are more scared of terrorist attacks than fatal traffic accidents.
Consequently, terrorism is often used as way to generate publicity and draw
attention by terrorist groups (Hoffman 2006: 5; Laqueur 1977: 49). From another
point of view, terrorists want to create more frightened people than dead
people (Jenkins 1975: 4-5). In consideration of the PKK case, violence towards
government servants, civilians, state buildings, and public vehicles has always
been one of the tactics used by the PKK to weaken state authority and exert
regional political influence (Marcus 2007: 117; Unal 2012b: 434). Moreover, it
has been used by the PKK to engage its militants and sympathizers in political
mobilization (Congar and Cagatay 2004; Tezcür 2010: 781-82; Unal 2012b: 446-
47).
The second characteristic of terrorism is its political motive, which
differentiates it from other sorts of crimes (Chalk 1996: 12; Horgan 2005: 1).
Even though there may be similarities between the violent acts of terrorists and
other kinds of criminals, such as kidnapping, shooting, or committing arson,
there is a clear motivational difference between them (Wilkinson 2008: 72). For
instance, whilst criminals employ violence for personal reasons, terrorists intend
to spread fear among the citizens who are possible targets of terrorist attacks.
Also, criminals use short-term violence to terrorize victims without any concern
for the message they propagate; on the other hand, terrorists intend to convey a
message to change the political behaviour of those terrorized (Kellen 1982: 9).
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From the point of view of the terrorists themselves, however, they are altruists
who believe they are working for a good cause, unlike the criminal, who acts for
personal enhancement and satisfaction (Hoffman 2006: 37). In view of these
factors, the PKKs main motivation is establishing an independent socialist
Kurdish state in the Southeast of Turkey (Unal 2012b: 434), which is an obvious
political motive that differentiates it from other criminal organisations.
Furthermore, the PKKs involvement in other criminal activities such as drug
trafficking, extortion, human and weapon smuggling, is predominantly
undertaken to finance its activities rather than for profit making purposes (Pek
and Ekici 2007: 142-43).
The third characteristic of terrorism is the selecting of a specific type of
target to influence the masses. In this respect, the selected person could be
either a symbolic person, such as an important politician or a member of a royal
family; or it could be an ordinary person, who has no value for the terrorists
(Hoffman 2006: 5; Wardlaw 1989: 17). The random placement of bombs and
indiscriminate shootings help to sustain a climate of uncertainty, and creates
fear among people who are possible targets. These unexpected attacks also lead
to fear amongst even those individuals who are not targeted, and coerces them
to fulfil the political demands of the perpetrators (Horgan 2005: 6; Wardlaw
1989: 16). In consideration of the PKKs target selection, they generally assault
security forces who are assigned to the Southeastern region of Turkey. However,
other non-armed state officials such as teachers, doctors, clerics who were
providing public services to Kurdish citizens, have also been assaulted.
Furthermore, villagers who allied themselves with the Turkish State, and many of
those who questioned the PKKs authority, have also been executed by the PKK
(Marcus 2007). PKK violence towards members of these groups was either to
eliminate or intimidate them.
In these three respects, the PKK must be regarded as employing terror
related tactics to achieve its political goals in Turkey. Some authors argue,
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however, that the PKK has the nature of an insurgency group in terms of popular
support, its political goals, and its struggle to gain authority in the Southeastern
region of Turkey (Unal 2012b; Çandar 2012). Both the EU and Turkey share the
view that the PKK is a terrorist group and not an insurgency, despite the grey
area between the two categories.
From the point of view of the Turkish political elite, and in Turkish public
opinion, the PKK has been considered as a separatist terrorist organization since
1984 when they launched their first attack. The legislative initiatives and
counter-measures to prevent PKK influence was conducted with the intention of
countering terrorism. Furthermore, the Turkish authorities demands to their
European counterparts on issues relating to the PKK (e.g. demands for the
extradition of PKK members from other EU states) are always framed in terms of
counter-terrorism. So, the PKK has not been viewed as an insurgency group
neither at the level of the state, nor at the public level, in Turkey.
From the EUs perspective, the PKKs terrorist activities were condemned
by the European Parliament resolutions from the late 1980s (European
Parliament 1988: 128). The members of the parliament have generally kept in
touch with Kurdish activists, however, they have refrained from contacting with
PKK members and from legitimizing the PKKs representation of the Kurdish
people (Casier 2011: 208-09). The EU member countries (e.g. Germany and
France) declared the PKK as an illegal organisation in 1994 (Criss 1995: 33).
Furthermore, after the 9/11 attack, the PKK was defined as a threat to EU
security, and the PKK was added to the EUs banned terrorist organisations list in
2002 (Council of the European Union 2002b). Since then, the EU has officially
seen the PKK as a terrorist organisation.
Both Turkey and the EU, then, have regarded PKK as a terrorist
organisation since the late 1980s. Even though some EU member countries have
not pursued an active strategy to prosecute PKK networks in their country, they
have never declared the PKK as a legitimate organization representing the Kurds.
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Therefore, in this research, the PKK will be considered as a terrorist organisation,
and Turkeys policies towards the PKK, and the EU requirements from Turkey to
change these policies, will be evaluated under the counter-terror context.
Furthermore, despite the fact that Turkey has a long history of terrorist
violence, not only due to the PKK, but also other terrorist organisations acting in
Turkey, the PKK is the most significant security threat to Turkish state, which also
has an economic and social burden dimension (Unal 2012a: 1). Also, the EU is
mostly concerned with the PKK rather than other terrorist organisations, in its
successive documents (e.g. European Parliament resolutions and progression
reports related to Turkey) (Tocci 2007: 55). Therefore, this study chooses to
focus on the PKK rather than other terrorist organisations operating in Turkey.
1.3. Turkeys Democratic State Dilemma: Security versus Liberty
How to adopt EU promoted liberal democratic norms, whilst struggling with PKK
terrorism, is one of the challenges that face Turkish political actors. On the one
hand, if there is an overreaction in the framing of counter-terrorism measures,
this may result in negative consequences for its integration into the EU. On the
other hand, if EU promoted norms are adopted, some of which overlap with the
PKK demands, concerns are raised about territorial integrity, galvanised by those
in nationalist circles, which creates an electoral cost for any ruling government.
In this respect, one needs to look at the dichotomy between security and liberty
in order to explain why there is link between the adoption of EU promoted
liberal democratic norms and Turkish counter-terrorism policies.
As Becker notes, states have a natural desire to control power in their
territory, and to ensure their own security. In the absence of any formal law-
making and enforcement mechanisms, states cannot rely on any other entity to
ensure their security. Therefore, it is vital for those who control power to
establish and maintain the security and integrity of the state (Becker 2006: 5).
However, in contrast with states, the major aim of terrorists is to undermine the
political will, confidence, and the morale of governments and their citizens
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(Wilkinson 1986: 81). Through conducting their attacks, terrorists sacrifice all
moral and humanitarian values to reach their goals and they try to prove that
the government is weak in accomplishing its fundamental duty (Chalk 1995: 16,
1996: 95; Wilkinson 1989: 10). In view of this equation, the PKK has similar aims
to weaken state authority in the Southeast of Turkey by relying on terror tactics,
whilst Turkish political actors endeavour to maintain the security and integrity of
state by confronting the PKK.
In the counter-terror struggle, democratic states are more vulnerable
than authoritarian regimes (Eubank and Weinberg 1994). Whilst authoritarian
regimes do not hesitate to employ harsh measures to prevent terrorism,
democratic states are limited in the level of coercive power they can use. The
environment of freedom in democratic states makes it easier for terrorists to
publish their propaganda, recruit new people, and launch their attacks
(Wilkinson 1986: 211). So, in countries where democratic standards are poor and
terrorism a vital problem, given the likelihood of increasing vulnerability to
terrorism, there may be domestic resistance to the country making a democratic
transformation. This is especially so since those under most threat of a more
persistent and serious level of terrorism might, as a consequence, be against to
promotion of personal freedoms (Schmid and Crelinsten 1993: 333). This
situation compels policy makers to engage in an effort to show their electorate
that they are taking action towards the terrorist threat and to implement
repressive counter-terror measures (Goldstone 2005: 166; Wilkinson 1986: 81).
In addition, it may lead them to ignore calls of international organisations for
policy change.
There is also the potential political risk of overemphasizing the
importance of rights, which ties the hands of the security forces (Ignatieff 2005:
6). In on-going terrorist attacks, the state, by giving the impression that it is
making concessions to terrorist organisation, due to external pressure from
international organisations, may cause citizens to lose confidence in their
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government. They might perceive government decision as incompetent in
dealing with terrorism, and a betrayal to the country for the sake of fulfilling an
international organisations requirements. This might also lead them to vote for
another political party, which is another danger for the domestic political actors,
that undermines their authority and credibility.
In this context, Turkeys progress on democratisation with the EU
influence provides a suitable environment for the PKK to make its own
propaganda. However, the increasing influence of the PKK also raises security
related concerns, among the political elite and the public, that EU promoted
liberal democratic norms are putting in place favourable conditions for the PKK
to extend their influence. Therefore, the transformation of Turkish democracy in
line with EU demands creates a security versus liberty dilemma in the country, in
the shadow of PKK violence.
Within the security and liberty context, ethnicity adds another dimension
to this dilemma. Ethnic identity is an influential aspect of human behaviour, and
terrorists can find many supporters amongst people who share the same ethnic
origin. Terrorists can claim that they are representing a specific ethnic group,
and the methods of the terrorists became less repugnant for the majority of
these people (Byman 1998; Wilkinson 2006: 11). If those subjected to human
rights violations have the same ethnic-cultural origin as the terrorists, this makes
for a further facilitating factor in recruiting new members into the terrorist
ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ĂŶĚ ŝƐ ĐŽŶĚƵĐŝǀĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨŵĂƐƐ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ  ?ĂĐŦŬ ĂŶĚ
Coskun 2011: 248). Furthermore, the exclusion of one ethnic group from state
power, and their underrepresentation in the parliament, can increase ethnic
based terrorism (Cederman et al. 2010: 114). Economic inequality between
majority and ethnic populations, restrictions placed upon them, and
discriminatory policies against them, also stirs up ethnic based terrorism (Fearon
and Laitin 2003: 88).
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Considering the above, it can be seen that the PKK dilemma also has an
ethnic dimension. As will be described in the next section (section 1.4.),
restrictions on ethnic minority rights, and prohibitions on the democratic
involvement of Kurds, has resulted in the emergence of the PKK. The Turkish
political elites saw PKK terrorism as a pure security issue, and the ethnic
dynamics that caused the emergence of the PKK were ignored. To resolve this
problem, a coercive counter-terrorism approach was preferred. Punitive
counter-terrorism measures were employed, such as torture, extra judicial
killings, and denial of Kurdish ethnic minority rights. Relying on these policies,
the PKK based its campaign on the denial of Kurdish identity, and found
considerable support from Kurdish citizens (Unal 2012b: 434). As a result of
placing too much weight on security, Turkey-EU relations deteriorated, and the
adoption of EU promoted liberal democratic norms became a precondition for
Turkey, both for finding a peaceful solution to PKK terrorism, and to become a
member of the EU.
1.4. The Intersection of the Kurdish Question and European
Integration
The idea of adopting European norms goes back to the early years of the Turkish
Republic. From 1923 to 1938, a number of reforms were adopted from European
countries to modernize and regenerate Turkey as a European country (Baç 2000:
160). The first Turkish penal code (adopted from Italy), and a new civil code
(modelled on Switzerlands), are a few examples of the reforms of these early
years. However, during the years leading up to the Second World War, human
rights in the sense we understand them today, were not conceptualized (Henkin
1996). As such, the reforms adopted from European countries at that time were
adopted with the sole purpose of building a new state and a new society, based
on European norms replacing the Ottoman Empires Legacy.
The origin of the Kurdish Question, which incorporates PKK terrorism,
also has its roots back in early years of the Turkish Republic. Between the years
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1925 and 1938, Turkey witnessed three armed Kurdish rebellions in the Eastern
part of Turkey (Çandar 2012: 25). These rebellions were supressed by deploying
the army and setting up new tribunals to judge and execute rebels. To prevent
further revolts, a Turkification policy was also implement that forbade the use
of the Kurdish language in public places (Barkey and Fuller 1997: 61).
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the tension between the
Soviet Union and Western countries functioned in favour of Turkey. It was
accepted into a number of international organizations, such as the Organization
for Economic Cooperation (OECD) in 1948, the CoE in 1949 and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952. Organizations like the CoE, and its
substantial subsidiary institutions, were influential in shaping Turkeys counter-
terrorism policy in the following years (see chapter 5). In addition, in order to be
part of the Western club, restrictions on opposition parties were lifted, and the
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) was ratified (Barkey and Fuller
1997: 64). Although Turkey became part of these organizations, and relaxed
some restrictions in the political domain, this did not mean that the Turkish
authorities adopted the values of these institutions perfectly (Alexander et al.
2008: xv). The level of civilian control in the army placed Turkey far behind the
standards of Western European countries (Hale 1994). Riots against the Greek
Minority on 6-7 September 1955 demonstrated that the government was
incompetent in protecting ethnic minorities (Ahmad 1977: 53-54). Student
demonstrations opposing government policies on April 1960 were responded to
by declaring martial law (Ahmad 1993: 114). Despite these controversies, the
Western powers disregarded Turkeys immature democratic practices, due to
tension between the NATO and Warsaw Pact Countries. They preferred
sustaining the political stability of Turkey for the sake of the power equilibrium in
the region, rather than consolidating its democracy (Faucompret and Konings
2008: 30; Unver 2013: 207).
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Military interventions in 1960, 1971, and 1980, created a new level of
autonomy for the Turkish army, both in politics and matters of security. The
establishment of the National Security Council (NSC) institutionalised military
interventions, and gave the opportunity to the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) to
influence the civilian government through this institution (Patton 2006: 46).
Since the foundation of the Turkish Republic, the TAF authorised itself as the
guardian of the Republic. The founder of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal
Atatürk, was a soldier and the TAF took charge of his mission to protect the
Republic from internal and external enemies. Fighting against threats towards
the territorial integrity of Turkey, such as separatist terrorism, has always been
considered by the TAF to be one of their duties (Karaosmanoglu and Kibaroglu
2002: 148).
Turkeys first attempt to become part of the European Economic
Community (EEC) came in 1962 with the Ankara Association Agreement. The
treaty aimed to develop the Turkish economy and the living conditions of Turkish
citizens. Establishing a custom union, aligning the economic policies of Turkey
with the EEC, and finally full membership, were the goals of the agreement
(Ministry for EU Affairs 2014). At this time, the promotion of liberal democratic
norms was not one of the priorities of the European Community (EC) (see
chapter 4). Therefore, the consolidation of Turkeys democracy, and improving
its poor human rights record, did not form any part of the content of the
agreement. With the signing of the Ankara agreement, Turkeys long-term
relation with the EU had started.
During the 1950s, newly emerging Kurdish ethnic awareness found
expression in right and left wing parties without engaging in violence (Bozarslan
1992: 75; McDowall 2004: 407-08). However, during the 1960s the New Leftist
stream became more attractive to the Kurdish movement, and they looked for
an alternative way to engage in politics. Clandestine initiatives, such as the
Democratic Party of Turkish Kurdistan (KDPT), and the Socialist Party of Kurdistan
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(KSP), formed between the 1960s and the 1970s (Bozarslan 1992: 76-77;
McDowall 2004: 408-10). Besides this, the Turkish Workers Party (TWP) enticed
Kurdish votes with the promise of finding a solution to inter-ethnic politics.
Although the TWP has sought an implicit revolutionary solution to the Kurdish
Issue, Kurds who worked for this party understood that the Turkish left was
unwilling to support their cause (Barkey 2007: 347). As a result, cultural and
student clubs were formed to look for a solution to the Kurdish issue. The
Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Hearts (DDKO) was one of those clubs, which
brought up many young leaders such as Musa Anter and Abdullah Ocalan, who
were later to become important figures of the Kurdish movement. After the
military intervention in 1971, these clubs were abolished, and many of their
leading figures were arrested (Heper 2007: 156; Marcus 2007: 23).
The political turmoil before and after the 1980 military coup also added a
new dimension to Turkeys existing Kurdish question. Whilst the harsh measures
of the military coup (prohibiting the use of Kurdish, renaming Kurdish children,
changing names of Kurdish towns, and torturing Kurdish activists) destroyed the
Kurdish political movement, it also left fertile ground for the radicalization of
many Kurdish activist (Bozarslan 1992: 81-82; McDowall 2004: 426-27). It paved
the way for them to employ terrorist actions towards the state, and civilians
allied with the state. It was in these conditions that Abdullah Ocalan and his
friends founded the PKK in 1978. After the 1980 military coup, it consolidated its
power and broadened its activities in the Southeast of Turkey (Marcus 2007: 52-
75; McDowall 2004: 421-22).
The severe environment of the 1980 coup also offered a political
opportunity for the Kurds to emigrate to the European countries to seek asylum.
An increasing number of Kurds in Europe developed into a Kurdish diaspora,
which set up a network, including cultural organizations and mass media. The
Kurdish diaspora developed its relations with the leftist and Kurdish politicians,
who held seats in the national parliament and the European Parliament (EP)
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(Casier 2010a: 399). In an example given by Casier, the Kurdish Institute in
Brussels had good relations with Flemish politicians sensitive about language
rights. The Belgium Kurdish Institute regularly informed these politicians about
the political situation in Turkey (Casier 2010b: 17-18). With the help of these
politicians, Turkeys undemocratic actions towards the Kurds came under the
purview of the EPs political agenda.
In addition to the political dimension, in later years, this diaspora
network was also used by the PKK to collect financial contributions from the
European Kurds, and for transnational criminal activities, such as drug trafficking
(Turkish National Police Anti-Smuggling and Organized Crime Department 2011:
40). In the third congress of the PKK in 1986, it was decided that money would
be extorted from wealthy Kurds in order to meet the financial requirements of
the organization (Ocalan 1999: 240-47). This decision made the European Kurds,
who are comparatively richer than the Turkish Kurds, a new financial resource
for the PKK. Moreover, the PKK had discovered that drug trafficking to Europe
was highly profitable and also used this to fulfil its organizations financial
demands (Pek and Ekici 2007: 142). The PKKs existing networks, in both Turkey
and Europe, made it simple for the PKK to transfer drugs to Europe. The PKK
engaged in drug trafficking using its European networks, which also endangered
public safety in European countries.
To sum up, in the period before 1984, Turkeys interactions with the EU,
and the Kurdish question, continued down their own course. On the one hand,
Turkey was trying to be part of the European Community by adopting European
norms and becoming affiliated with international organizations. On the other
hand, employing a hard-line approach against the Kurdish activists lead to the
emergence of the PKK in Turkey and a Kurdish diaspora in Europe, which placed
Turkeys domestic problems on the EU agenda. Prior to 1984, the European
Community was also in its early stages of developing its institutions and
legislative instruments. The benefit of Turkeys stability in opposing the Soviet
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threat was much more important to European countries than democracy and
human rights in the country. Furthermore, political criteria for enlargement, and
common regulations for member and candidate states, began to appear from
the beginning of 1990s (see chapter 4). Therefore, in the period before 1984, the
European Community had little or no influence on Turkeys counter-terrorism
policies.
Although it is important to understand this period in order to understand
the conditions under which the PKK formed, and how Turkey engaged with the
idea of being a member of the European Community, there is no clear causal link
between the EUs activities and a shift in Turkish counter-terrorism policy. In
light of this minimal correlation, this study will not analyse the period before
1984, and will focus on later periods in which intensifying relations between
Turkey and the EU caused a considerable change in Turkeys counter-terrorism
policies.
1.5. The Structure of the Thesis
This thesis consists of eight chapters, in which the EU impact on Turkish counter-
terrorism policy is conceptualised and empirically investigated. This first chapter
has introduced the main scope of the thesis by crystallizing the research
question, the research hypotheses, and the main arguments based on these
hypotheses. Furthermore, the aspects under which the EUs norm diffusion role
on Turkish counter-terrorism policy will be analysed, have been identified. Under
the methodology framework, the research design, the issue of case selection,
the way in which the cases will be generalized, the method of data analysis, the
data collection methods, and the parameters used to measure the data, have all
been outlined. In addition, a definition of terrorism has been given, and the PKK
has been shown to satisfy this definition. In the final section, a brief history of
Turkeys European integration, and the conditions that paved the way for the
emergence of the PKK, has been explained to inform the reader of the historical
background of the research.
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The second chapter is a literature review, which provides a critical
overview of the existing literature on the EUs norm diffusion role. In this
chapter, six strands of the literature are analysed: the EUs norm diffusion role in
international power concepts; the EUs motives to promote its norms; the
concept of Europeanization; the EUs norm diffusion mechanisms; the EUs norm
diffusion role in its neighbourhood, and the EUs norm diffusion role in Turkey.
Doing the above positions this thesis within the literature on the EUs norm
diffusion role, and on Turkey-EU relations.
The third chapter presents the theoretical framework for the EU impact
on Turkish counter-terrorism policies. The two norm diffusion mechanisms used
by the EU (i.e. conditionality and socialization), and the explanatory
theoretical models used to conceptualize these mechanisms, are explained in
detail. The mediating factors that determine the efficiency of these theoretical
models and their hypotheses are clarified. Moreover, the tools used by the EU in
evaluating norm diffusion, and the influence of political actors (internal/external)
on the efficiency of these patterns, are discussed before moving on to the
empirical investigation.
In the fourth chapter, the EUs shifting norm diffusion role towards third
countries is analysed in order to understand whether the EUs profile on norm
diffusion is consistent with the requirements it has placed on Turkey. This
chapter investigates the EUs changing approach within three distinct time
periods; the period prior to the European Council at Tampere in 1999, the post-
Tampere period, and the period after the Madrid and London terrorist attacks in
2004-2005, in which EU policy actors developed new initiatives to transform
counter-terrorism policy in third countries. The findings of this chapter are
utilized in the empirical chapters to reflect how changing internal dynamics in
the EU has also been influential on Turkeys counter-terrorism policies.
Chapters five through seven present the empirical cases of the research.
In each empirical chapter, analysis starts by describing the counter-terror
49
measures used by Turkey towards the PKK. This is followed by a description of
the EUs political responses and contributions to Turkeys counter-terrorism
policies. The transformation of Turkish counter-terrorism policies is evidenced by
giving examples of its ratification of international conventions, domestic
legislative changes, and institution building initiatives. In the light of this
empirical investigation, the EU impact on Turkeys counter-terrorism policy is
discussed relying on the pre-determined mediating factors.
In the last chapter the empirical findings are summarised, compared, and
conclusions are drawn. It also links generalized empirical findings with further
potential cases. In addition, some innovative remarks about the EUs norm
diffusion role on the counter-terrorism policies of third countries are presented.
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2. Literature Review
2.1. Introduction
The devastating impact of the Second World War in Europe left both the winners
and losers of the war seeking alternative ways to prevent the reoccurrence of
such a war in Europe. As a result, since 1945, Europeans have developed a series
of declarations, treaties, policies, criteria, and conditions to end conflicts and to
sustain stability in Europe. According to Manners, five core liberal democratic
norms: peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law and human rights, have
been placed at the centre of these regulations (Manners 2002: 242). These
norms have become the founding principles of the EU, and fundamental to its
collective identity. Throughout this time, these liberal democratic norms have
gained a determinative role in the EUs internal (Merlingen et al. 2001) and
external relations (K. Smith 2001).
After the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union reduced
military risks considerably for the EC/EU. However, this change did not reduce
the security risk for the Western European Countries. The dissolution of the
Soviet Union left many unstable post-communist countries around the EC/EU,
who were poor in public administration and weak in democracy, human rights,
and the rule of law. Furthermore, Mediterranean countries neighbouring the
EC/EU were not much different from the post-communist countries in terms of
their state capacities and maintaining liberal democratic values in state
institutions. Along with these countries, the allied countries in the Cold War
period, such as Turkey, were left with democratic hardships and there was a risk
of their internal security problems being diffused outside of their borders.
In this regard, this new European order brought new paradigm changes in
the EU. Previous military threats were replaced by soft security issues such as
terrorism, organized crime, border conflicts, refugees, and illegal immigration. In
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order to combat these threats, the EU used a more active foreign policy towards
the countries in its vicinity. The transposition of democracy, human rights, and
the rule of law, were thought to be the proper way of preventing the effects of
the internal problems in countries such as Turkey from spilling over into to the
EU. The EUs new foreign policy objectives also produced broad strand of
literatures which encompasses the EUs efforts to stabilize peripheral countrys
internal soft security problems.
This literature review intends to emphasize the contribution of this
research to the existing literature by looking at seven distinct strands in the
existing literature, considered in six sections 2.2-2.8. In section 2.2, the main
contributions regarding the EUs external dimension of counter-terrorism will be
discussed. This section will reveal the shortcomings of current studies regarding
the EUs promotion of liberal democratic norms in order to transform third
countries counter-terrorism policy. In section 2.3, the literature that examines
the EUs norm diffusion role within international power conceptions will be
reviewed. The literature in this section reveals why the EU has a special
character in comparison to nation states. It also shows how the EUs sui generis
norm diffusion role is relevant to the transformation of Turkeys counter-
terrorism policies. In section 2.4, the literature that covers the motivations the
EU has in promoting liberal democratic norms to third countries will be outlined.
In light of these studies, the EUs aim to transpose its norms to third countries,
and its connection with the transformation of Turkish counter-terrorism policies,
will be explained. Section 2.5 will examine those studies concerned with
Europeanization and EU-ization concepts, which are concepts often used in
order to understand the diffusion of EU norms inside and beyond its borders. It
will be shown that these concepts are inadequate for explaining the EU impact
on Turkeys counter-terrorism policies. Section 2.6 will outline the literature that
reveals the operation of the EUs diffusion mechanisms towards third countries.
It will highlight the diffusion mechanisms that best explain the EU impact on the
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transformation of Turkeys counter-terrorism polices. In section 2.7, an overview
of the literature that explains what sort of diffusion mechanisms are used by the
EU in its vicinity, and why the Turkish case is different from the other
neighbouring countries, is given. In section 2.8 the literature concerned with the
norm diffusion patterns of the EU in Turkey will be discussed. By looking at these
studies, this research will be distinguished from existing studies that examine the
EU impact on Turkey. In the concluding section, 2.9, an overview will be given of
how this study contributes to these six different strands of the norm diffusion
literature. In order to justify the contribution of this research, this literature
review chapter will consult secondary sources such as books, theses, journal
articles, and think thank reports.
2.2. External Dimension of EUs Counter-terrorism Policy
Since the 9/11 attacks, the rising trend of terrorism in EUs political agenda has
attracted attention of many scholars. This constituted a new stand of literature
dealing with the EU and its counter-terror capabilities. Before the birth of this
literature, EU counter-terror issues were mostly discussed in the context of
limitations for police cooperation among member countries (Den Boer and
Walker 1993; Den Boer 2000; Peek 1994; Reinares 2000) and its accountability
problem within liberal democratic parameters (Chalk 1994, 1996, 2000).
However, due to the absence of a foreign policy objective in those years that
aims to transform other countries counter-terrorism policies, the external
dimension of EUs counter-terrorism policy did not appear in these studies.
After the 9/11 attacks, however, in line with the political developments in
the EU, the literature concerned with EUs counter-terrorism policy has
multiplied. On the one hand, a group of studies focused on member states
counter-terror responses towards the domestic and international terrorism (Van
Leeuwen 2003; Von Hippel 2005). On the other hand, the majority of remaining
studies sought the answer of whether the EU could be considered a counter-
terror actor in global war on terror.
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Within this context, some scholars identified the EU as a paper tiger,
which is an inefficient counter-terror actor (Bures 2011) and as lacking foreign
policy objectives for countering terrorism (Keohane 2008). Another group of
studies saw the EU as a coordinator for member countries, facilitating their
counter-terror cooperation (Argomaniz 2009b; Edwards and Meyer 2008;
Zimmermann 2006) but, still, it needs further improvement to be regarded as an
actor (Brattberg and Rhinard 2012). For another group of scholars, the EU is
considered a fully-fledged counter-terror terror actor with its supranational
institutions and interaction with other states and international organisations
(European Commission, Europol, Counter-terror Coordinator) (Den Boer and
Monar 2002; Kaunert 2007, 2010c, 2010b; Kaunert and Giovanna 2010; Kaunert
2010a; Kaunert and Zwolski 2013; Alexander Mackenzie 2010; Alex Mackenzie et
al. 2013b). However, if an indepth analysis is made on these studies, it reveals
that their argument is predominantly based on the EUs security actorness on
counter-terror issues with other international actors. The EUs normative role,
involving the promotion of human rights, ethnic minority rights, and rule of law
in the context of countering terrorism, appeared as a minor topic in these
studies for the efficiency of counter-terror cooperation.
Although less attention was attached to normative issues in these
studies, the EUs impact on the promotion of liberal democratic norms in
counter-terrorism was discussed within different frameworks. According to one
group of scholars, the EU has an ability to alter counter-terrorism measures in
normative means. For instance, Eling argued that the EUs concern with human
rights was influential in shaping UN sanction regimes against the terrorist groups
and individuals financially supporting terrorist groups (Eling 2007: 119-20). From
a similar point of view, the EUs normative influence was emphasised receiving
guarantees from the US about the protection of human rights, such as data
protection of its citizens, non-execution of death penalty, whilst signing counter-
terror cooperation agreements for Europol, judicial cooperation, Passenger
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Name Records (Kaunert 2010c; Kaunert and Zwolski 2013: 97-108; Occhipinti
2010: 97-104; Rees 2006: 90-100).
Contrary to the above-mentioned contributions, there is also another
group of scholars who criticized the EU for being torn between its security
interests and normative values. For instance, the application of UN based
sanction regimes by the EU for the sake of multilateralism (which is related to
the blacklisting of terrorist groups and individuals) had negative consequences
on the protection of human rights of some individuals and the EU was subjected
to unfavourable European Court of Justice Rulings (Bures 2010; Guild 2008;
Leonard and Kaunert 2012; Vlcek 2008). Furthermore, some of the EU
institutions dealing with terrorism are considered unaccountable and some
counter-terror measures are inadequate to protecting the human rights of EU
citizens (Den Boer et al. 2008; Gregory 2005). In view of these studies, human
rights protection is mostly evaluated for the internal dimension of the EU rather
than its influence on other international actors policies. Also, as indicated by
these studies, the EUs impact on other international organisations and states
was rarely perceived as a major or holistic change.
In the context of the promotion of liberal democratic norms in the
counter-terror domain, limited EU influence was also revealed through its
interaction with its two interlocutors, the US and the European Neighbourhood
Policy Countries. As Rees indicated, the EU has been in an intense counter-
terrorism cooperation with the US since the 9/11 attacks (Rees 2006: 79-104).
However, within this close interaction, the US possesses a dominant role in
which imposing its security based policies and in other words the EU become a
norm-taker rather than a norm promoter (Argomaniz 2009a; Kaunert et al.
2012; Alex Mackenzie 2012; Pawlak 2009b). Therefore, in these studies the EUs
strong transformative role to alter third countries counter-terrorism policies by
normative means did not emerge because of an absence of EU superiority over
the US.
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In consideration of ENP countries, in the literature the EU was criticized
for employing many security-oriented policies in regard to the ENP countries. For
instance, Baracani stresses that the EUs interest in the ENP countries mainly
focuses on the stabilization of these countries, rather than on promoting liberal
democratic norms within them (Baracani 2009). Furthermore, some authors
have emphasized that the promotion of democracy in Maghreb countries is
perceived by the EU as having a destabilising effect in those countries, and is
thereby endangering the counter-terrorism efforts of the EU. Therefore, the EUs
normative objectives, such as achieving economic and political development in
the ENP countries, has been replaced by short-term interests such as co-
operation in combating terrorism after the devastating terrorist attacks in the US
and the EU (Dannreuther 2006; Eder 2011; Joffe 2008).
Apart from the EUs lack of normative interest in ENPs, the literature
criticizes the EU for focusing its policies too much on immigration issues, rather
than on the root causes of terrorism. According to Pace, the EUs counter-
terrorism initiatives did not materialize in the Mediterranean countries. In her
analysis she argues that the EU is much more interested in the reduction of
immigrants from southern neighbours than in cooperating in the counter-
terrorism field (Pace 2010). Similarly, as Dover has stressed, tightening
immigration policy has, not only endangered the lives of illegal immigrants, but
has also contributed to the radicalisation of them (Dover 2008).
However, there is also another group of scholars who argued that the
EUs security-based objectives on the ENP countries was significantly below
expectations and after the Arab Spring, when the region became unstabilized,
the priority of security issues for EU countries was notably lost (Kaunert and
Leonard 2011; Alex Mackenzie et al. 2013a).
As illustrated by examples given by these authors, the promotion of
liberal democratic norms in the US and the ENP countries was not significant in
the counter-terror domain. Therefore, these studies do not reveal the EUs
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power to transform other countries counter-terrorism policies by normative
means. In this respect, this research is differentiated from studies examining the
external dimension of EU counter-terrorism policy, which are mostly focused on
the dimension of cooperation, rather than the normative transformation of
other countries counter-terrorism policies.
2.3. The EUs Normative Role on Counter-terrorism
The exertion of influence by one international actor on others is based on
different factors. There is a correlation between the social and political
institutions of an international actor and its foreign policy. The democratic
quality of a regime mirrors its foreign policy approach towards other countries
(Holsti 1964: 180). This link is not only related to internal factors, however, but
also to the resources of the international actor, which derive from its history and
geography. Its capability to operationalize these resources determines its power
and influence (Hill 2003: 134-38). The EU is regarded as a sui generis structure in
its ability to influence other countries (Checkel 2005: 801-02; Manners and
Whitman 1998: 232; Rosamond 2005: 463). It is neither a state nor an
association of states, but lies somewhere in between (Laruelle and Widgrén
1998: 321). Assumptions that are valid for nation states might not be valid when
explaining the EU impact on other countries. Therefore, special attention needs
to be paid when conceptualizing the EUs power in order to understand its
influence on third countries.
The unique foreign policy role of the EU has been subject to serious
discussion from the 1970s in the context of what type of power the EU is. The
early debate on the EUs special role in promoting liberal democratic norms
starts with Duchenes Civilian Power description. Duchene defines the
European Community as long on economic power and relatively short on armed
forces. His proposal is that the European Community can be influential in the
international environment by exerting a civilian form of power, which can be
established by wielding political cooperation and by sticking to social values of
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equality, justice and tolerance (Duchene 1973: 19-20). Duchenes civilian power
definition is conceptualized as having three key features by Twitchett and Maull.
As derived from both authors definitions, civilian power relies more on
economic power to achieve its goals, is committed to diplomatic cooperation to
solve international problems, and prioritizes legally-binding supranational
institutions for achieving international progress (Maull 1990: 92-93; Twitchett
1976: 1-2). At the time these studies were made, however, the EU was in
transition from an economic community to a political union. The norm diffusion
instruments had not yet been implemented in third countries. Furthermore,
there was incoherence among member countries and EU institutions (the
European Commission, the European Parliament, and Member States) in
promoting liberal democratic norms to third countries, due to the conflicting
strategic and economic interests of member states (see chapter 4). The focus of
early studies was thus on how the EU can influence international systems in
comparison to its rivals, rather than the extent to which the EU influences the
diffusion of liberal democratic norms in transforming the polity, politics, and
policy of third countries. Unlike these studies, this research will look at the EUs
level of influence in transforming the domestic policies of third countries (and
specifically, Turkey).
The Treaty of European Union (TEU) came into force in 1993, adding the
promotion of liberal democratic values into the EUs foreign policy objectives.
This changed the direction of the civilian power debate. At that time the
discussion was centred around whether the EU is a civilian power or not, and
Manners suggested another term, Normative Power, to identify the EU.
According to Manners, normative power is based on the power of opinion rather
than physical force, and diffuses its norms ideologically to others in order to
shape the conception of what is normal in international relations (Manners
2002: 239-40). He argues that civilian power is more appropriate in the case of
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nation states than the case of the EU, in terms of direct physical power and
national interest (Manners 2002: 238).
As Manners emphasizes, the EUs normative difference comes from its
historical context, hybrid polity, and political legal constitution. As for the
historical context, Europe was the battle area of the First and Second World
Wars. Thus, Europeans were committed to sustaining peace and liberty for the
sake of their continent. The EU also possesses a hybrid polity, which has
supranational and international forms of governance in its structure that
distinguishes it from nation states. Furthermore, the EUs political legal
constitution is formed by multilevel interactions (e.g. elite driven, treaty based
and legal order interactions), which is completely different from the constitution
of nation states (Manners 2002: 240-42). As an example of the its normative
commitments, Manners cites the EUs efforts to abolish the death penalty in
many countries, with Turkey being an instance of such a country (Manners 2002:
250). However, Manners normative power discussion does not go beyond what
the EU is in the international system, rather than what it does in its external
relations (Schimmelfennig 2009: 5). It has a limited interest in studying the
domestic impact of the EU on third countries. In that sense, this research will
contribute to the normative power discussion by looking at how the EUs
normative concerns and commitments have been influential on the
transformation of counter-terrorism policies in third countries.
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the later attacks in Madrid and
London, the EUs internal and external initiatives to combat terrorism launched
another discussion of whether the EU had sacrificed its normative power in
order to be a security actor. For some authors, the increasing focus on security
issues, such as fighting against terrorism, and implicitly abandoning normative
pressure for democratization and human rights, was considered to overshadow
the EUs foreign policy objectives (Joffe 2008: 166; Van Reisen et al. 2004: 36).
Furthermore, the EU has been criticized for moving from its legalistic approach
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to a more security based approach, investing more on insecurity technologies
for security governance (Oz 2010: 462). Aside from undermining its normative
power, the EUs focus on increasing its security capabilities has been criticized
for not leading to an increase in its normative power (Manners 2006: 194).
However, these studies focus on the EUs shifting, or evolving, normative
approach (which seems to be focused more on security than normative values),
rather than its consequences on the counter-terrorism policies of those third
countries which are subject to EUs normative pressure. They have not discussed
whether those target countries dealing with terrorist organisations have
followed the EUs changing policy prescriptions. However, this research does just
this, and puts aside the issue of why the EU requirements gradually relied more
heavily on a security based approach.
As for Turkey, the EUs normative power role is important for the
transformation of its counter-terrorism policies. The EU has used its normative
power to shape Turkeys counter-terrorism policies by using tangible incentives,
or by convincing Turkish political actors of the appropriateness of EU norms. Any
deterioration in the EUs normative power can have negative effects on
candidate countries such as Turkey, where the EU policies are closely observed
for rule adoption in the counter-terror domain. In this regard, this research will
contribute to the normative power literature by analysing how and why the EUs
normative power role was influential on the transformation of Turkeys counter-
terrorism policy.
2.4. The Motives of the EU to Diffuse Liberal Democratic Norms
Transposing the EUs liberal democratic norms in the counter-terrorism domain
is a difficult task for non-member countries like Turkey, where terrorism is a
perceived existential threat to the country. Without convenient domestic
mediating factors, the EU efforts in Turkey will be inadequate to transform its
counter-terrorism policies. However, in the literature, studies are concerned
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with the Union, and its motives in promoting liberal democratic norms to third
countries, rather than on the outcomes of EU impacts on third countries.
According to the domestic analogy thesis, international actors in
countries with good normative practices prefer to be surrounded by a
neighbourhood where similar principles and procedures to their own exist. The
existence of a similar normative environment beyond the borders of such
countries reduces risks for international actors within them, and makes it easy
for them to use this environment for their own benefit (D. Peters and Wagner
2005 Cited from ; Schimmelfennig 2012: 10). Based on this analogy, the EU has
promoted its liberal democratic norms in order to establish similar normative
standards in Turkey, and thus to reduce political instabilities within Turkey for its
own benefit. However, the adoption of EU required liberal democratic norms is
difficult for Turkish political actors whilst terrorism is seen as an existential
threat. They may be reluctant to transpose the EU norms and so may continue to
use security-based strategies. In this respect, the aspiration of the EU is not the
only important factor. The domestic political environment should also be
suitable for the adoption of EU required norms in third countries. Therefore,
domestic mediating factors in Turkey need to be taken into account, which can
be conducive to, or hinder, the adoption of EU promoted human rights norms.
From Lavenex and Reess inside-out view, rule-extension towards other
countries is being used as an external projection of internal solutions, which
means internal policies are used in other countries to increase the efficiency of
their policies and to solve their domestic problems (Lavenex 2004: 681-95; Rees
2008). Furthermore, exporting EU values into the international legal order may
make the EU and its members more successful in the eyes of other international
actors, if these values are found principled, consistent and beneficial (Khaliq
2008: 455). However, in some policy areas (e.g. in counter-terrorism policy), the
EU might not have policy prescriptions to offer third countries, and its remedies
can evolve over time. So, the EU requirements may have a problem of legitimacy
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when put forward in order to alter the domestic policies of third countries such
as Turkey. Therefore, in order to understand the impact of the EU on Turkey, it is
necessary to understand the perception of domestic political actors about the
appropriateness of EU norms.
Within the norm diffusion literature, the motives of the EU have also
been analysed under altruistic reasons. According to Bicchi, the EUs norm
promotion is regarded as unspontaneous behaviour, and is based on the
engrained belief that the EUs grim history should be a lesson for other countries
(Bicchi 2006: 287). In other words, the EU promotes democracy for the good or
well-being of others based on its negative experiences (Aggestam 2008: 8; K.
Smith 2003b: 130-31). However, terrorism was never a serious problem for the
European Union, at least until the Madrid and London Bombings in 2004/2005.
As an international institution the EU did not have a serious security versus
liberty dilemma in its policies when compared with countries like Turkey, where
countering terrorism has been priority since the early 1980s. Therefore, the
absence of experience in the counter-terrorism domain, and the absence of a
common threat in the EU, undermines these authors explanations.
From another wave of analysis, the normative concerns of the EU are
given as the reason for norm diffusion in third countries. For Stahn, the
international community (third states, multilateral institutions, and non-state
actors) has a responsibility to protect human security (Stahn 2007). As a
respected member of the international community, the EU has a responsibility to
disseminate its liberal democratic principles to prevent violations against human
security. Similarly, the EUs normative concerns in third countries are a major
reason for the promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law
(Manners 2002: 240-41). It is the validity of universal beliefs and ideas that
motivates EU authorities, on this view, rather than the pursuit of material
benefits (Schimmelfennig 2009: 9). Even though these are strong arguments in
explaining the EUs normative motivations, they underestimate the rationality of
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the EU and its members when dealing with other states. Human rights violations
due to counter terrorist measures in the peripheral countries of the EU cause a
flow of immigrants to EU countries, which brings criminality, integration, and
diaspora problems to member countries. Therefore, the EU promotes liberal
democratic norms to these countries in order to transform their counter-
terrorism policies, and so prevent the internalization of these countries
domestic problems. This research is differentiated from these studies by looking
at the EUs rational motives rather than its altruistic intentions.
As a rational foreign policy actor, the EU also has self-interested reasons
to promote its norms to third countries. According to democratic peace theory,
democratic countries do not wage war against each other (Rasler and Thompson
2005; Rousseau 2005; Russett and Antholis 1993). Considering this fact, the EU
aims to promote liberal democratic principles to third countries in order to
prevent the spread of negative effects of war reaching the EU (Knodt et al. 2011:
996). However, in terms of the level of violence and destruction caused, war and
terrorism are dissimilar. So, the promotion of liberal democratic norms for the
transformation of counter-terrorism policies in third countries should be
analysed within a different framework. This study does just this.
Spill over effects of the internal security problems of third countries, such
as terrorism, organized crime, and illegal immigration, are another reason for the
EU to promote liberal democratic principles to third countries. The promotion of
democratic values is considered to eliminate the internal security problems of
third countries, whose problems the EU fear will be imported into the Union
(Cottey 2007; K. Smith 2003b; Tocci 2007: 7-8). This research similarly examines
the EUs norm diffusion role from a security perspective. However, unlike these
studies, it is particularly interested in the counter-terrorism dimension in Turkey,
where Turkeys hard-line counter-terrorism practices towards the PKK have
created negative costs for the EU (in terms of creating a rising number of the
Kurdish immigrants in the EU). Therefore, the promotion of liberal democratic
63
norms in Turkey will be argued to occur within the counter-terrorism context to
reveal the EUs self-interested motives.
2.5. Europeanization and Counter-terrorism
The spreading of the EUs democratic liberal norms, values, and rules inside and
outside of the Union has given rise to a new strand of literature called
Europeanization. Europeanization is a phenomenon that can be explained
through different theoretical approaches, rather than a theory itself (Bulmer and
Burch 2005: 863; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003: 340). As a candidate state,
Turkey has been required to adopt EU promoted liberal democratic norms in
order to become a member of the Union, which has implicitly affected its
counter-terrorism policies. From another point of view, the transformation of
Turkish counter-terrorism in line with the EU requirements can be considered to
be the Europeanization of Turkeys counter-terrorism policies. Therefore, special
attention needs to be paid to whether the concept of Europeanization can
explain the EU impact on Turkish counter-terrorism policy.
Risse, Cowles and Caporaso conceptualize Europeanization as an
emergence of distinct structures of governance, which comprise political
institutions, social institutions, and institutions for problem solving and
interaction among the political actors and networks, for the creation of a
European Union authority (Risse et al. 2001: 3). However, this definition is based
on the creation of European governance amongst the member countries rather
than non-member countries who do not have any role on in this process. In this
sense, Risse, Cowles and Caporasos concept of Europeanization is not relevant
in the case of Turkey, which is non-member country.
For Radaelli, Europeanization is defined as a process of construction,
diffusion, and the institutionalization of European norms, values and rules, which
have developed and have been consolidated during the EU policy process and
then incorporated into domestic discourse, identities, political structures, and
public policies (Radaelli 2002: 108). However, in some policy areas, the EU lacks
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its own norms, and borrows norms from other international organisations (such
as the UN, the CoE or the OSCE) which it then requires non-member countries to
adopt. In this sense, Radaelli has not made clear that the adoption of other
international organizations rules should be considered as aspects of
Europeanization.
The meaning of Europeanization is distinguished from terms such as
integration, convergence, or harmonization. As Börzel stresses, the issue
of integration is concerned with why nation states discard their sovereignty in
order to be part of a supranational organization. Changes in state and
sovereignty are the main concerns of integration studies, whereas
Europeanization seeks to explain changes in domestic institutions and the
behaviour of political actors (Börzel 1999: 576-77). For Radaelli, Europeanization
is different from convergence. Even though there may be policy convergence
among EU member countries, these countries may have different responses to
EU requirements, which also produces divergence (Radaelli 2002: 111). The
harmonization impact of the EU is not fully correlated with Europeanization. The
EU has no homogenising impact on the domestic policies of target countries.
There is still room for manoeuvre for target countries to implement their own
policies (Knill 2001: 41-50). However, these definitions have mostly been given
for the Europeanization of member countries, rather than non-member
countries who have power to negotiate with the EU.
In view of these definitions, it is noticeable that Europeanization has no
single and stable meaning (Kassim 2000: 235). Some conceptualizations do not
explain norm diffusion in non-member countries. Others suffer by failing to
explain the use of other international organisations rules as aspects of
Europeanization. So, this research will not employ the concept of
Europeanization to explain the EU impact on Turkish counter-terrorism policy.
The EU impact on the domestic policies of non-member countries has
also been conceptualized under the term EU-ization. According to Wallace,
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EU-ization refers to the internalization of the EU membership and accession
process by applicant countries. In her argument, domestic change in applicant
countries is driven by the influence of the EU (Wallace 2000). However, as
emphasized earlier, the EU is not the only international institution that promotes
liberal democratic norms for domestic change. The EU benefits from the
recommendations and conventions made by other international organizations
(i.e. the UN, the CoE, and the OSCE). According to Graziano and Vink, this means
Europeanization is more than just EU-ization (Vink and Graziaon 2007: 12). So,
the concept of EU-ization is also irrelevant in explaining the EU influence on
Turkeys counter-terrorism policies. Therefore, instead of the concepts of
Europeanization and EU-ization, much more attention will be given to the EUs
diffusion mechanisms in order to emphasize the contribution of this research.
2.6. Mechanisms for Diffusing EU Norms
In order to understand the EU impact on Turkeys counter-terrorism policies, the
way EU rules have been transposed to Turkey should be taken into
consideration. In the norm diffusion context, however, the EU has different
mechanisms from those that are employed in third countries. The EU norm
diffusion mechanisms applied to Turkey, as a candidate state, are different from
those applied to non-candidate countries. So, if the appropriate norm diffusion
mechanisms employed in Turkey, and their strengths and weaknesses, can be
identified, similar strategies can be applied to other third countries whose
counter-terrorism policies create concerns for the EU. Therefore, this section will
present an overview of the literature on the norm diffusion mechanisms of the
EU towards third countries, and it will choose the right norm diffusion
mechanisms to conceptualize and theorize about the EU impact on Turkish
counter-terrorism policy in the third chapter.
In the existing literature, the diffusion mechanisms of the EU can be
found within different parts of the literature, such as Democratization (Kubicek
2003; Whitehead 2001), the Normative Power debate (Manners 2002),
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Europeanization (Bauer et al. 2007; Börzel and Risse 2003; Jacoby 2004; Lavenex
and Uçarer 2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005), Conflict Resolution
(Diez et al. 2006; Tocci 2007) and Diffusion (Börzel and Risse 2012). The
mechanisms proposed by different authors generally overlap with each other.
Therefore, in this section, the most prominent diffusion mechanisms will be
categorized under more general categories, in order to avoid confusion.
In the existing literature, there are three logics of action. According to the
Logic of Consequence (Instrumental Rationality), non-member countries try to
maximise their utilities. Changing political behaviour in third countries is based
on cost-benefit calculations. In the Logic of Appropriateness (Normative
Rationality), target countries are motivated by norms, values and the identity of
the community where they belong. Legitimacy and appropriateness of rules are
determinate factors of action (March and Olsen 1989). Both rationalities are
mostly applied in the existing literature to explain the EU impact on non-member
countries. However, there is also another rationality called the Logic of
Argument (Communicative Rationality) in which actors reach mutual
understanding by arguing. One of the actors tries to persuade the other to
change by justifying the validity of its claims (Risse 2000).
The diffusion of the EU norms also has two dimensions, namely, direct
and indirect. In the direct dimension, the EU is an agent of diffusion who actively
promotes certain policies or institutional models. In the indirect dimension, the
EU is a role model that other international actors emulate, i.e. they emulate the
EUs solutions according to their own needs (Börzel and Risse 2012: 5-6; Lavenex
and Uçarer 2004: 422). From Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeiers point of view,
domestic change can be either EU-driven or domestic driven. In the former case
the EU induces the domestic changes, whilst in the latter non-member countries
makes the decision to change (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 8). Direct
diffusion has four types: Coercion, Persuasion, Socialization, and Conditionality.
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Indirect diffusion also has four types: Contagion, Competition, Lesson Drawing,
and Normative/Mimicry Emulation.
The coercion strategy is based on coercive authority or legal force to
diffuse policies towards third countries (Börzel and Risse 2012: 6). In the existing
literature this strategy has appeared under the names overt diffusion
(Manners 2002) and control (Whitehead 2001). The most prominent feature of
this strategy is that dominant international actors impose their norms and their
governance models on others by using physical or legal intervention (Kubicek
2003: 4). In this way, superior actors transform a third countrys polity, politics,
and policy. The promotion of liberal democratic norms in neighbouring countries
using the coercion strategy might be less costly to the dominant actor than
sustaining old security structures in order to maintain territorial security
(Whitehead 2001: 8-15). The coercion strategy gives little room to manoeuvre to
the target country, due to an asymmetrical power balance between the two
parties (the dominant actor and target country) (Beichelt 2012). The use of
economic and diplomatic sanctions, or arms embargos, are considered as part of
the coercive foreign policy instruments of the EU (Matlary 2004: 144).
Humanitarian intervention to stop ethnic cleansing has also been given as a
special example of the EUs coercive approach (Schimmelfennig 2007: 127-28).
The EU can also utilise a legal coercive power on member countries, and to a
lesser extent accession countries, due to the rulings of the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) (Börzel and Risse 2012: 6). In the context of this study, coercion is
not the right mechanism to explain the interaction between the EU and Turkey.
Firstly, the EU has never had an intention to use physical force towards Turkey in
order to transform its institutions and policies. Secondly, the ECJ mandate on
Turkey only applies when there is a legal dispute between EU institutions and
Turkish institutions, companies and individuals. That is, it is only applicable when
there is a failure to implement EU law by the EU institutions, or by Turkish
contracting parties. The ECJ cannot solely rule against Turkey for not applying EU
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law. Thirdly, the EU requirements are not responded to in line with the EU
expectations at all times. Turkish authorities sometimes refuse to fulfil EU
demands, if there is major domestic political cost of complying. In these
circumstances, Turkey has room for manoeuvre when adopting EU promoted
norms, which means the EU is not capable of exerting a coercive power on
Turkeys decisions.
The persuasion strategy is based on communicative rationality or the
logic of argument (Börzel and Risse 2012: 8). According to Beichelt, this strategy
is the most understudied mode of norm promotion in the literature (Beichelt
2012: 7). It has been named as informational diffusion (Manners 2002: 244),
constructive impact (Diez et al. 2006: 574), and communication (Bauer et al.
2007) by different authors. The EU represents its arguments and tries to
convince the target country of the validity of EU promoted rules. This mode of
interaction occurs amongst national agents working together in the EUs legal
and administrative network (Bauer et al. 2007: 414). In this interaction no
incentive, except the power of argument, is influential on changing the political
behaviour of the target country (Schimmelfennig et al. 2006: 31). The persuasion
strategy gives national actors the power to interpret EU recommendations, and
they have room for manoeuvre in deciding on the appropriate policy (Bauer et
al. 2007: 414). However, as Kelly has shown, the EU may also use the persuasion
strategy with other material based reinforcement strategies (rewarding with
incentives) to persuade target countries of the appropriateness of EU promoted
rules (Kelley 2004). In practice, when the EU has nothing to offer, persuasion is
the preliminary strategy adopted in target countries. As the distance between
the target country and Europe increases, the EU relies more on strategies such as
persuasion (Börzel and Risse 2012: 8). In view of the Turkish case, persuasion
might be an influential strategy for norm diffusion. However, Turkey has been a
candidate country, which aims to join the EU. In order to do so, it has adopted
EU norms (i.e. those that have been set as a condition of membership) into its
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domestic legislation. If Turkey fails to comply with the EU requirements, it will
not be rewarded with membership status. Consequently, the EU does not
necessarily need to persuade Turkey, because it offers tangible incentives, such
as EU membership, to push Turkey into rule adoption. Nevertheless, this strategy
can be used as a complementary strategy if the provided material incentives are
not sufficient on their own to change the political behaviour of Turkey.
The socialization strategy is another way for the EU to diffuse its norms,
values, and rules to third countries. It is defined as convergence (Kubicek
2003), cultural filter (Manners 2002), social learning (Schimmelfennig and
Sedelmeier 2005), consent (Whitehead 2001), and connective impact (Diez
et al. 2006) within different studies. In this process, the EU is the socialization
agency which transmits the rules of its community (Schimmelfennig et al. 2006).
Target countries, on the other hand, are the inducting actors who internalize
these rules (Checkel 2005: 804; Risse and Sikkink 1999: 5). As Schimmelfennig
has stressed, socialization covers all EU efforts to teach other countries that EU
policies (including the ideas and norms behind them) are more appropriate than
their current policies for dealing with their internal problems. The EU also
endeavours to motivate target countries to adopt their rules (Schimmelfennig
2012: 8). The socialization strategy has many similarities with the persuasion
strategy.1 A major distinction between the two strategies, however, is that
persuasion relies more on argumentative communication. Socialization, on the
other hand, is learned by domestic actors through the observance and re-
contextualization of EU norms under domestic conditions (Beichelt 2012: 8). The
socialization mechanism is successful in explaining the autonomous political
changes in target countries, which are based on identity, common values, and
norms, but it suffers by failing to explain policy alterations that are related to
1
i.e. it is similar in terms of constructive impact and communication. These have been explained
above in the disucssion of persuasion. These two combine elements from the persuasion and the
socialization strategy. However, as they are more relevant to the issue of persuasion, they were
explained above rather than here.
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material incentives. Therefore it has been generally used as a complementary
strategy for utility based explanations (Kelley 2004; Kubicek 2003). Considering
the long-term and fluctuating relations between the EU and Turkey, socialization
is a very strong mechanism in explaining the EU impact on domestic adjustments
in Turkey. When the EU failed to offer tangible incentives for rule adoption,
socialization became the prominent mechanism for the reform process.
Domestic political actors learnt the suitability of EU promoted norms in their
social interactions with EU institutions. Therefore, they transposed the EU
promoted norms on the basis of their appropriateness rather than on the basis
of rational based reasons, such as cost-benefit calculations. In this research,
socialization will be one of the diffusion mechanisms used to explain rule
adoption in Turkey in the counter-terrorism domain.
Conditionality is one of the direct diffusion mechanisms used by the EU in
third countries to diffuse its norms. As Stokke has emphasized, conditionality is
not an aim itself, but a foreign policy instrument used to reach foreign policy
objectives (Stokke 1995). In addition, it is not a constant factor of causation but
rather a process for examining domestic change (J. Hughes et al. 2004: 548). In
the existing literature, conditionality has been named as utility calculations
(Börzel and Risse 2012), compliance (Bauer et al. 2007), compulsory impact
(Diez et al. 2006), thresholds (Jacoby 2004), procedural and transference
diffusion (Manners 2002), leverage (Vachudova 2005) and reinforcement by
reward (Schimmelfennig et al. 2003). The basic rationality of conditionality is
the Logic of Consequence. The EU sets some conditions on non-member states
in order to minimize their political and economic risks, and in order to assess
their readiness to meet the EU requirements (Grabbe 2001: 251). If the target
country adopts the EU required norms, the EU rewards the country with
incentives, whereas, it withdraws the incentives if the requirements are not
fulfilled (Bauer et al. 2007: 409; Diez et al. 2006: 572; Schimmelfennig and
Sedelmeier 2005: 10; K. Smith 2005). As Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier have
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stressed, before the conditionality strategy is put into practice, a domestic
equilibrium exists in the target country, which is based on the preferences and
bargaining power of the domestic society. The conditionality strategy upsets this
equilibrium, and domestic actors make calculations between the adoption costs
of EU rules and the incentives provided by the EU. If the value of the potential
benefits exceed the adoption costs, most target countries adopt the EU required
norms. Otherwise, they refrain from adopting them (Schimmelfennig and
Sedelmeier 2004: 672). The conditionality strategy is seen as the most efficient
mechanism that the EU has at its disposal to promote its norms to third
countries (Beichelt 2012: 6). It also provides a strong causal link between the EU
influence and norm diffusion in Turkey. As will be revealed in chapter 6, when
the EU has given clear membership prospects to Turkey, the adoption of EU
promoted norms was easy for Turkish political actors, despite the cost of ethic
separatist terrorism. Therefore, conditionality will be used as the main diffusion
mechanism to explain the EU impact on the transformation of Turkeys counter-
terrorism policies towards the PKK.
Contagion is another strategy for the diffusion of the EUs normative
rules, values, and institutions to target countries. It has also been described as
democratic gravity (Emerson and Noutcheva 2005) and it is grounded in the
logic of appropriateness. According to this mechanism, contagion through
proximity is the main reason for the diffusion of liberal democratic norms to
other countries (Whitehead 2001: 5). The countries located near democratic
regimes have more economic, intergovernmental, and inter-organizational,
touristic, and informational based interactions with democratic regimes than
geographically distant countries. Links between the two sides causes diffusion
(Levitsky and Way 2005: 23). In the contagion process, institutions of the well-
regarded neighbour is copied wholesale (Kubicek 2003: 5). For Whitehead, in
order to talk about contagion, there must be a neutral transmission mechanism,
which encourages the neighbouring countries to replicate the institutions of its
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democratic neighbours without the influence of outside agencies and strategic
calculations (Whitehead 2001: 5-8). As Kubicek has emphasized, contagion has
some weakness in explaining the EU impact on third countries. Firstly, it ignores
local conditions and neglects the role of internal and external actors on norm
diffusion. Secondly, the EU is regarded as a passive entity, which is against its
normative power identity (Kubicek 2003: 5). In line with Kubiceks critiques,
contagion is not the appropriate form of diffusion to explain the EU impact on
changing Turkish counter-terrorism polices. Although the prosperity, security
and stability of the EU has been influential on Turkey, in its interactions with the
EU, the efforts of domestic and civil society actors cannot be put aside. Ignoring
the role of internal and external actors on norm diffusion undermines the
explanatory role of contagion in the Turkish case.
Competition is another indirect diffusion mechanism used by the EU. This
has also be called negative externality (Lavenex and Uçarer 2004: 421). This
strategy is also based on the Logic of Consequence. As explicated by different
authors, the EU requires target countries to adjust certain institutional
arrangements to create a market competition environment amongst them. They
adjust their domestic policies in line with the EU regulations in order to gain an
advantage over other countries, or they resist these requirements in order not to
lose their market advantages. Being a winner or loser stimulates the competition
as well as stimulating rule adoption (Bauer et al. 2007: 411-12; Lavenex and
Uçarer 2004: 421). In the competition mechanism, policy adjustment is a
unilateral process which is adopted by target countries, rather than being
imposed by the EU (Börzel and Risse 2012: 9). However, this does not mean that
the reform process is completely under the control of target countries. The
consequences of competitive performance are more influential on norm
diffusion, rather than the decision of domestic political actors. This aspect of the
competition strategy thus differs from other norm diffusion strategies, such as
conditionality (Bauer et al. 2007: 411-12). Nevertheless, as experienced in the
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Central and Eastern European Countries, competition can be an additional factor
in complying with the EU requirements, along with the material incentives
provided by the EU (Grabbe 2001: 1015). In addition, the lack of competition
among the ENP countries is one of the reasons why the EU is not as influential in
the ENP countries as it is in the CEECs (Gebhard 2010). There is also a difference
between the socialization and the competition strategy. Socialization can occur
independently in target countries without peer pressure; however, for the
competition strategy to be effective there should be contestant countries that
ignite competition in the target country. Competition can explain some of the
reform processes in Turkey, such as trade related rule adoption, in which Turkey
has competed with other candidate countries to gain an advantage in European
integration. However, counter-terrorism is not a policy area in which Turkey has
competed with other countries. Adopting the EUs liberal democratic values is
necessary for a peaceful solution to Turkeys internal problems, such as ethnic
separatist terrorism, and being the winner of competition based relations is not
so important.
The Lesson Drawing strategy is another diffusion mechanism that works
without inducement from the EU. It also appears in the literature as passive
enforcement (Tocci 2007: 17), enabling impact (Diez et al. 2006: 573),
unilateral policy emulation (Lavenex and Uçarer 2004: 421), templates
(Jacoby 2004: 6) and mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1991: 69).
This strategy is again based on Logic of Consequence, or cognitively motivated
behaviour (Lavenex and Uçarer 2004: 421). Non-member states adopt the EU
rules in response to domestic dissatisfaction, which stem from uncertainty,
policy failure and their seeking the best policy (Rose 1991: 11-13). According to
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, firstly, political actors seek alternative policies
elsewhere. Secondly, they narrow their search to the EU or to its members. Then
they evaluate whether or not the EU rules are suitable for adoption
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004: 676). For a better lesson-drawing
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process, rules that will be adopted by target countries must be clearly defined
(Tocci 2007: 17). As Börzel and Risse argue, in the lesson-drawing process,
institutional solutions are not adopted in a wholesale manner, rather they are
tailored to the particular case and adopted selectively (Börzel and Risse 2012:
10). Therefore, this feature distinguishes the lesson-drawing strategy from the
contagion mechanism. In addition, contrary to socialization or social learning,
policy change in target countries does not occur through communication
channels, but is rather based on the experience of target countries themselves.
In other words, it is not a social learning based strategy, but an experimental
learning strategy (Tocci 2007: 17-18). It is further distinguished from conditional
based strategies, because the EU does not enforce the adoption of its norms in
target countries (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 20). By providing
incentives through the conditionality strategy, the EU does aim to compensate
target countries for the concessions they make (Tocci 2007: 17). In the light of
these arguments, lesson drawing can be considered a proper pattern of diffusion
in the Turkish case, if the material incentives provided by the EU are not the only
reason for rule adoption, or experimental learning overwhelms social learning.
However, ensuring a peaceful and non-violent solution to end PKK terrorism is
one of the requirements the EU has for the stabilization of Turkey, alongside the
other political demands. The EU directly induces Turkey to adopt liberal
democratic norms for the solution of the Kurdish issue, which is closely linked
with PKK terrorism. Therefore, under these circumstances, the lesson-drawing
mechanism has little power to explain the EU impact on Turkey.
Normative Emulation/Mimicry is another domestically driven indirect
diffusion mechanism the EU uses. It is based on the Logic of Appropriateness.
According to Börzel and Risse, some countries may want to be well-regarded
members of the international community. They adopt norms symbolic of
communities such as the EU in order to increase their legitimacy in the
international environment. The adoption of appropriate norms are not based on
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functional reasons, but rather for reputational gain (Börzel and Risse 2012: 10).
As stressed by Jetschke and Murray, in the normative emulation process, the
norms of the EU are not deeply internalized. The EU-style institutions are
adopted in line with the existing domestic institutional structure (Jetschke and
Murray 2012: 180). Normative Emulation/Mimicry is more influential on the
regions or states where the EU is seen as a legitimate authority to emulate
(Börzel and Risse 2012: 10). Considering the other diffusion mechanisms,
normative emulation/mimicry has the risk of being confused with other
mechanisms, such as persuasion, socialization, and lesson drawing. Firstly, in
order to talk about persuasion and socialization, there must be a socialising
agent, such as the EU, which tries to persuade or teach the target country the
appropriateness of its rules. However, normative emulation diffusion is driven
entirely by domestic factors, rather than by any external actor (Jetschke and
Murray 2012: 179). Secondly, in the lesson-drawing process, the EU rules are
adopted selectively, but without altering the essence of the rules adopted, when
there is a policy dissatisfaction or uncertainty. In normative emulation/mimicry,
however, the EU model is not fully internalised. There might be diversity
between the domestic rules and the EU rules, even though the former emulate
the latter (i.e. emulating does not mean exact copying). Furthermore,
adopting the EU norms does not correspond to any internal functional problem.
It is purely a manifestation of the fact that the target country intends to be a
respected member of the international community (Lenz 2012: 159). In view of
these arguments, the normative emulation/mimicry strategy does not fit the
Turkish case for two reasons. Firstly, as a prospective EU member, Turkey is
obliged to adopt the EU rules without alteration. Therefore, the flexibility
entailed by the normative emulation/mimicry mechanism does not match the
Turkish case. Secondly, in Turkey-EU relations, the EU has the role of the
socialization agent, whereas Turkey, wanting to be part of the EU, has the novice
role. The adoption of liberal democratic norms is one of the requirements for EU
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membership status, and to be a well-reputed member of international
community is not. In this sense, the relation between Turkey and the EU is more
intense, and in some aspects rule adoption is obligatory, which undermines
explanations given through the normative emulation/mimicry mechanism in
Turkey.
2.7. How the EU Diffuses Norms in its Neighbourhood
The dynamics of norm diffusion from the EU to Turkey has distinctive features. In
this interaction, the EU sets rules without asking for Turkeys opinion, and
expects Turkey to adopt them. In addition, the EU offers a membership carrot, if
Turkey fulfils all of its requirements. Furthermore, Turkey has no trump card,
such as oil and gas reserves, to use against the EUs normative pressure.
Therefore, in this part of the study, Turkeys special status will be emphasized by
looking at the literature that examines the EUs norm diffusion role in its
neighbourhood.
As discussed in earlier sections, the EU has different mechanisms to
diffuse its norms beyond its borders. Similarly, there is no uniform model that
the EU applies towards the countries in its immediate neighbourhood. In the
literature, the reasons for the variation of these mechanisms are given as being
due to time (Börzel et al. 2008), geographic proximity and institutional links
(Lavenex and Uçarer 2004), the self-interest of the EU (Schimmelfennig 2012),
and due to the asymmetrical relation that holds between the EU and a given
third country (Börzel and Risse 2012: 13). These authors have identified four
groups of countries; quasi-member countries, Russia, the European
Neighbourhood Policy Countries, and Candidate countries (CEECs and Western
Balkan Countries), which are located near the EU, and have been subject to
different norm diffusion mechanisms.
According to Lavenex and Uçarer, quasi-member countries such as
Norway and Switzerland are one group of countries which share contiguous
borders, and have historical, social, and political links with the EU. Norm
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diffusion in these countries occurs mainly on a voluntary basis, and these
countries adopt the EU norms to tackle common problems that they share with
the EU. They participate in the decision shaping processes of the EU, and
unpopular decisions for target countries are overcome by association
agreements (Lavenex and Uçarer 2004). Considering the circumstances of rule
adoption in quasi-member countries, the main mechanism of diffusion is based
on the lesson-drawing model, or on unilateral policy emulation, rather than
other diffusion mechanisms. In comparison to Lavenex and Uçaners study, this
research examines Turkey-EU interactions in terms of the rules the EU sets, and
wants Turkey to adopt, in order to achieve membership status. Turkey has no
role in the decision shaping process, in contrast to the quasi-member countries.
Therefore, this study is differentiated from the studies above that analyse quasi-
member countries.
The second group of studies is concerned with those countries that are
loosely connected with the EU, such as Russia. According to Dimitrova and
Dragneva, Russia shares contiguous borders with the EU, however they have
weak institutional links. Russia sees sovereignty as an important aspect of its
power, which hinders the EUs norm diffusion efforts (Dimitrova and Dragneva
2009). It denies the EU authority, whilst adopting international conventions,
even though these conventions are embedded in the EUs legislative structure. In
that sense, the EU rules are less legitimate for Russia than international
conventions (Barbé et al. 2009). Furthermore, Russia is one of the oil and gas
providers for the EU. Such an energy dependency means the Union has to trade
off its economic interests with its normative responsibilities (Youngs 2009: 93-
97). As these studies indicate, the EU has relied more on soft diffusion
mechanisms in Russia, such as persuasion, socialization, and normative
emulation, because using the conditional strategy might put the self-interest of
the EU at stake. In that sense, norm diffusion in Russia is not compatible with
norm diffusion in Turkey, where the conditionality strategy plays an important
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role in norm diffusion. Therefore, this research should be categorized differently
from the studies that have examined the EUs norm diffusion role in Russia.
The third group of studies that has received great attention are
concerned with the ENP states. Under the ENP scheme, the EU is committed to
promoting democratic, economic, and security related reforms to four regions
and sixteen countries; North Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia),
South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia), the Middle East (Israel, Jordan,
Lebanon, Palestine, Syria), and Far East Europe (Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine).
According to Kelley, the ENP has been mostly influenced by the enlargement
policy. Contrary to the previous failed policies in the ENP, the enlargement policy
proved to be a success. Therefore, the ENP was modified by the European Union
Commission, keeping the instruments of enlargement policy in view (Kelley
2006: 30-34). As emphasized my many authors, the major difference between
enlargement and the ENP comes from the presentation of membership
prospects, which are excluded from the ENP framework. The EU has provided
technical and financial assistance to the ENP countries in order to pursue its
conditionality strategy. The absence of a membership incentive is the major
handicap that hinders the EU in diffusing its norms to these countries (Bobitski
2008; Gawrich et al. 2010; Lavenex and Uçarer 2004: 434; Schimmelfennig 2012:
20). This research is differentiated from these studies, because of its analysis of
Turkey, where the prospect of EU membership is the major motive for Turkish
political actors to adopt the EU promoted norms in the counter-terror context.
Another group of studies is concerned with the EUs norm diffusion role
in candidate countries such as the Central and Eastern European Countries. As
indicated by many authors whose interest lies in this study area, terrorism has
never been an imminent threat for the CEECs (Ibryamova 2004; Mares 2008,
2011; Rihackova 2006). However, as Rihackova has indicated, after the 9/11
attacks, the possibility of Al-Qaeda networks using the CEECs borders to enter
the EU raised concerns about these countries, and the internal dimension of
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counter-terrorism policies in these states was shaped by the EU, and the
external dimension by NATO/US (Rihackova 2006: 3). According to Ibryamova,
the main interest the EU has had in transforming the counter-terrorism policies
in the CEECs relates to border controls, and preventing the financing of
terrorism and cooperation in counter-terror matters (Ibryamova 2004: 5-6). In
this respect, the major contribution of these studies to the literature is that they
reveal the EUs transposition of its security based strategies in candidate
countries. However, contrary to these studies, this research is concerned mainly
with the EUs impact on the adoption of liberal democratic norms in Turkey
within a counter-terror context. Therefore, by focusing on its normative
dimension, it will bring a novel perspective to the EUs norm diffusion role on
counter-terrorism policies within candidate states.
In recent years, the EUs norm diffusion role towards the Western Balkan
Countries has also been subject to many studies. The EU policies used to resolve
inter-ethnic conflicts in the Western Balkans have been investigated in these
studies. They have found that the EU relies heavily on security based policies,
rather than pursuing normative objectives in these countries (Anastasakis 2008;
Richter 2012; Vasilev 2011). The EU strategies have also been criticized for
undermining the consolidation of democracy in these countries (Richter 2012),
reducing the domestic support for EU membership (Stahl 2011), and for blurring
the EUs normative intentions (Anastasakis 2008). In this literature the EU impact
on these countries is framed under the issue of ethnic conflict, which relates to
the Yugoslav War. In this respect, the EU democratic prescriptions for Western
Balkan countries have focussed on preventing the outbreak of a new war in the
Balkans, rather than on dealing with terrorist organisations. In this respect, by
analysing the EUs norm diffusion role in the counter-terror context, this
research stands in a different category from those that have investigated the
Western Balkan Countries.
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2.8. Norm Diffusion in Turkey
In recent years, there has been a large amount of literature concerned with the
EU impact on Turkish polity, politics, and policy. Within these studies, a few have
focussed on the influence of the EU on Turkeys counter-terrorism policies
towards the PKK. In one of these studies, documents from the EU, the Council of
Europe, and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) relating to Turkish
counter-terrorism policies, were collected together without any detailed
evaluation or the use of a theoretical framework (Alexander et al. 2008). As such,
the work of Alexander et al. only reveals the attitude the EU has taken towards
Turkeys counter-terrorism policies, and indicates how Turkeys counter-terror
related domestic legislation has been amended. However, the internal and
external mediating factors influential on the transformation of domestic policy
change are ignored. In this study they are not ignored, which serves to
differentiate this research from that study.
In another study, the EU influence on Turkish counter-terrorism policy
has been examined through the JHA framework, comparing it with Turkeys
policies against drug trafficking and organized crime. According to Bakar, the
EUs conditionality strategy (used to promote the adoption of JHA rules and for
enhancing cooperation on issues of counter-terrorism) only works when Turkeys
domestic threat perception converges with the EU requirements (Bakar 2011). In
this regard, Bakars study was mainly focused on the cooperation dimension of
counter-terrorism. The EUs normative requirements to transform Turkish
democracy, as well as Turkeys counter-terrorism policies, were not at the centre
of his research, and this distinguishes this study from his.
In the remaining studies, the EU influence on Turkish counter-terrorism
policies towards the PKK have generally been conducted within the context of
democratization, human rights, ethnic minority rights, and conflict resolution.
Within these studies, counter-terror related reforms in Turkey have been given
as an example to show how Turkeys democracy, human rights, and ethnic
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minority regime has been transformed in line with EU requirements. However,
these studies are mainly concerned with examining the EU impact on these
fields, rather than Turkeys counter-terrorism policies.
However, despite the fact that the focus of the above studies is not on
counter-terrorism in Turkey, they have made an important contribution to the
literature by showing the reader key determinants of policy chances in Turkey.
They address norm diffusion in Turkey as being either EU-driven (exogenously-
indirectly), domestically driven (endogenously-indirectly), or driven by a
combination of both EU and endogenous factors. Furthermore, these studies
frame their arguments in terms of different EU norm diffusion mechanisms.2
According to one group of studies, democratic reforms in Turkey have
been driven mainly by EU related dynamics. The EU is considered to have
stimulated a reform process in Turkey by providing it with a clear accession
prospect in 1999 (Baç 2005; T. Smith 2003c; Usul 2011). However, since the EU
withdrew this prospect in 2005, the reform process in Turkey has been
weakened (Kubicek 2011; Özer 2012), which signifies that rule adoption in
Turkey is correlated with the EU offering it a credible membership incentive (E.
Hughes 2006; Magen 2003). Consequently, the EUs conditionality strategy is
regarded as being the main mechanism for the adoption of liberal democratic
ŶŽƌŵƐŝŶdƵƌŬĞǇ ?ĞŶŐŝǌĂŶĚ,ŽĨĨŵĂŶŶ ? ? ? ? ?ƵǇƵůŵƵƔ ? ? ? ? ?^ĐŚŝŵŵĞůĨĞŶŶŝŐĞƚ
al. 2003). However, these studies undervalue the internal demand for policy
transformation in Turkey, i.e. demands arising from consideration of the human
rights and the minority rights of Kurdish citizens. That democratic reforms
continued to be made after 2007 in Turkey, at a time when there was no
prospect of EU membership, is a challenge to the arguments of these studies.
Therefore, this research aims to contribute to the literature by taking into
consideration the realization of domestic political actors that EU norms are
appropriate for solving PKK terrorism by peaceful means.
2
See section 2.4. for details of these mechanisms.
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The second group of studies have noted that the reform process in
Turkey has been greatly influenced by domestic dynamics rather than by the EU.
According to these scholars, there has been an on-going transformation of
democracy in Turkey since the early 1980s, which has been motivated by strong
public demand, by elite socialization with the EU, and by the CoE seeking
alternative ways to solve political violence in Turkey (Dagi 2001; Grigoriadis
2008; Saral 2010; Sugden 2004; Tocci 2005; Ulusoy 2007). In addition, the
continuation of EU required reforms has been considered to be beneficial to
some domestic actors in achieving their electoral goals (Saatcioglu 2011).
Furthermore, the EU requirements have been used as a legitimization tool by
reform minded politicians in order to frame their political agenda (Börzel and
^ŽǇĂůƚŦŶ ? ? ? ? Z ?ƐƐƵĐŚ ?ƚŚĞƐĞĂƵƚŚŽƌƐƐĞĞƐŽĐŝĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂƐĂŵĂũŽƌŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵŽĨ
norm diffusion in Turkey. However, after the Helsinki European Council in 1999,
when the EU gave strong signals that Turkey would gain candidate status, the
adoption of EU required norms accelerated in Turkey. So the EU has had an
undeniable influence on norm diffusion in Turkey (despite strong domestic
opposition to some of the reforms, such as the abolition of death penalty)
(Magen 2003). Moreover, prior to the Helsinki European Council, Turkeys
policies towards the PKK and the Kurdish minority were monitored by other
international organisation (such as the UN, the CoE, and the ECtHR). The EU
promise to grant Turkey with candidate status was more powerful than the
socialization efforts made by these international organisations to induce the
ĂĚŽƉƚŝŽŶ ŚƵŵĂŶ ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ŶŽƌŵƐ ŝŶ dƵƌŬĞǇ  ?DĂŐĞŶ  ? ? ? ? ?ĂůŦ  ? ? ? ? Z ? dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?
explaining the adoption of liberal democratic norms through the socialization
mechanism is inadequate unless the EUs conditionality strategy is taken into
consideration. As this is taken into consideration in this research, this
distinguishes it from the above-mentioned studies.
A third group of studies, however, has indicated that EU promoted norm
diffusion in Turkey has been based on both EU and domestic driven reasons.
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According to these studies, the EU, by providing a membership incentive, has
been the initial driver of the reform process since 1999. However, strong
domestic demand for democratization and the promotion of civil rights have also
been active, and their momentum ensured that reforms continued even in the
ĂďƐĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ĂŶ ĂĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶ ŝŶĐĞŶƚŝǀĞ  ?ĐŝŬŵĞƐĞ  ? ? ? ? ? <ĞǇŵĂŶ ĂŶĚ PŶŝƔ  ? ? ? ? ?
Keyman and Düzgit 2007; Kubicek 2005). Within this context, the credible
membership commitment of the EU (conditionality) and the preferences of
ĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐ ĂĐƚŽƌƐ  ?ƐŽĐŝĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ Z  ?ŝŵŝƚƌŽǀĂ  ? ? ? ? ? zŦůŵĂǌ  ? ? ? ?ď Z ĂƌĞ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ
reasons for the adoption of EU promoted norms in Turkey. This research shares a
similar conceptual framework with these studies. However, unlike these studies
this research will use conditionality and socialization mechanisms to examine the
transformation of Turkish counter-terrorism policy, rather than the consolidation
of Turkish democracy, human rights, and ethnic rights regime.
/ŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞƐĞƐƚƵĚŝĞƐ ?zŦůŵĂǌŚĂƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůŝǌĞĚŶŽƌŵĚŝĨĨƵƐŝŽŶŝŶ
Turkey for Kurdish ethnic minority rights within the conditionality and lesson
ĚƌĂǁŝŶŐ ? ŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵƐ  ?zŦůŵĂǌ  ? ? ? ?Ă Z ? ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ĂƉƉůǇŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ůĞƐƐŽŶ ?ĚƌĂǁŝŶŐ
mechanism for voluntary rule adoption contradicts Turkeys candidate status, as
the EU demands that Turkey finds a peaceful solution to the Kurdish Question.
For this reason this research will apply the socialization mechanism, instead of
ƚŚĞ  SůĞƐƐŽŶ ĚƌĂǁŝŶŐ ? ŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵ ƵƐĞĚ ďǇ zŦůŵĂǌ ? ŝŶ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŝŶŐ dƵƌŬĞǇ ?Ɛ ŽŶ ?
going EU candidacy and the associated negotiation process.
2.9. Conclusion
As indicated earlier, the EU, as a sui generis international actor, has a special role
in promoting liberal democratic norms to third countries. In this regard, a broad
literature has been developed from early 1970s to show why and how the EU
diffuses these norms to the countries surrounding the EU in order to stabilize
them. In consideration of these studies, which were examined in the earlier
sections, this research will contribute to the existing literature in seven ways.
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Firstly, in the literature concerned with the external dimension of the
EUs counter-terrorism policy, the EUs impact is analysed within the context of
cooperation with other countries such as the US and the ENP. The normative
transformation of third countries counter-terrorism policies is a largely
neglected research area in the relevant academic literature. Therefore, this
research aims to bring a novel perspective by focusing on the EUs normative
influence on third countries counter-terrorism policies, rather cooperation in
counter-terror matters.
Secondly, this research is not concerned with what the EUs power
definition should be, or how it can be influential in the international system in
comparison to its rivals. Furthermore, debates regarding the EUs shifting
approach from a normative power to a security actor in the counter-terrorism
context are not at the centre of this study. Instead of these research areas, the
focus of this dissertation is on the impact of the EU on non-member countries
domestic policies, in particular the counter-terrorism policies of Turkey. The EUs
alternating normative and security centric stance towards the third countries will
only be evaluated through its consequences on Turkeys domestic policy, rather
than by seeking the reasons for it or considering its negative effects on the EUs
normative reputation.
Thirdly, contrary to the literature concerned with why the EU diffuses its
norms to third countries, this research is not only concerned with the EUs norm
diffusion motives, but it also takes into account domestic motivational factors in
Turkey. Aside from this, under the EUs motivational classification, it is interested
in the EUs self-interested norm diffusion motives rather than its altruistic ones.
However, it will focus on security related motives, in particular norm diffusion in
the counter-terrorism context. In arguing for the main thesis this study will also
establish that the EU promotes liberal democratic norms in Turkey to transform
hard-line Turkish counter-terrorism policies in order to protect the EU from any
negative outcomes of Turkeys policies.
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Fourthly, in the literature, Europeanization and EU-ization are considered
to be major concepts that explain the EUs norm diffusion role within and
beyond its borders. However, as indicated earlier (section 2.3.) these concepts
have limitations in explaining the transposition of the EU promoted norms in
non-member countries. Furthermore, they fail to explain the use, by the EU, of
other international organisations rules as its own norms. In this regard, this
research is distinguished from the existing Europeanization/EU-ization literature
as it refrains from using either concept to examine the EUs norm diffusion role
in Turkey.
Fifthly, as discussed in section 2.4, there are different norm diffusion
strategies in the literature that have been utilized to explain the EU impact on
third countries. Within these mechanisms, conditionality is considered to be the
most appropriate mechanism to explain norm diffusion in Turkey, due to
Turkeys EU candidacy. However, this strategy has some shortcomings when
explaining domestic adjustments, i.e. when the EU does not have tangible
incentives to offer candidate countries. Socialization should therefore be
considered as a complementary strategy when explaining the EU influence in
Turkey in the counter-terrorism context. So, this researchs original contribution
will be to apply the conditionality and socialization mechanisms together for the
first time to reveal the EU influence on Turkish counter-terror policy.
Sixthly, according to the norm diffusion literature, the EU has used
different approaches to disseminate its norms to the countries surrounding its
borders. This research is differentiated from the studies concerned with quasi-
member countries, Russia, and the ENP countries, as it uses different norm
diffusion mechanisms to explain the EUs influence on Turkey. With regards to
the accession countries, Turkey is an exceptional case among them, in light of its
struggle with ethnic separatist terrorism, and with it striving to become a
member of the EU. Thus far, no study has analysed the impact the EU has had on
a candidate countrys counter-terrorism policy by transposing its liberal
86
democratic norms. Therefore, this research aims to contribute to the literature
by filling this gap.
Finally, this thesis will contribute to the EU-Turkey literature by analysing
the EU influence on Turkeys counter-terrorism policy through the conditionality
and socialization frameworks. In this context, both EU-level and Turkish-level
mediating factors will be taken into consideration when analysing the EU
influence. By using the conditionality and socialization mechanisms, this research
is distinguished from the descriptive studies written on the same topic.
Furthermore, the EU-Turkey interaction on counter-terror matters will be
evaluated under the adoption of EU promoted human rights and ethnic minority
rights, rather than the cooperation dimension between the two parties.
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3. The Theoretical Framework for the EU
Impact on Turkish Counter-Terrorism
Policy
3.1. Introduction
As revealed in chapter 2, the EU has different mechanisms to exert influence
over third countries in its neighbourhood. These mechanisms vary according to
the interaction between the EU and the target country, and there is no
mechanism that is applicable to every neighbouring country. For instance, those
diffusion mechanisms valid for Turkey, which has candidate status, are not valid
for the quasi-member countries, Russia, and the ENP (see section 2.5).
Therefore, examining the EU influence on Turkey necessitates focusing on the
norm diffusion mechanisms that relate to the enlargement framework.
Turkeys longstanding desire to join the EU, and the membership
conditions for Turkey laid down by the EU, have ensured a political environment
in which the EU can influence the domestic policies of Turkey. Rule adoption has
sometimes been conditional, i.e. when Turkish political actors have transposed
EU rules conditional on there being a prospect of EU membership. At other
times, it has been based on sociological reasons, e.g. when Turkish political
actors have considered EU promoted norms to be appropriate for solving
domestic problems (see section 2.4). In view of these examples, two EU norm
diffusion mechanisms, Conditionality and Socialization, come to the
forefront when attempting to explain the EU influence on Turkey.
These two EU mechanisms are based theoretically on New
Institutionalism, which is the primary framework in contemporary
Europeanization studies. According to March and Olsen, an institution can be
defined as a stable collection of practices and rules defining appropriate
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behaviour for specific groups of actors in specific situations (March and Olsen
1998: 948). The institutions have an influence on actors within an organization
not only by telling them what to do and how things should be done, but also in
specifying what kind of actions are unacceptable (Karlsson 2008: 41). In this
research, the EU is the institution that outlines the appropriate behaviour for its
member countries, and for candidate countries such as Turkey. According to the
new institutionalist perspective, Turkeys counter-terrorism policies must be in
line with EU standards.
In the existing literature, these two mechanisms have been applied to
enlargement countries such as Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Turkey. Within these studies the EU impact
has been analysed under the topics of: democratization (Dimitrova and Pridham
2004; Freyburg and Richter 2010; Pridham 2002; Richter 2012; Sadurski 2004;
Schimmelfennig et al. 2003), state-building (Keil 2013; Papadimitriou 2007),
human rights (Arikan 2002; Iusmen 2012), ethnic minority rights (Kelley 2004;
Tasch 2010; Vasilev 2011; Vermeersch 2002), conflict resolution (Tocci 2007;
Tzifakis 2012; Woelk 2013), foreign policy (Mutlu 2011; M. Smith 2000; Van
Westering 2000), asylum and immigration policy (Grabbe 2005; Novak 2013),
monetary policy (Epstein 2008; Johnson 2008; Mattli 2004), political party
systems (Vachudova 2008), and Justice and Home Affairs Policies (Bakar 2011;
Trauner 2009b). However, none of these studies has specifically focused on the
counter-terrorism policy of a candidate state. As this study does focus on this, it
therefore provides a novel perspective on the EU impact on Turkish counter-
terrorism policies.
The remainder of this chapter is divided into four main sections. In
section 3.2 the conditionality mechanism, and how conditionality can be
influential on Turkeys counter-terrorism policies, will be explicated. The
theoretical basis of this mechanism (Rational Choice Institutionalism) and its
theoretical model (the External Incentives Model) will be explicated along with
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its variables and its hypotheses. In section 3.3, the socialization mechanism and
its link with Turkish counter-terrorism policy will be highlighted. The theoretical
basis of this mechanism (Sociological Institutionalism) and its theoretical
model (the Social Learning Model) will be explicated along with its variables
and its hypotheses. In section 3.4, the instruments used by the EU to evaluate
the extent of rule adoption in Turkey, and how the EU uses them to implement
the conditionality and socialization mechanisms, will be explained. Finally, in
section 3.5, which internal and external policy actors are influential on the
efficiency of these mechanisms will be discussed.
3.2. Conditionality
The conditionality mechanism generally applies in situations where an
international organization promises rewards to target states, on the condition
that they make certain policy adjustments, or instigate certain institutional
changes (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2007: 88-89). The most well-known
example of the mechanism at work is the International Monetary Funds (IMF)
use of conditionality. The IMF requires that member states implement certain
economic policies in order to receive loans. In the Europeanization studies,
conditionality is considered as implementing a vast array of legislation and
procedural rules in order to comply with EU standards (Grabbe 2006: 207). The
EU employs conditionality as a reinforcement strategy towards candidate
countries (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004: 670). If a candidate country
adopts the EU promoted norms, it is rewarded with membership. If not, the EU
suspends the entry of the candidate country to the Union.
Conditionality is also a generic term that has been categorized as having
two different forms in the existing literature. Hughes, Sasse and Gordon, provide
two categories of international conditionality: first generation and second
generation conditionality. First generation conditionality is based only on
economic conditions, which are mostly related to IMF policy adjustments in third
countries. Second generation conditionality, used by the EU, arose after the
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collapse of the Soviet Union, and combines both economic and political
conditions (J. Hughes et al. 2005: 15-16). Similarly, Vachudova categorizes the
EUs conditionality strategy as being comprised of an active leverage and a
passive leverage strategy. The passive leverage strategy was in operation in
the period before 1994 when the EU did not make a deliberate effort to
influence the domestic policies of candidate countries. The democratization of
target countries was not one of the EUs priorities (Vachudova 2005: 65). The
active leverage strategy has been implemented from 1994 onwards, since the EU
developed its pre-accession process that includes extensive requirements for
membership. The democratization of target countries then became one of the
EUs primary goals (Vachudova 2005: 137).
Conditionality is categorized according to its rewarding (positive) and
punitive (negative) features by Smith. Positive conditionality mechanisms are
those where rewards are promised on the condition that certain requirements
are fulfilled. Negative conditionality mechanisms are those that employ the
reducing, suspending and terminating of benefits, if the target country fails to
comply with the conditions laid down (K. Smith 1997: 4). For Lavenex and Uçarer,
conditionality has two modalities: a domestic interest modality and an
external pressure modality. In the former modality, EU policies are seen as
opportunities to tackle existing internal problems and domestic political actors
welcome EU conditionality. In the latter modality, where the adoption cost of
transferring a policy to a target country is high, the conditions laid down are not
welcomed by the target country, and so the conditions have to be imposed by
making non-compliance itself costly for the target country (Lavenex and Uçarer
2004: 421). From Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeiers point of view, conditionality
is comprised of democratic and Acquis Communautaire (acquis)
conditionality. Democratic conditionality concerns the application of the
founding principles of the EU, such as democracy, human rights, and the rule of
law. Acquis conditionality first arose with the accession negotiations in which the
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EU began to monitor the adoption of specific rules by target countries
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004: 677, 2007: 89).3 The Acquis is the name
of the common rules, standards, and policies of the EU. It is divided into
chapters, each covering a specific policy area (e.g. Judiciary and Fundamental
Rights (JFR) (Chapter 23) and JHA (Chapter 24)). Hughes, Sasse and Gordon have
further argued that conditionality has both a formal and an informal
dimension. Formal conditionality embodies publicly stated conditions, which
consists of the Copenhagen Criteria and acquis rules. Informal conditionality is
concerned with the pressure and recommendations that European Commission
members apply to their counterparts in target countries (J. Hughes et al. 2004:
526). Finally, Dyson has distinguished between soft and hard conditionality.
Hard Conditionality arises in policy areas where EU rules are well-defined, and
so there exists little room for manoeuvre in target countries. In such cases the
EU has been persistent in its attempt to impose those rules on target countries.
Soft Conditionality arises in policy areas where the EU does not have well-
defined rules. Although the EU has still attempted to impose more loosely-
defined rules on target countries in some cases, it has done so less persistently
(Dyson 2006: 15-16).
In view of these categories, this study principally concerns to what extent
the EU liberal democratic conditions have been influential on Turkeys counter-
terrorism policy. As Keohane states, there is no defined EU counter-terrorism
policy to be implemented in third countries (Keohane 2008: 129-30).
Furthermore, there is no chapter in the acquis allocated to counter-terrorism
policy. Principles regulating liberal counter-terrorism policies for candidate
countries were, however, defined at the Copenhagen European Council in 1993.
In its conclusion the decision of the Presidency was that countries which desire
to be part of the Union are required to achieve stability of institutions
3
A similar categorization is also made by Hughes, Sasse and Gordon under the name of
principled/normative (democratic conditionality) and technical conditionality (acquis
conditionality).
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guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and
protection of minorities (European Council 1993: 13). The EUs political
conditions, that involve ethnic rights and human rights, not only target the
transformation of candidate countries democracies, but they are also implicitly
influential on candidate countries counter-terrorism policies. For example, the
abolition of the death penalty is seen as a significant reform, and is one that the
EU requires target counties to make in order to be considered as a true
democracy. However, this issue has been closely linked with issues in the
counter-terrorism debate. For example, the question has been raised in Turkey
as to whether it is legitimate to impose the death penalty on Abdullah Ocalan,
the captured leader of the PKK. Therefore, the link between the EUs liberal
democratic norms and the counter-terrorism policies of Turkey require us to
focus more on democratic conditionality, rather than the other conditionality
types.
3.3. Theorizing Conditionality
The conditionality mechanism used by the EU is based on Rational Choice
Institutionalism. According to this theoretical approach, the political actors are
regarded as rational entities who voluntarily choose from the available
alternatives on the basis of the future benefits they offer (Schimmelfennig and
Sedelmeier 2005: 9). These political actors act on the logic of consequence in
which they maximize their own interest, power and welfare (March and Olsen
1998: 949). When these political actors are seeking alternative institutional
engagement for their benefit, they may realize that their expectations can be
achieved efficiently by being a member of a certain institution, and as such, they
may be involved in a bargaining process with this institution. The desire to be
part of that institution, and the contingencies of the bargaining process, will then
serve as a constraint on their behaviour (G. Peters 1999: 44).
The desired coordination between a political actor and an institution
depends on the bargaining powers of the actors and the opportunities seized by
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them (March and Olsen 1998: 949). Therefore, institutions provide incentives to
political actors to strengthen their bargaining power. If the political actors gain
benefits from institutional membership, they abandon their inappropriate
behaviour to receive those benefits (G. Peters 1999: 47). If the provided
incentives do not offer significant benefits, however, the political actors will be
reluctant to change their behaviour in line with the institutions rules.
The institutions themselves also aim to maximize their benefits by
creating an environment that has similar standards to the institution itself. Such
an environment reduces external risks for the institution (Schimmelfennig 2012:
10). In order to accomplish this objective, members of the institution set some
rules that structure behaviour. If the outside players wish to join the institution
in order to maximize their benefits, they are obliged to adopt these rules. Setting
such rules for prospective members protects the institution from instabilities
spreading into the institution itself by contagion.
Turkey, considered as a rational political actor, has been seeking stable
markets for exporting its goods since the early 1980s. The EUs unwavering
export markets were very attractive to Turkish political actors compared to those
in the Middle East (Birand 2005: 325). Therefore ensuring integration into the EU
was an important step for Turkeys economic development and prosperity.
However, the EU has set a number of liberal democratic conditions to be met by
any prospective EU member. The political cost of these conditions was high for
Turkish political actors, because Turkey was struggling at the time with the PKK.
In order to combat the PKK, Turkey implemented heavy-handed counter-
terrorism policies towards it, such as extra judicial killings, village evacuations,
banning Kurdish, and torturing PKK members and sympathizers. Adoption of the
EUs liberal democratic norms would have involved granting ethnic rights to
Kurds, which created the fear in Turkish political actors that the demands of
autonomy from the Kurds would increase and become legitimized. Furthermore,
the required norms would have curbed the authority and immunity of the
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security forces in the struggle against terrorism. In these circumstances, Turkish
political actors were forced to make a calculation balancing the benefits of EU
membership with the adoption costs of EU promoted norms on its counter-
terrorism policies towards the PKK.
When considering the EU requirement on Turkey to find a peaceful
solution to PKK terrorism, Turkeys wish to maximize its own interests is not the
only relevant issue. The EUs self-interest in protecting itself from the instabilities
in Turkey is also relevant. Turkeys hard-line counter-terrorism policies towards
the PKK exacerbated the tension in Southeastern region of Turkey, rather than
solving the Kurdish Question. Rising instability in the region led many Kurds to
seek asylum in Europe. Involvement of some of the Kurds in criminal acts in
European countries raised concerns about Turkeys counter-terrorism policies
and their consequences. Furthermore, without a peaceful solution to PKK
terrorism, including Turkey in the EU was likely to lead to an internalization of
Turkeys Kurdish problem in the EU itself. Therefore, the EU followed an active
strategy towards Turkey, by reinforcing democratic reforms in order to
transform Turkeys counter-terrorism policies. The conditionality mechanism
was the main strategy employed to encourage Turkey to adopt EU promoted
liberal norms, such as human rights and ethnic minority rights, in return for
granting membership to Turkey.
The membership incentive offered by the EU is the most valuable
incentive for Turkey. However, in order to increase its bargaining power and
motivate Turkey to adopt EU rules, the EU has also provided technical assistance
to Turkey. In order to aid it in the adoption and implementation of the EU liberal
democratic norms, different schemes have been employed to transfer know-
how and direct investment to Turkey.
Technical assistance has been offered to Turkey and other countries
using two instruments: The Technical Assistance and Information Exchange
Instrument (TAIEX) and the Twinning Projects instrument. These two direct
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forms of assistance have been influential on CEECs in improving the quality of
their public administration in terms of human resources, management skills, and
transparency (OECD 2011: 295). Under the TAIEX scheme, the EU supports
candidate countries with short-term assistance, for example, by training
significant numbers of officials, and by offering guidance on the transposition of
EU legislation (Commission of the European Communities 2013). The Twinning
Projects instrument is used by the EU to develop candidate states technical
capabilities. These projects are designed to provide support to beneficiary
countries in the implementation of EU acquis rules within priority areas decided
by the EU Commission. The EU Experts reside in the beneficiary country and the
projects are carried out in a cooperative way between the member states home
administration and the corresponding ministry of the candidate state
(Commission of the European Communities 2010a).
Although Rational Choice Institutionalism presents a general theoretical
framework in which to understand the Conditionality strategy, there are also
other mediating factors that determine the efficiency of the EUs conditionality
strategy. So, in the next section, the External Incentives Model and its two
independent variables Credibility of Conditionality and Adoption Costs will
be explained in detail in order to assess how EU conditionality can be efficient in
transforming Turkeys counter-terrorism policies.
3.4. External Incentives Model
According to Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, the External Incentives Model
emerged from Rational Choice Institutionalism and the Logic of Consequence. It
represents the relations between the EU and candidate states as being
bargaining processes whereby the EU sets conditions that the candidate states
must meet in order to become members of the Union. If the benefits the Union
offers exceed the domestic adoption costs, candidate states are expected to
adopt the EUs promoted rules (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 10-12). In
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this thesis the two variables of this model, credibility of conditionality, and
adoptions costs, will be used to measure the EUs influence on Turkey.
3.4.1. Credibility of Conditionality
To motivate candidate states, the EU uses rewards for the adoption of its rules,
and withholds the rewards in cases of non-compliance. EU membership is the
key incentive for candidate states that inspires the governments to make
reforms. The credibility of conditionality depends on the capabilities of the EU in
fulfilling its promises. If the EU fulfils its promises, the credibility of conditionality
increases, but if it does not, the credibility decreases. (Schimmelfennig and
Sedelmeier 2005: 13-16).
According to Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, the EU must be capable of
withholding rewards in cases of non-compliance, and capable of delivering the
rewards in cases of compliance (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004: 673). Its
capability must also be known by the target country (Sedelmeier 2011: 12), and
trust between the EU and the target country must be established (Pridham
2007a: 464). Furthermore, as Vachudova has stressed, the EUs credibility
depends on its use of merit-based monitoring (Vachudova 2005: 112-20). If the
EUs conditionality strategy is not credible, the target country can use this
uncertainty to gain room for manoeuvre (Grabbe 2006: 192), or it can criticize
the EU for its double standards (Tocci 2007: 24).
In the existing literature, there are different opinions about the
credibility of the EUs conditionality. According to Vachudova, the EU has
developed a merit-based approach to monitor the target countries. According to
her, they are more or less evaluated on the same basis and subject to the same
requirements (Vachudova 2005: 112). However, Smith and Anastasakis argue
that the EU might impose very strict conditions when rewarding some countries,
and loose conditions when rewarding others (Anastasakis 2008; K. Smith 2003a).
Similarly, for Schimmelfennig, the EU sometimes abandons the political
conditionality criteria in favour of interest based policies (Schimmelfennig 2007:
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140). For instance, ignoring human rights violations in Russia, Libya, Sudan and
China for energy, trade, or security related concerns raised doubts about EUs
sincerity in promoting human rights in third countries (K. Smith 2003b: 116-20;
Youngs 2009: 44). Inconsistency among the member countries in rewarding
target countries reduces the credibility of its conditionality. (Aybet 2006: 538;
Baç 2008: 214-16). Also, the EUs credibility suffers if there is an inconsistency
between the Commission and the member states (Grabbe and Sedelmeier 2010:
382). Furthermore, if the EU does not set a definite deadline for administering
the rewards it promises, and makes unclear promises, this also reduces the
credibility of conditionality (Lavenex and Uçarer 2004; Pridham 2007a: 459;
Steunenberg and Dimitrova 2007). On the other hand, by not setting a definite
deadline for administering rewards, the EU can increase the efficiency of
conditionality. This is because candidate countries can be punished, or their
reward can be administered by the EU, at any time during the negotiations. This
motivates candidate counties to adopt norms in an on-going manner
(Anastasakis 2008: 368; Avery 2009: 263; Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2008: 207;
Steunenberg and Dimitrova 2007).
The value of the reward also plays a role in determining the credibility of
conditionality. Membership conditionality has the highest cost for the EU, and is
the highest reward for candidate countries (i.e. in comparison with technical and
financial assistance). For example, the EU has made attempts at collaboration
with Morocco and Algeria on issues of counter-terrorism (Wolff 2009a: 150,
2009b: 173). However, they have not been able to make progress because they
have not offered either country a membership incentive (Hadfield 2009: 93-94).
Admission of new members into the EU requires a new infrastructure, and new
members increase the heterogeneity of the Union. The decision making process
becomes more complicated with the addition of new members (Leuffen and
Schimmelfennig 2007: 7). Based on these considerations, the credibility of
conditionality hypothesis for this study is:
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The adoption of EU promoted norms in the field of counter-terrorism increases in
line with the credibility of membership prospects.
In the changing relations between Turkey and the EU, credibility of conditionality
is considered to play a crucial role in the transformation of Turkish counter-
terrorism policies towards the PKK. As repeatedly emphasized, violent PKK
attacks towards civilians and the armed forces, and its secessionist motives to
establish an independent state in Southeastern Turkey, generates turmoil in
Turkish domestic politics. If the Turkish government downplays these attacks and
motives, they may then be in a weak position and unable accomplish their
fundamental security duties. This is why they have often employed hard-line
counter-terrorism policies with the aim of eliminating the PKK, and in order to
retain their political power. In order to abandon such policies, there must be a
tangible reward for Turkish political actors. EU membership is the most valuable
incentive for Turkish politicians to give up their existing counter-terrorism
policies, and convince the Turkish public, opposition parties, and those in
nationalist circles that it is in the countries best interest to do so. So, having
credible EU membership prospects is an important factor in changing Turkeys
counter-terrorism policies in line with EU requirements.
3.4.2. Adoption Costs
The adoption cost of EU promoted rules is another important factor in
measuring the efficiency of conditionality. According to Schimmelfening and
Sedelmeier, adoption of EU promoted norms upsets the domestic equilibrium in
candidate states, which means that their existing/traditional policies conflict
with the EUs liberal democratic policies. It therefore creates a political cost for
candidate countries. Otherwise, the policies would be adopted without
resistance (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 16). In order to offset
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adoption costs, the EU provides motivational incentives to target countries. As
many authors emphasize, EU membership is the most precious reward for many
countries (Grabbe and Sedelmeier 2010: 390; Schimmelfennig et al. 2006: 54;
Schimmelfennig 2007). However, the decisions of target states also depend on
the size of domestic costs (Schimmelfennig et al. 2006: 52).
In the existing literature, there are several reasons given for there being
high adoption costs. Klievewer and Stivachtis state that the reduction of state
autonomy is one of the high adoption costs (Klievewer and Stivachtis 2007: 153).
ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽǎŝŚŝđĂŶĚtŝĞƐĞƌ ?ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞƚĂƌŐĞƚĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ
relies on ethno-nationalist representation, creates another high adoption cost
ĨŽƌƚŚŝƌĚĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ?ǎŝŚŝđĂŶĚtŝĞƐĞƌ ? ? ? ? Z ?ŶĚĂƐ^ĐŚŝŵŵĞůĨĞŶŶŝŐŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚƐ ?ŝĨ
the liberal democratic norms of the EU effect the security and integrity of a
state, this also increases the adoption costs for it (Schimmelfennig 2007: 130).
In the area of counter-terrorism, which is related to national security and
sovereignty, adoption costs are high for governments (Bakar 2011: 15). The
leverage an external actor has upon such critical security issues could raise
domestic opposition. The domestic opponents consider rule adoption as a
weakening factor in the struggle against counter-terrorism. Furthermore, they
can criticize the government for betrayal (Walker 2013: 229). Therefore, a low
level of adoption cost is a necessary factor for the adoption of EU promoted
liberal democratic norms. Based on these arguments, the hypothesis regarding
the relationship between the adoption costs and rule adoption is:
The fewer adoption costs there are, the higher the compliance is with the EU
promoted norms that relate to counter-terrorism policies.
In view of the cited literature, adopting the EUs liberal democratic norms, whilst
engaging with the PKK, is costly for Turkey. State elitists, such as higher-ranking
army officers or senior Supreme Court members, and opposition parties,
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perceive the transposition of EU rules as a risk to domestic security. It is thought
that adopting EU rules makes countering the PKK by military means impossible,
and so leads to an escalation of PKK influence in the Southeastern region of
Turkey. Furthermore, granting ethnic minority rights to Kurds is considered to
increase the risk of a Kurdish state forming in the Southeastern part of Turkey.
Therefore, aside from tangible incentives, events that reduce adoption costs for
decision makers in Turkey, are needed in order to facilitating the adoption of EU
promoted norms. The unilateral ceasefire of the PKK, or the capture of PKK
leader Abdullah Ocalan, are examples of such events.
3.5. Socialization
Although conditionality is the dominant approach used to explain the interaction
between Turkey and the EU, it does not always explain the changing patterns of
political behaviour in Turkey. More specifically, it does not do so in the absence
of membership prospects and with high adoption costs. Hence, another
complementary mechanism is needed. To this end, the Socialization mechanism
counterbalances the weaknesses of the conditionality mechanism.
The socialization mechanism is defined by Checkel as a process of
adopting and internalizing the norms of a certain community, which is
independent of the material incentives offered and sanctions imposed (Checkel
2005: 804). In the enlargement framework, the EU is considered as an agent that
socializes third countries by promoting its norms. Correspondingly, the third
countries are the agents socialized by the EU, because they come to believe EU
norms are appropriate to solve their indigenous problems.
In the existing literature, three logics have been used in conceptualizing
Socialization. In the first group of literature, Socialization is based on the logic of
appropriateness, in which individual states learn from the community they
identify with (Kubicek 2003: 6).4 A socialization agent, such as the EU, persuades,
shames, or teaches the target country to adopt appropriate norms and rules
4
For Kubicek this is identified as convergence through socialization.
101
(Checkel 2005: 804; Risse and Sikkink 1999: 1-38). As Kubicek has noted, norm
diffusion occurs when the target country accepts that Good people do X
(Kubicek 2003: 6). According to the second group, the socializing agent and the
socialized actor can engage with each other because the socializing agent offers
material benefits to the socialized actor, and the socialized actor has domestic
costs that it wishes to reduce.5 The EU transfers its community norms, values,
and rules to improve its own security, welfare, and power. On the other hand,
the target country adopts community rules to increase its political utility. In that
sense, neither the EU nor the target country engages in socialization due to the
appropriateness of the community rules, but rather due to the logic of
consequence (Schimmelfennig et al. 2006: 18-19). According to Kubicek, this
type of norm diffusion can be understood as Do X to get Y (Kubicek 2003: 6).
Some authors have also argued that the socialization process combines both
logics, which is called the Spiral Model. Governments are not only actors in
socialization processes. There are also norm entrepreneurs and epistemic
communities, and in addition, advocacy networks also play a crucial role. When
socialization occurs, the government of a target country at first uses the logic of
consequence, and resists adopting community rules to protect its power.
However, the moral discourse, initiated by mediating domestic actors (such as
norm entrepreneurs) breaks down this resistance. So, over time and due to
increasing pressure, they end up adopting the community rules as a result of the
logic of appropriateness (Risse and Sikkink 1999: 16).
This research utilizes the logic of appropriateness in understanding
socialization. According to this form of socialization, adoption of the EU rules by
Turkish political actors is based on the appropriateness of the norms, rather than
on cost-benefit calculations made by them. The EUs political conditions
promoting human rights and ethnic minority rights are transposed by Turkish
political actors because consideration of these norms can help to find a peaceful
5
For Kubicek this is identified as instrumental convergence.
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solution to PKK terrorism. The theoretical framework for socialization will be
explained in the next section, in order to understand how socialization leads to
the transformation of Turkeys counter-terrorism policies in line with the EU
promoted norms.
3.6. Theorizing Socialization
The EUs Socialization mechanism is based on Sociological Institutionalism. This
theoretical approach is built on the logic of appropriateness, in which political
actors follow rules of a certain environment associated with identities, values,
and norms. According to Sociological Institutionalism, members of an institution
engage in appropriate actions depending on their previous experiences. These
actions provide stability to the institution and are good for the individuals
themselves (G. Peters 1999: 103-06).
Social interaction between political actors involves learning, and as a
consequence of what is learnt, their political behaviour changes (Checkel 1999:
547). Material benefits provided by the socializing institution are not the main
cause of changing political behaviour, in this model. If the socialized actors are
convinced that the promoted rules of the socializing institution are legitimate
and appropriate, they adopt the norms of the institution (March and Olsen 1998:
951-52). If not, they carry on with their existing behaviour.
As a Normative Power, the EU promotes liberal democratic values such as
the rule of law, and the protection of human and ethnic minority rights, in its
neighbourhood (see section 2.1). When countries in the vicinity of the EU
consider these norms to be appropriate to solve their internal problems, then
they adopt them autonomously. In such circumstances, no disputes arise
between the socializing and socialized actors. Instead, the norms are adopted
through a social learning process (Beichelt 2012: 8).
In view of Turkeys counter-terrorism policies, the EU promoted liberal
democratic norms offer a potentially appropriate way to solve PKK terrorism
peacefully. For example, democratic control over armed forces obliges security
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officers to be more accountable for their actions during counter-terrorism
operations. Also, adherence to human rights limits the abuse of coercive power
by security forces against terrorist suspects. In addition, providing public services
in the Kurdish language (e.g. by translating municipal documents into Kurdish)
integrates Kurdish citizens into society and protects them from PKK
manipulation. Therefore, Turkish political actors might adopt these norms if they
come to accept that they are an appropriate solution to existing terrorism
problems. Furthermore, they may conform to these norms due to thinking that
Turkish citizens deserve to have democratic standards similar to those enjoyed
by EU citizens.
Although Sociological Institutionalism constitutes a theoretical
framework for understanding the Socialization strategy, there are a few
mediating factors, which are influential on the efficiency of the EUs socialization
strategy. In the next section, the Social Learning Model and its two
independent variables, the Legitimacy of EU Requirements and Domestic
Resonance, will be explained in order to emphasize how the EUs socialization
strategy can be efficient in altering Turkeys counter-terrorism policy towards
the PKK.
3.7. Social Learning Model
The social learning model is grounded in Sociological Institutionalism. According
to this theoretical model, compliance with norms is not an issue of rational
choice. Instead, state behaviour is governed by rules and the appropriateness of
the norms (Checkel 2001: 557). Likewise, the social learning model assumes the
logic of appropriateness (Olsen 2002: 928-29). In this model, the EU is seen as
an international community having its own identity and norms. The non-member
states adopt these norms if they are appropriate for solving their domestic
problems (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 18). In this study, the social
learning model is used as an alternative model to explain Turkeys changing
behaviour in the absence of credible membership prospects. In this context, the
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two variables of the model (Legitimacy of EU Requirements and Domestic
Resonance) are used as controlling variables in addition to the external
incentive model variables.
3.7.1. Legitimacy of the EU Requirements
According to Franck, legitimacy means the quality of a rule, or a system of rules,
or a process for making or interpreting rules that pulls both the rule makers and
those addressed by the rules toward voluntary compliance(Franck 1992: 50). In
line with this definition, the quality of institutional requirements are further
increased if these requirements are respected both by institutions and
individuals. In terms of the EU norm diffusion framework, the EU demands on
third countries gain legitimacy if these demands are respected by the EU (and its
member countries) as well as by third countries. In order to improve the
legitimacy of the EU requirements, these demands should be based on factors
such as clarity, consistency, and the ownership of the EU (Schimmelfennig and
Sedelmeier 2004: 676).
Setting clearly defined requirements is one of the determinants of the
efficiency of the socialization strategy. As Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier have
emphasized, if the norms proposed by the EU are clearly defined, the likelihood
of rule adoption increases in target countries (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier
2005: 13). Clarity in the requirements reduces the risks of political management
in third countries, because domestic political actors know what the EU is
demanding, and what they should do in order to meet those demands (Tocci
2007: 25). Although in theory norm clarity is known as a facilitating factor in rule
adoption, in practise norm clarity is not always achieved by the EU.
According to Grabbe, contrary to the acquis related rules, the political
requirements set by the EU in the Copenhangen Criteria of 1993, are vaguely
defined (Grabbe 2001: 1025) and they have a moving target problem, which
means they are not fixed and evolve over time (Grabbe 2002: 251). Tocci sees
this vagueness as a problem for the EUs conflict resolution role. As she argues,
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the EU does not specify solutions to resolve conflicts between parties. It uses
fuzzy expressions such as peaceful and non-violent solutions, effective political
participation and the right to enjoy ones culture, which do not give clear
guidelines on how to proceed (Tocci 2007: 25). This lack of clarity may be
interpreted as being due to a lack of interest on the EUs part in solving such
conflicts. As a consequence, contending parties pursue their own initiatives
rather than EU proposals.
In view of the above, the clarity of EU requirements is important for any
country struggling with terrorism, and at the same time trying to become
members of the EU. If such countries are subject to severe EU criticism, they will
naturally expect the EU to suggest a concrete alternative strategy. If there is no
such strategy in the EU structure, the EU becomes a power that tells others in
general terms what to do, but does not have a specific solution to propose. In
the absence of clear guidelines on how to act, the legitimacy of the EU
requirements on counter-terrorism policy will decrease. The candidate countries
will interpret the EU requirements widely for their own interests, and, in the
end, the EU promoted norms will not be adopted in an appropriate way.
Along with clarity, consistency increases the legitimacy of the EU
requirements. In order to be consistent, each member of the EU and each of its
institutions should endorse the requirements that the EU lays down
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 18). Non-member countries may
reasonably object from having to adopt an EU promoted norm, if there is
disagreement about it within the EU (Sedelmeier 2011: 11).
Some EU countries have had real experiences of domestic terrorism,
whilst others have not. For example, there has been little domestic terrorism in
the Netherlands and Belgium, whilst the UK, France, Spain, Germany and Italy,
have experienced relatively high levels of terrorism (Rees and Aldrich 2005: 910).
As such, different EU countries have different threat perceptions regarding the
possibility of terrorist attacks. Because of this diversity amongst the member
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countries, there have been negative consequence when it comes to norm
promotion in third countries. Those EU countries which have faced terrorism
themselves tend to be more sympathetic with the hard-line counter-terrorist
approach that candidate countries have used. However, those countries which
have not faced a terror problem in their territory, tend to pursue a more rigid
approach towards these countries. A lack of unanimity amongst member states
reduces the legitimacy of EU requirements.
The ownership issue is another factor that is influential on the
legitimacy of the EU requirements. If the EU can create an impression that the
requirements have been formulated by the EU itself (i.e. that they own them),
this may lead to an increase in the legitimacy of the EU demands
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 19). Furthermore, if the EU requirements
are based on the EUs legal structure, and overlap with other requirement laid
down by other international organisations, then the legitimacy of the EU
requirements increase in target countries (Freyburg et al. 2009: 926). However,
in some policy areas the EU may lack clear rules of their own, or its rules may
conflict with those of other international organisations (Schimmelfennig and
Sedelmeier 2005: 19). In such cases, the legitimacy of the EU requirements are
undermined because of cross-socialization. In order to promote liberal counter-
terrorism policies, the EU uses both the norms of other international
organisations, and its own norms, to transform the counter-terrorism policies of
candidate countries. For instance, the EU utilizes the European Court of Human
Rights litigations to emphasize its concerns about human rights violations that
relate to counter-terrorism policies in candidate states. Alternatively, the EU
evaluates the progress of the candidate states counter-terrorism policies by
relying on the OSCE recommendations, which relate to ethnic minority rights. If
these institutions monitoring mechanisms and legal frameworks overlap with
the EU demands, the legitimacy of the EU requirements increases. However,
where the EU lacks its own rules and monitoring mechanisms, and relies almost
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solely on the rules and mechanisms of other institutions, the EU itself will be less
influential in altering the political behaviour of candidate countries. In light of
the discussion above, the hypothesis regarding the legitimacy of EU
requirements proposed in this research is:
The adoption of EU promoted liberal democratic norms (relating to counter-
terrorism) increases if the legitimacy of the EU requirements increases.
In EU-Turkey relations, the legitimacy of the EU demands is an important factor
in ensuring that Turkish political actors adopt the EU promoted norms to change
their counter-terrorism policies. In consideration of the high adoption costs that
terrorist attacks impose on policy transformation in Turkey, Turkish decision
makers pay great attention to whether the EU demands are clear to follow,
whether they are applied consistently, and whether they are owned solely by the
EU or shared with other international organisations. If the EU requirements lack
clarity, Turkish political actors may take advantage of their ambiguity, and
continue to implement their existing counter-terrorism policies in order to avoid
conflict with domestic opposition. Similarly, if the EU demands are inconsistent,
there is no convincing reason for the Turkish political elite to transpose EU
promoted norms, because other EU members have not themselves adopted
them. Furthermore, Turkey has been monitored not only by the EU, but also by
other international organisation (such as the UN, the CoE, the ECtHR, and the
OSCE). If the requirements of the other international organisations are more
dominant than the EUs, then this decreases the latters legitimacy, which may
lead to the Turkish political elite paying less attention to them than they do to
the former. However, if the EUs demands overlap with the requirements of
other international organisations, this can increase the legitimacy of the EUs
demands which increases the efficiency of the EUs socialization mechanism.
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3.7.2. Domestic Resonance
The adoption of the EU promoted norms also depends on the attitude of
domestic political actors and the general public. Whether a non-member state
complies with the appropriate rules depends on how these rules are perceived
by the domestic political elite and the public. According to Schimmelfennig and
Sedelmeier, two things increase domestic resonance. Firstly, domestic resonance
is increased if domestic political actors are open to innovative ideas regarding
how to solve their domestic problems. Secondly, it is increased if those ideas are
accepted as being legitimate by the general public, i.e. if they chime with their
existing cultural and political beliefs (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 20)
In relation to the first point, in the absence of domestic policy
prescriptions in a problematic area, or where the EU promoted norms are
perceived as being better than the existing domestic rules, domestic political
actors are likely to be more open to rule adoption. Unless domestic political
actors are open in this way, rule adoption is unlikely to occur in the target
country. Existing policies will be stubbornly applied without proper consideration
of their failures, and without proper consideration of the available alternatives.
In relation to the second point, a lack of domestic legitimacy can stem
from the tendency of public administrative bodies to reflect the existing cultural
and political beliefs of the general public. If those existing beliefs conflict with
the new policies, they tend to stick to policies based on historical legacies and
traditional habits that do not conflict in this way (Pridham 2007b: 248). In so
doing, they refrain from adopting the EU promoted norms in order not to
damage national political culture (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 20).
On the basis of the above discussion, the hypothesis proposed in this
study with regard to domestic resonance is:
The adoption of EU promoted liberal democratic norms (relating to counter-
terrorism) increases in line with an increasing level of domestic resonance.
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Applied to Turkey, the hypothesis says that in order for there to be an effective
transformation of Turkeys counter-terrorism policies, there should be openness
amongst the Turkish political actors to adopt innovative EU promoted norms.
Turkish politicians, judiciary, senior security officials, and the general public
must, therefore, realise that the existing hard-line counter-terrorism policies
have failed to solve the PKK problem. In addition, they must also come to believe
that the EU promoted liberal democratic norms should be considered as the best
alternative policy option.
However, in dealing with such a sensitive security issue, the adoption of
EU promoted norms may be seen as a threat to internal security and territorial
integrity. Furthermore, a fear of Kurdish territorial separation may lead to there
being a consensus that existing hard-line counter-terrorism policies are
legitimate and the most appropriate way to deal with the PKK. This consensual
legitimacy may also play into the hands of supporters of hard-line counter-
terrorism policies in public administration. Therefore, the Turkish political elite,
judiciary, and security bureaucrats, may be reluctant to abandon their traditional
understanding of how to deal with counter-terrorism. Moreover, these decision
makers may not be aware that the EU promoted liberal democratic norms can be
useful in diminishing the manipulation of Kurdish citizens by the PKK.
3.8. The Tools Evaluating Adoption of EU Promoted Norms
In order to evaluate the accession progress of candidate states, the EU
Commission has played a gatekeeper role. It is this institution that determines
whether a candidate states passes to another stage in the process of accession
(Grabbe 2001: 1019-20, 2002: 256). To follow this progress, the EU employs five
instruments in order to apply the conditionality and socialization mechanisms.
Firstly, the EU uses demarches to condemn candidate states in cases
where their practices are undemocratic (e.g. where abuses of human and ethnic
minority rights take place). Any criticism made by the EU has a powerful impact
on democratic debates in candidate states, because the EU questions the
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performance of the indigenous government openly (Grabbe 2001: 1021). The
EUs negative assessment may undermine the success of the government in the
eyes of its electorate (Vachudova 2005: 127). On the other hand, gaining EU
approval legitimizes the political choices of the domestic political actors (Grabbe
2001: 1021).
Secondly, opinions are another tool used by the EU to evaluate the
progress of candidate states. In July 1997 the European Commission published
its Opinions by assessing each candidate state in the light of the Copenhagen
political criteria and their ability to apply the acquis. Moreover, it made
predictions about whether candidate states are ready for membership
(Vachudova 2005: 128).
Thirdly, progression reports are one of the important instruments used
by the EU to assess the progression of candidate states. The progression reports
were published for the first time in 1998, and have been subsequently published
yearly and includes an assessment of every candidate state until they become
members of the Union (Vachudova 2005: 129). These reports include different
sections in which the European Commission evaluates the progression of each
candidate states under the categories: Copenhagen Political Criteria, Economic
Criteria, the Ability to Assume the Obligation of Membership, Common
Foreign and Security Policy, amongst many others (Usul 2011: 62). As
mentioned earlier, there is no chapter on counter-terrorism in acquis. So, there
is no specific section reserved only for the evaluation of the counter-terrorism
policies of candidate states in the progression reports. However, counter-
terrorism policy failures are evaluated under the Copenhagen Political Criteria
or the Justice and Home Affairs sections.
Fourthly, the accession partnership and the national programmes are two
other tools designed to promote rule adoption. The accession partnership
provides a clear work plan to candidate countries, in which the rules and
regulations they must adopt are outlined (Grabbe 2001: 1022; Vachudova 2005:
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130). Furthermore, the European Commission sets a time frame in each
accession partnership (such as mid-term and long-term) to indicate which
reforms should be a priority for candidate countries. In response to this,
candidate countries prepare a national programme, which consist of reforms
that the government intends to fulfil. Promised reforms are also categorized
under mid-term and long-term priorities (Vachudova 2005: 130). The national
programmes are also an indication that a candidate countrys government is
aware of the EU requirements and its responsibilities.
Finally, screening and negotiations are other important tools in
evaluating progression towards accession. Screening involves the process of
checking whether the domestic laws are compatible with the acquis. It is carried
out collectively by the Commission and candidate states. After the screening
process, the EU and the candidate state enter into negotiations based around
each individual chapter of the acquis, and candidate states must prove that they
have made progress in the adoption and implementation of the rules given in
each of its chapters (Usul 2011: 63; Vachudova 2005: 130-32).
3.9. Policy Actors
In order to understand policy changes using the conditionality and socialization
mechanisms, the political actors who have a direct or implicit impact on Turkeys
counter-terrorism policy should be taken into consideration. These actors play a
significant role in the transformation of Turkeys counter-terrorism policies in
line with EU rules. They sometimes aid norm diffusion in Turkey, and sometimes
hinder it. In this respect, this section will focus on these policy entrepreneurs.
They will be categorised as falling into two major groups; internal and external
actors.
3.9.1. Internal Actors
In order to understand the transformation of Turkeys counter-terrorism policies,
it is important to understand the perceptions of its internal political actors. If the
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majority of these actors see the EU promoted norms as being appropriate and
beneficial for Turkey, norm diffusion is likely to occur. On the other hand, if the
majority of the internal actors are against the reforms, it is not likely to occur.
There are two groups of internal actors in Turkey who are influential in
the EU accession process. The first group is known as the pro-EU
coalition/circle, and its members support the adoption of EU norms (Eylemer
and Tas 2007; Önis 2003: 20). This group is aware of the dangers of terrorism
and seek democratic ways to deal with it and to prevent the threat of Kurdish
separation. According to this group, adoption of the EU promoted norms can be
helpful in finding a peaceful solution of PKK terrorism. With the use of the EU
rules, these policy entrepreneurs also aim to increase their influence in the
political system (Eylemer and Tas 2007: 570; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier
2005: 11).
The second group are known as the veto players and its members
oppose the adoption of EU norms (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004; Young
and Dugan 2011). According to Tsebelis, veto players are individual or collective
actors and securing their agreement is a necessary condition of changing the
status quo. The change in the status quo requires the unanimous agreement of
all the veto players (Tsebelis 2002: 19). According to this group, the PKKs
terrorist activities can be solved only by military means, and they defend the
adoption of hard-line counter-terrorism legislation. The adoption of EU rules in
the area of human and ethnic minority is thought by them to weaken Turkey in
its struggle against the PKK, and so they are considered as a threat to territorial
integrity. Liberal laws are seen as a concession to terrorists and their supporters.
Security based concerns are seen by this group as being more important than
the possible benefits of EU membership, and the adoption of the liberal values of
the Europe.
Nevertheless, the distinction between the pro-EU coalition and the veto
players is not stable. The political stance of these actors towards the adoption of
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EU promoted norms has changed during the EU accession process. The political
actors who oppose EU reforms at one time may at other times position
themselves with reformist groups, and so may at those times in fact support the
adoption of EU promoted norms. Contrarily, some of those who are generally
placed in the reformist camp may at times ally themselves with veto players and
challenge EU reforms. In this respect, rather than focusing on these political
actors according to the aforementioned grouping, they will be examined under
four groups.
The first group is the Turkish governments, who are the primary political
actors in policy making in Turkey. All legislative actions and institution building
initiatives put in place to protect human rights are under the responsibility of the
government of the time. There are four Ministries in the government who are
relevant in this discussion. The first two are the Ministry of the Interior, and the
Ministry of Defence, and they deal with counter-terrorism. The second two are
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry for EU Affairs, and are
responsible for negotiating with the EU. But each of these Ministries is
responsible to the government, and so, therefore, the governments decision is
binding on each of these Ministries and their subsidiary organs.
The second group is the Turkish Army, which is the leading security actor
in the struggle with the PKK. Even though the military is legally and institutionally
responsible to government, in practise it has had an autonomy on security
matters, and has not been accountable in any substantial sense to any civilian
government since the 1960s (Greenwood 2005; Karaosmanoglu and Kibaroglu
2002). In this respect, the EU requirements, such as the requirement to increase
the accountability of security forces, makes the Turkish Army an important
internal political actor in the norm diffusion process, because if the EU rules are
adopted, they will lose their autonomy and impunity, a result they wish to resist.
The third group is the Judiciary. It is another internal actor that shapes
the counter-terrorism policy of Turkey. The court decisions regarding terror
114
suspects are not only subject to EU monitoring but also ECtHR decisions. If the
Judiciarys decisions conflict with ECtHR litigation, then this creates a problem
between Turkey and the EU, and necessitates further domestic legislative
changes. So, it is important to understand the position of the judiciary towards
the EU requirements.
The fourth group is the general public, who are implicitly influential on
Turkish counter-terrorism policies. Public opinion is an important determinant of
whether Turkish governments are able to adopt the EU required norms. If public
opinion carries electoral risks for the government (e.g. because of a reduction in
its popularity), the government will be reluctant to adopt the EU norms, and will
shy away from EU based initiatives. On the hand, strong public support makes it
easy for the government to adopt EU norms. In this respect, public opinion
towards the EU required norms will be taken into consideration in order to
determine which norm diffusion mechanism is influential in Turkey.
3.9.2. External Actors
The external actors are another political group who are influential on policy
adjustments in Turkey. In this study, the EU is seen as the major external policy
actor. However, there are also three other external policy actors who share
regulations and recommendations with the EU in the area of counter-terrorism.
That the influence of these actors is considered is important when measuring the
legitimacy of the EU requirement in Turkey. As indicated earlier (see section
3.7.1), when the EUs demands overlap with other international organisations,
their legitimacy is increased.
The first of these external political actors is the CoE and its subsidiary
institutions (such as the ECtHR, the European Committee for the Prevention of
Torture (CPT), and the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe (VCCE)).6 The
EU screens Turkeys human rights record by observing the ECtHR rulings, the CPT
6
The Venice Commission assisted Council of Europe members in drafting new constitutions and
laws on constitutional courts, electoral codes, minority rights and the legal framework relating to
democratic institutions.
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reports, and its cooperation with VCCE. Along with these instruments, the EU
monitors compensation payments to those Turkish citizens identified as victims
in the ECtHR rulings. The EU supports legislative changes that are made in
conformance with the ECtHR litigations, and the CPT reports.
The second external policy actor contributing to legal Turkish counter-
terrorism policy is the UN. The EU promotes the ratification of the UN
conventions on terrorism to its member states and the third countries (European
Union 2001: 7-8). Furthermore, the EU closely follows whether candidate states
have adhered to UN protocols with regard to human and ethnic minority rights
(Commission of the European Communities 2003: 110-19). Ratifying these UN
rules is in itself a requirement that is laid down by the EU on candidate countries.
The third external policy actor is the OSCE. Although the OSCE has a
limited capacity to play an active role in fighting terrorism, its recommendations
regarding public awareness and legal assistance are used by the EU to address
problems in candidate states (Tardy 2004: 131). For example, the expertise and
political dialogue of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM)
guides the EU authorities when evaluating ethnic based conflicts in candidate
states (Kelley 2004: 17).
3.10. Conclusion
As explicated in the previous sections, conditionality and socialization are two
prominent mechanisms that are considered when explaining the EU influence on
Turkeys counter-terrorism policy towards the PKK. Why these two mechanisms
are the most appropriate in dealing with EU-Turkey relations is related to
Turkeys candidate status, as explained in chapter 2. Even though, these
mechanisms have been used for the CEECs, the Western Balkans and Turkey to
explain the EU influence on domestic policy adjustments, they will be employed
for the first time here to examine a candidate states counter-terrorism policies.
Relying on just one of these mechanisms alone may be insufficient to
explain the EU influence on Turkey. Using the conditionality mechanism alone
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may be insufficient because it appears that norm diffusion has occurred in
Turkey even in the absence of concrete incentives. For this reason, it is necessary
to also consider the socialization mechanism. Using the socialization mechanism
alone, on the other hand, ignores the fact that when there are concrete
incentives, norm diffusion is easier to secure. So, it is necessary to consider both
mechanisms. In this regard, it is possible to build a bridge between the two
mechanisms by showing how they can both be operative (Jupille et al. 2003: 17-
19). Therefore, in this study both the conditionality and the socialization
mechanism will be used in order to better conceptualization the EU influence on
Turkeys counter-terrorism policy.
According to the conditionality mechanism, in the context of counter-
terrorism, the likelihood of rule adoption increases if the EU provides a clear
membership prospect to candidate countries, and there is a low level of terrorist
threat. In line with this proposition, in this thesis Turkey is regarded as a rational
political actor, which calculates the material benefits of EU membership and the
costs of transforming its counter-terrorism policies. If the value of being an EU
member is considered to be higher than the domestic political cost of changing
counter-terrorism policies towards the PKK, Turkey is expected adopt EU
promoted norms. However, in the absence of clear membership prospect and
high levels of terrorist violence, the likelihood of rule adoption in Turkey
decreases.
However, according to the socialization mechanism, in the context of
counter-terrorism, rule adoption will be most effective if domestic political
actors consider the EU requirements to be legitimate, and they are open-minded
about adopting the EU promoted norms. In this respect, Turkey, as a socialized
agent, adopts the EU promoted norms because EU norms are an appropriate
way of solving its PKK problem in peaceful way. If Turkish political actors see the
EU requirements as being legitimate and appropriate, they are expected to
adopt EU promoted norms. Nevertheless, if the EU requirements are not seen to
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be legitimate, and Turkish political actors are reluctant to change existing policy,
rule adoption will be unsuccessful.
The efficiency of the conditionality and socialization mechanisms in terms
of the speed and quantity of the reforms they facilitate is another question that
requires empirical investigation. These issues will be dealt with based on the
results obtained in the empirical chapters.
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4. Role of the EU in Promotion of Liberal
Democratic Norms to Third Countries in
Counter-Terror Context
4.1. Introduction
The interactions between the EU and Turkey that are influential in transforming
Turkeys counter-terrorism policies do not take place independently of political
developments in the EU. In line with the EUs (and its member states and
institutions) changing perception of the threat of terrorism, the priorities of the
EU oscillate between security and liberty. Sometimes security related concerns
outweigh liberty based concerns, and sometimes the latter outweigh the former.
The shifting priorities of European political actors also leads to policy
change in the EU, and this is not only influential on the EU and its constituents,
but also on candidate countries like Turkey, whose human and ethnic minority
rights policies are closely monitored by the EU. But it is not only the EU that
monitors Turkey. Turkish political/security actors also keep a close eye on the
EU. Any attempt by the EU or any of its constituents to strengthen its security-
based policies are closely observed and may be used in Turkey to justify its hard-
line counter-terrorism practices (e.g. by justifying the widening of the definition
of terrorism, or the increasing of detention periods). Therefore, the fact that the
EU oscillates between security and liberty is significant, as this has an influential
effect on the legitimacy of the requirements that the EU expects Turkey to meet.
Turkeys counter-terrorism policies change along with the EUs changing
standards.
As discussed in the theoretical chapter (chapter 3), the socialization
mechanism used by the EU to encourage Turkey to adjust its policies depend on
the legitimacy of the EU requirements. In terms of civil rights protection, if the
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EU requirements are legitimate then its impact on Turkeys counter-terrorism
policies will be high. Otherwise, Turkey will not take the EU requirements
seriously, and this will undermine EUs normative power to effect on Turkey.
In view of these arguments, this chapter looks at the EUs role in the
promotion of liberal democratic rights to third countries, in the context of
counter-terrorism. It will reveal whether those political developments in the EU,
relevant to counter-terrorism and human rights, have provided a legitimate
setting for Turkey to adopt EU norms. The challenges faced by the EU with
regard to security and liberty, and its reflection on third countries, will be
examined in detail. The findings of this chapter will be used within the empirical
chapters to assess whether the EUs changing role in the promotion of liberal
democratic policies in the counter-terrorism domain have been influential on
Turkey.
This chapter argues that, in the context of counter-terrorism, the EUs
role in the promotion of liberal democratic norms in third countries is not stable.
In line with an increasing threat of terrorism in the EU, the political actors of the
Union transpose many security-oriented policies to third countries. However,
when the threat of terrorism diminishes, liberty once more becomes important
and new human rights initiatives are developed.
Three critical time periods will be considered, namely; the pre-Tampere
period (1970-1999), the post-Tampere period (1999-2004), and the post-
Madrid/London period (2004-2013). The intersections of these periods
correspond with major events in the EU, which mark the beginning of policy
development aimed at transforming the counter-terrorism policies of third
countries. In the Tampere Summit in 1999, for the first time the EU officially
admitted the necessity of transforming the internal security policies of third
countries, in line with EU standards, for the safety of the Union. At the start of
the Madrid/London period, however, the EU countries Spain and the UK became
targets of Al-Qaida terrorist attacks (in 2004 and 2005 respectively). After these
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attacks, terrorism became a common problem in the EU and many EU initiatives
were put into practice to influence the counter-terrorism policies of third
countries.
The time periods selected in this chapter differ slightly from those
selected in chapter 1. The reason for this is that the EU and Turkey have different
strategic cultures. According to the concept of strategic culture, states and
intergovernmental institutions have an institutional culture, which is constituted
by historical experiences, strategic preferences, beliefs, values, and geographical
necessities. These factors shape the political/strategic behaviour, and the policy
decisions about security threats, that states and supranational institutions make
(Biava et al. 2011: 1227-28; Johnston 1995: 34; Rees and Aldrich 2005: 906-07;
Toje 2005: 122). The EU (as an institution) and Turkey have different strategic
cultures and deal with terrorist threats differently. Therefore, the EUs role in
promoting liberal democratic norms in Turkey will be evaluated within these
different time periods.
4.2. The Pre-Tampere Period
The first steps made in establishing a common approach towards the external
terrorism threat date back to early 1970s. During these years, terrorism was not
a common concern for EC states. However, after the hostage crisis in the 1972
Munich Olympic Games, which ended up with murder of 11 Jewish athletes by
the Palestinian terrorist group Black September, things began to change. In this
respect, an informal ad hoc group TREVI (Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extrémisme et
Violence Internationale) was established in 1976 to improve police cooperation
among the European countries (Hoffman 1999: 71; Peek 1994: 201). The TREVI
working group was composed from ministers and law enforcement chiefs of
member states. In their meetings, best practices of national authorities and
general policing issues were discussed amongst the contributors (Den Boer and
Walker 1993: 6). These informal gatherings are considered successful for
providing an opportunity for European countries to develop counter-terrorism
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cooperation (Hoffman 1999: 71; Monar 2001: 750). However, the promotion of
liberal democratic norms to third countries was not a concern of the TREVI
group.
The first symptoms of change appeared in line with the idea of
constructing the European Union. The members of the EC drew up a document
called the Copenhagen Declaration in 1973, which listed democracy, the rule of
law, and human rights as fundamental values of European Identity. This
declaration proposed that member countries should act together in accordance
with these principles towards the other countries in order to play a major role in
the international system, to be influential on world economic relations, and to
protect Europe from external military threats. Furthermore, the document
emphasized that the Community is open to other European nations who share
the same fundamental values of European Identity (Copenhagen European
Summit 1973). However, the declaration was only an announcement that the EC
wanted to be active in the international environment by relying on economic and
diplomatic cooperation with other countries, and did not suggest that it wanted
to transform them politically. Furthermore, no concrete strategy was laid out to
diffuse these values to other countries. Therefore, the Copenhagen Declaration
was an initial, but inefficient, step towards promoting liberal democratic norms
to third countries.
Even though the EC lacked a strategy to diffuse liberal democratic norms
to third countries, one of the institutions of the EC, the European Parliament,
voiced its concerns about human rights violations in third countries. In this
respect, the EP revealed reports and resolutions regarding human rights
violations in third countries, including Turkey, and required the European
Commission to impose punitive actions, such as arms embargos, and economic
and diplomatic sanctions (Balfe 1985: 186; K. Smith 2001). However, during the
pre-Cold War years, the strategic interest of the EC in the Soviet Union was much
more important for the Community than the promotion of democracy and
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human rights in countries such as Turkey, which had been one of its allies in
NATO (Faucompret and Konings 2008: 30; Unver 2013: 207). Therefore, the calls
of the EP for the EC to take action on third countries had a limited impact on
transforming their democracies or their human rights policies.
The Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 took the diffusion of liberal
democratic norms to third countries one-step further in the EC. There were two
reasons that led to this progress. Firstly, the EC was defined as a promoter of
democracy, the rule of law, and human rights in the SEA (The European
Communities 1986). According to Manners, after this decision, the EC moved
towards becoming a Normative Power, and these principles were placed at the
centre of its external relations with third countries (Manners 2006: 185).
Secondly, the EP gained power to consent to agreements with third countries.
Thus, the EP became more influential on European Council decisions by gaining
the power to refuse financial protocols with third countries on the grounds of
human rights violations in those countries (Khan and Kotzeva 2007: 87).
In comparison to the other EC institutions, the EP had no binding
obligations to maintain good relations with any particular third country, which
enabled it to bring to the fore human rights violations within those countries
without fear of reprisal. The EP was developed as a human rights lobby and it
was easy for all human rights NGOs and political groups to be in contact with
parliament members and make their voices heard (Casier 2011: 202-03;
Interview_11 2013; Interview_15 2013). Furthermore, the Parliament had a
much freer way of dealing with human rights issues. It was easy for them to
make resolutions, and they could pass any resolution they felt necessary without
fear of political censure (Interview_13 2013; Sugden 2004: 245). Conversely, the
Commission and the Council were constrained by their obligation to maintain
diplomatic relations with third countries, and fulfilling the foreign policy
objectives of the Community. Furthermore, they were concerned by the limits of
their legal boundaries (Interview_12 2013). Therefore, throughout the pre-
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Tampere years human rights issues were in the hands of the European
Parliament, rather than the other Community institutions, because the EP did
not have the responsibility of putting these policies into practice (Interview_12
2013).
During the pre-Tampere years, the legal instruments concerning the
protection of human rights and ethnic minority rights in Europe (such as the
ECHR, the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages (ECRML), the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCP), and the Charter of
Paris) were developed by other international organizations like the UN, the CoE
and the OSCE. In addition, the monitoring mechanisms of these organizations
(such as the ECtHR, the CPT, and the OSCE HCNM) were influential on shaping
the human and ethnic minority rights policies of European states. In that sense,
prior to 1999, the transformation of the counter-terrorism policies of EU
members and candidates was mostly influenced by the other international
organizations, rather than the EC/EU. For instance, when the UK joined the EU in
1973, the UK membership was not questioned in the EC on the basis of its
human rights violations in the 1970s against the IRA (Irish Republican Army),
despite the ECtHR rulings against the UK on this issue. The main concern
regarding the UK was its economy and its attitude towards the EC (Interview_15
2013).
By 1989 the EU was becoming more closely integrated, both
economically and politically. But the end of the Cold War at that time left many
unstable countries sharing borders with the EU. After being governed by
communist regimes for a long time, the CEECs were not at the required level to
bear the EC norms and values. Furthermore, these countries lacked the
institutional capacity to put an effective law enforcement strategy into practice
in order to deal with their internal security problems within democratic
parameters (Ibryamova 2004). In this context, the institutional vulnerabilities of
CEECs caused a paradigm change in the EC. The military threats posed by the
124
Soviet Union were replaced by new external security threats, such as illegal
immigration, terrorism, drug trafficking, and organized crime (Anderson 2000:
234; Chalk 2000: 186-87; Crelinsten and Özkut 2000: 259; Den Boer 2000: 217).
In order to prevent the Community from suffering spill over effects from the
CEECs internal security problems, and to disrupt the Russian hegemony on them
(i.e. before Russia had time to gain power), the EC decided to absorb these
countries for the effective establishment of democracy, and to maintain peace
and security (Interview_14 2013: 85; Rees 2011; Schwok 1999: 159).
In this context, in the 1993 Copenhagen European Council, the EU set the
so-called Copenhagen Political Criteria which contains political conditions
candidate countries must fulfil before becoming members of the EU. In view of
these requirements, the EUs main aim in candidate countries was to transform
their democracies, rather than their counter-terrorism policies. However, as
Pridham has indicated, the EU requirements targeting democracy had an implicit
impact on the subordinate policies of candidate countries such as their counter-
terrorism policies, local administration policies, and media policies (Pridham
2005: 21). In this respect, the EU demands for the rule of law were important for
a well-functioning judicial system and the accountability of law enforcement
agencies. The promotion of human rights was important in order to constrain
the offensive actions of law enforcement officers towards terror suspects. In
addition, the EU demands to grant ethnic rights was very influential in
undermining the attempts made by ethnic separatist terrorist organisations to
manipulate ethnic minorities.
The new conditions brought by the Copenhagen criteria were an
important turning point for candidate countries like Turkey. Turkey had been
struggling with the PKK for nearly a decade at this time. The hard-line counter-
terrorism practices of Turkey, such as human rights violations against PKK
sympathizers, and ethnic restrictions against the Kurdish citizens, contradicted
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the Copenhagen principles. So, Turkeys counter-terrorism policies became an
obstacle to Turkeys accession to the EU.
Along with the Copenhagen political criteria, candidate states were also
required to adopt the Acquis Communautaire (Grabbe 2002: 251-52). Each
chapter of the acquis not only covers legally binding regulations within the EU,
but also contains international agreements with other countries and
international organizations, within the framework of the Common Foreign and
Security Policy (Pillar II), and Justice and Home Affairs (Pillar III) (Miller 2011: 2).
In the field of counter-terrorism, the EU transposes rules (e.g. the UN and CoE
conventions against torture, and the UN and the CoE conventions against
terrorism and financing terrorism) or requires the assimilation of norms (e.g. the
efficiency and impartiality of the judiciary, transparency, and the accountability
of law enforcement units) in order for a state to become a member of the EU.
During the pre-Tampere years, the EUs efforts to diffuse liberal
democratic norms in the counter-terrorism context was not only limited to
candidate countries, but the Mediterranean countries as well. In this respect, the
Barcelona Process was launched in 1995 (Council of the European Union 1995).
This initiative intended to sustain the stability and security of the Mediterranean
region. Respect for human rights in accordance with the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR)7 was one of the fundamental principles of this scheme.
Furthermore, fighting terrorism was one of the aspects of this project, which
aimed to develop police and judicial cooperation between contracting parties via
the exchange of information and improving extradition procedures (Council of
the European Union 1995: 16). However, unlike the candidate countries, the EU
did not offer a membership carrot to these countries to motivate them to
transform their democracy and counter-terrorism policies. Moreover, the
cooperation with the Mediterranean countries on transnational crime issues was
a priority of this project, rather than the diffusion of liberal democratic norms. As
7
Most of these countries were party to UDHR rather than the ECHR. Therefore, complying with
the principles of UDHR was prioritized by the EU for these countries.
126
such, the EU offer had a high cost and low yield for Mediterranean countries
(Lavenex and Wichmann 2009: 89-90). This is because the EU wanted the
Mediterranean countries to use their law enforcement resources to maintain
safety in the EU. However, this would be to incur a high cost, and the EU offered
no tangible reward for them doing so. Therefore, the Barcelona Process did not
give satisfactory results for the EU. With the introduction of the ENP in 2004, this
project lost its importance, and continued only as a multilateral forum between
the EU and the Mediterranean countries (European External Action Service
2013).
The Treaty of Amsterdam (ToA), signed in 1997, amending the TEU,
brought a new dimension to the promotion of liberal democratic norms in third
countries in the security context. It created the Area of Freedom, Security and
Justice (AFSJ), and aimed to facilitate the free movement of EU citizens within
the EUs borders, and to secure their safety from external security threats (Rees
2008: 97). However, the removal of internal borders within the EU also increased
security considerations (Skålnes 2005: 214). Freedom of movement in the EU
was linked with a flow of immigrants from the CEEC countries, which were
lagging behind their Western counterparts in both economical and institutional
terms. It was thought that an increasing number of immigrants in the EU would
result in an increase in crime rates and organized crime, and so end up disrupting
public order in member states. However, within these security considerations,
terrorism was not a primary concern for the EU (Ibryamova 2004: 3-4; Trauner
2007: 4). Therefore, after the ToA, the promotion of liberal democratic norms
was mainly based around security considerations (illegal immigration, organized
crime) rather than humanitarian concerns in the EU (Lavenex 1999: 155).
The fear of the flow of immigrants from neighbouring countries also led
to policies relating to freedom of movement (such as visa, asylum, and
immigration policies) being transferred to the first pillar of the EU. First pillar
policies are managed by community institutions rather than an
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intergovernmental panel made up of all member countries. Even though this
decision targeted freedom of movement policies, it also resulted in many policy
areas relating to counter-terrorism being transferred to the first pillar. Asylum
policies, immigration policies, and external borders policies, were all moved into
the first pillar, whilst other counter-terrorism related policies, like those dealing
with human rights, democracy, and common security, remained in the second
pillar. The judicial and police cooperation on terrorism remained in the third
pillar. This decision caused a division between the first, second and third pillar
sectors (Argomaniz 2011: 6). So, the promotion of liberal democratic norms, and
cooperation with third countries in the counter-terror domain, became
separated in the EUs legal framework. Furthermore, the decision making
process in the field of counter-terrorism was mainly left to national authorities
rather than to the EUs supranational institutions (Monar 2006: 507).
This cross-pillarization created difficulties for countries such as Turkey.
On the one hand, Turkey, wishing to become a member of the EU, was subject to
EU normative leverage. On the other hand, there was no formal and binding JHA
policy among the member countries. Cooperation against terrorist organisations
was carried out by intergovernmental collaboration. But, if a member state was
reluctant to collobarate with member or non-member countries, there was no
mechanism forcing this country to cooperate. This situation also demonstrates
that countering terrorism was a low level priority at this time, in comparison to
illegal immigration policies. In the absence of concrete incentives (i.e.
membership prospects) and the lack of cooperation with member countries,
candidate countries such as Turkey had no reason to adopt the EUs liberal
democratic norms. Therefore, the cross-pillarization decreased the norm
diffusion capacity the EU had to transform the counter-terrorism policies of third
countries. The EU was telling others what to do without being involved in
cooperative action.
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In short, in the pre-Tampere years the EC/EU could not be regarded as a
significant actor in promoting liberal democratic norms to third countries in the
counter-terror context. It was in a transition from an economic community to a
political union, and the promotion of liberal democratic norms in third countries
targeted mainly the democratization of these countries, rather than the
transformation of their counter-terrorism policies. In terms of the stabilization of
internal security problems, the EC/EU prioritized organised crime and the illegal
immigration policies of third countries, and not their counter-terrorism policies.
Furthermore, during the pre-Tampere years, the legal instruments and
monitoring mechanisms of other international organizations (such as the UN, the
CoE, and the OSCE) were much more influential on third countries than those of
the EC/EU.
4.3. The Post-Tampere Period
The 1999 Tampere Summit in Finland was one of the critical junctures for the
development of policies in the EU to transform counter-terrorism in
neighbouring countries. Even though this meeting was not focussed on counter-
terrorism, for the first time the external dimension of the JHA was taken into
consideration by European authorities (Wolff 2009a: 140). Member states
officially admitted that a satisfactory level of internal security in the EU can only
be accomplished by consolidating democracies and the security capacity of the
countries surrounding the EU. They found it necessary to stablise these countries
by implementing a comprehensive strategy which included preventing conflicts,
and ensuring human and ethnic minority rights in these countries (European
Parliament 1999). So, the stablization of countries such as Turkey became a
priority for the EU, whose territory was not completely at peace due to the
existence of terrorists and powerful criminal organisations (Interview_13 2013;
Interview_14 2013).
However, after the cross-pillarization decisions were made in the ToA,
JHA policies were under the control of national authorities rather than those EU
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institutions responsible for maintaining the foreign policy of the EU (such as the
Commission and the Council). Therefore, both the Commission and the Council
had little power to diffuse the EUs JHA requirements to third countries and
develop a better AFSJ. They had little power to respond to and negotiate with
third countries on JHA matters. In this regard, due to the existence of this
fragmented decision making structure, the decision taken at Tampere did not
result in an efficient system for altering the domestic policies in third countries.
As a consequence, in the Feira European Council in 2000, the European Council
demanded that JHA policies be incorporated with the Unions external policies
(European Council 2000: 21). With this decision the Council aimed to
complement the internal and external dimension of JHA policies, and maintain
the consistency of them by strenghtening the role of the EUs supranational
instituions on these policies (Wessel 2011: 280-81; Wolff et al. 2009: 13).
In these circumstances, the 9/11 attacks gave the EUs political actors a
window of opportunity to accelerate the unfinished work of the Tampere
Summit in 1999 and the Feira Europe Council in 2000, i.e. of convincing all
member countries to harmonize their policies in line with EU requirements (Den
Boer 2006: 90; Giorgetti 2005: 251). After the attacks, terrorism became a top
priority in the EUs political agenda, which replaced former security priorities,
such as illegal immigration and organized crime (Ibryamova 2004: 5). It gave
impetus to the development of the internal and external dimensions of the EUs
counter-terrorism policy (Den Boer and Monar 2002: 26; Kaunert and Giovanna
2010: 276; Oz 2010: 452; Wolff 2009a: 143). The EU governments agreed to put
forward several frameworks to build a common strategy inside and outside of
the Union.
One of these steps was to adopt an Action Plan, which was prepared by
the JHA Council and approved by the European Council. More than sixty counter-
terrorism measures were summarised in this plan. They were given names,
deadlines were assigned, and a responsible body to observe its implementation
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was formed (Council of the European Union 2001). The action plan was a useful
and comprehensive structure that summarized the EUs efforts to establish a
collective response to countering terrorism (Argomaniz 2011: 20; Monar 2007a:
267-83). However, with regard to the EUs external counter-terrorism relations,
the Plan was mainly concerned with strengthening cooperation on security
matters in certain Asian countries such as Pakistan, Iran, India, and Afghanistan,
and with supporting political construction of these countries. The promotion of
liberal democratic norms in third countries was not listed among these measures
(Council of the European Union 2001). In that sense, the EU focused mainly on
the protection of its citizens from external terror threats, rather than eradicating
the root causes of terrorism in third countries via the diffusion of liberal
democratic norms.
The other important European Council regulation, which is closely linked
to this study, was the Councils common position regarding the persons, groups,
and entities involved in terrorist acts, released in December 2001. The aim of the
regulation was to prevent the funding of terrorist organizations in line with the
1373 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution in 2001. Names of the
persons, groups, and entities are delivered by member states based on credible
evidence, and they are reviewed at least once every six months to ensure that
there is enough evidence to keep them on the list. The consent of all member
countries is sought when any addition is made to the list (European Council
2001b). Being on this list is not a necessary condition for being considered a
terrorist organization. Member states can continue counter-terrorism
investigation against any organization whether they are on the list or not. The
main aim of the list is to identify terrorist groups in order to freeze their assets.
In addition, the production of the list sent a political message that the EU was
taking action against terrorist organizations (Interview_12 2013). However, the
listing mechanism is subject to ECJ revision, and where there is inadequate
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evidence for the inclusion of a person, group, or entity on the list, it is removed.8
Therefore, it has been revised several times and aligned with the ECJ rulings
(Barros 2012; Guild 2008; Interview_12 2013; Leonard and Kaunert 2012).
The PKK was added to the list in May 2002. This was an important change
for Turkey, because until this decision there was no unity among the EU member
states as to whether the PKK was a terrorist organisation. The absence of
consensus on the PKKs status (terrorist organisation/civil organisation) in the EU
was depicted as a conspiracy in Turkish nationalist circles. The claim was that the
h ŝŐŶŽƌĞƐ W<< ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ ƚŽ ĚŝƐƌƵƉƚ dƵƌŬĞǇ ?Ɛ ƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĂů ŝŶƚĞŐƌŝƚǇ  ?<ŝƌŝƔĕŝ  ? ? ? ? P
290). Therefore, the addition of the PKK into the designated terrorist list
increased the sincerity of the EU in the fight against the PKK, and also enhanced
the legitimacy of the EU requirements placed on Turkey (see section 6.5.3)
According to a senior EU External Action Service official, after the 9/11
attacks, it was harder for EU members to defend the actions of the PKK.
Therefore, the addition of the PKK was a signal to Turkey that the EU shared
solidarity with the Turkish government (Interview_11 2013). There are three
main reasons why the PKK was placed on the list at this time (these reason were
cited as being particularly important by Turkish senior officials from different
ministries: (i) Because of the threat perception brought about by the 9/11
attacks; (Interview_5 2012; Interview_9 2012) (ii) Political pressure was placed
on the EU by Turkey at this time, and the US supported Turkey on this matter
(Interview_1 2012; Interview_4 2012; Interview_6 2012; Interview_8 2012;
Interview_10 2012); (iii) there was an increase in the illegal activities of the PKK
in the EU at this time (such drug and human trafficking, extortion, and money
laundering) (Interview_2 2012; Interview_3 2012; Interview_4 2012; Interview_5
2012; Interview_6 2012; Interview_23 2013). However, in April 2008, The EU
8
See cases ; Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and
Commission, C-402/05 P and C-415/05. Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple dIran v Council
of the European Union, Case T-228/02
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Court of First Instance (CFI)9 overturned the decision of the Commission, arguing
that the inclusion of the PKK on the list was not justified by member states.10 In
that sense, even though EU institutions have taken action against terrorist
organizations in line with the wishes of third countries, these decisions can be
annulled by the European courts, if they contradict the EUs normative
principles. Therefore, the continuation of the EUs normative role on counter-
terrorism issues is secured by the European courts even when there are risks
that the EU is slipping into adopting security-based policies.
Another initiative for a common strategy was the Framework Decision of
the European Council on Combating Terrorism that was released in June 2002.
This decision provided a common definition of terrorism for the EU countries
(Council of the European Union 2002a). However, the common definition was
also important for third countries such as Turkey, which suffer from the refusal
of their extradition requests by the EU. As senior European Union officials have
indicated, the definition of terrorism in Turkey was too broad. Some journalists,
who may simply be reporting terrorism, could be interpreted under the
legislation of the time as supporting terrorist organizations (which gives rise to
questions of proportionality in sentencing in Turkey). Therefore, in order to
overcome obstacles of extradition, Turkey has been required to narrow their
definition of terrorism in line with the EU standards (Interview_11 2013;
Interview_12 2013).
Within the same Framework Decision, criminal penalties for terrorists
and terrorist related activities were also harmonized to eliminate differences
between member states. Custodial sentences were required to range from
between eight to fifteen years for terrorist offences in member states, in order
to ease the extradition process between them, which stem from differences in
their national penal codes (Council of the European Union 2002a). As for third
countries, these limits for terrorist offences constituted a problem for
9
This is a secondary court in the ECJ, which is hiearchically one level below the ECJ.
10
Kongra-Gel and Others v Council, T-253/04
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extradition demands, if disproportional sentences were foreseen for terror
suspects in third countries, in comparison with the EU standards. As indicated by
an advisor to the EUs Counter-terrorism Coordinator, the upper limit of life
sentences in Germany is 25 years, and every person convicted for a terrorist
offence has the hope of being released. This provision is considered an
important norm for human dignity in the German Constitution. However, in
Turkey, life sentences can be issued, which means there is no hope of freedom
for the offender. In view of these differences in sentencing, German authorities
have refused to extradite terror suspects to Turkey. So, Turkey has been
required to harmonize its custodial sentences with the EUs standards in order to
facilitate the extradition of terror suspects from member countries
(Interview_12 2013).
In line with rising concerns about international criminal activities in the
EU, institutions like Europol became operational during the post-Tampere period
(Lavranos 2003; Marotta 1999).11 When it was first established, Europol was
tasked with improving cooperation amongst the law-enforcement agencies of
the member states against the organised forms of criminality. Neither the
internal nor the external dimension of countering terrorism were in its priorities
in the early years (Den Boer 2000: 212; Occhipinti 2003: 141). However, in 1998,
the fight against terrorism was added to its mandate, and it was authorized to
negotiate with third countries in order to cooperate in counter-terrorism
matters (Deflem 2006: 344-48). In order to conform with the ECtHR standards,
third countries were required to upgrade their legal systems in line with the rule
of law and its human rights principles (Guild et al. 2011: 74). Therefore, Europol
implicitly played a role in the promotion of human rights in third countries
counter-terrorism policies.
An advisor to the Senior EU Counter-terrorism Coordinator has stated
that Europol has both Strategic and Operational agreements to engage in
11
Even though the decision to establish Europol was taken in 1993, it was fully operationalized in
July 1999. See: https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/page/history-149.
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cooperation with third countries . In order to sign an operational agreement and
avoid problems in European courts, the EU wants minimum human rights
standards to be met in third countries. For instance, the adoption of data
protection rules is set by the EU as a condition for an operational Europol
agreement with third countries (Kaunert 2010b; Kaunert and Zwolski 2013: 101-
03). If a third country adopts data protection rules, member countries exchange
information with it through the Europol channels. However, in the absence of
compliance, third countries do not benefit from Europol cooperation initiatives
(Interview_12 2013). So, countries like Turkey, who are seeking operational
agreement with the EU countries on PKK matters, are required to align their
rules with the EU, in order to benefit from Europol cooperation.
Along with Europol, the Eurojust was set up in 2002, which also plays a
constructive role in the diffusion of liberal democratic norms in third countries
counter-terrorism policies.12 The reason for establishing the Eurojust was to
underpin the fight against terrorism and other transnational crimes by
consolidating cooperation and extradition among the European countries. Public
prosecutors, judges, and police officers with equivalent responsibilites were
tasked in this institution to facilitate the execution of international mutual legal
assistance, and to implement extradition requests (Bures 2011: 114-15). Not
only members states, but also non-member states (primarily the candidate
states), can benefit from Eurojust if a cooperation agreement has been
concluded (Council of the European Union 2002d: 1-2). In order to be part of the
Eurojust system, non-member countries are required to conform with the ECHR
and the UN Human Rights Conventions, and the relevant EU acquis rules (such as
rules regarding the protection of personal data) before signing a cooperation
agreement (Alegre 2008: 33-38). According to an advisor to the EU Counter-
terrorism Coordinator, the EU wants third countries to conform to these
principles in order to maintain the high efficiency and legitimacy standards of
12
The decision to establish Eurojust was first taken in the Tampere European Council in 1999.
However, it was formally operationalized in 2002.
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Eurojust. If Eurojust decisions are questioned by member states and European
courts on the basis that its decisions contradict human rights principles, the
system will not work, and it will fail to fulfil its objectives (Interview_12 2013).
So, the more third countries conform with the procedural and judicial standards
of the EUs legal framework, the more they benefit from the Eurojust system and
its extradition opportunities. In this respect, candidate countries such as Turkey,
who are looking for the extradition of PKK members from the EU, have beem
required to transform their legal systems in line with EU standards.
After the 9/11 attacks, the US decided to intervene in Iraq on the grounds
that Saddam Hussains regime possessed weapons of mass destruction that
could possibly be used against Western countries, either my rogue regimes or
terrorist organisations. This decision created diversity among the EU states.
Some EU countries (such as the UK, Spain, Poland, and Denmark) supported the
US war on terror and its approach towards Iraq. On the other hand, other EU
states (such as Germany and France) opposed this decision. The failure of EU
member states to reach an agreement on this matter necessitated the
preparation of a new EU security strategy (Becher 2004; Quille 2004; Toje 2005).
The European Security Strategy (ESS) came into force in 2003. It was
drafted by the EU High Representative, Javier Solana, and approved by the
European Council. Terrorism was counted as the first key threat to the EU, and if
a state failed to confront terrorism, this was seen as a leading factor in providing
opportunities for terrorist organizations (European Council 2003c: 3-4). The ESS
thus suggested a comprehensive approach to security, by engaging with other
international organizations (such as the UN, the CoE and the OSCE) and by
strengthening international order by spreading good governance, establishing
the rule of law, and protecting human rights (European Council 2003c: 10).
Furthermore, coherent cooperation on terrorism among the member countries
and between the EU and third countries was emphasized as being a crucial factor
in the implementation of JHA policies (European Council 2003c: 13). In the post-
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9/11 environment, the ESS was an announcement that the EU sees countering
terrorism differently from the US (Quille 2004: 422-23; Rees 2006: 65). Rather
than intervening in third countries and using security-based strategies, the EU
was offering a constructive policy that emphasized diffusing liberal democratic
norms to third countries, and strengthening their governance skills to eradicate
global terrorism.
In the ESS, special attention was also paid to the countries neighbouring
the EU, where violent conflicts and weak states pose problems for the EU.
Extending the benefits of economic and political cooperation to these countries
was suggested, in order to help such countries tackle their political problems
(European Council 2003c: 7-8). Enlargement was thus highlighted as one of the
EUs foreign policy instruments that can be used to diffuse its norms and values
to candidate countries, such as Turkey, where terrorism creates regional
instability.
In short, during the post-Tampere years, the EU political actors realized
that the internal security of the Union depends mostly on the existence of well-
governed, secure, and economically and politically stable countries around the
EU. Therefore, political transition in the EU focused on developing a common
JHA policy that aimed to increase counter-terror cooperation with third
countries and to strengthen their law-enforcement capacity. This was absent in
previous years. So, the 9/11 attacks gave an opportunity to the EUs political
actors to pursue measures decided at the 1999 Tampere Summit and the Feira
Europe Council in 2000. Institutions such as Europol and Eurojust became active
in counter-terror cooperation and in the extradition of terror suspects.
Furthermore, a common definition of terrorism was made in the EU, and terror
offences were harmonized among the member countries. Third countries, such
as Turkey, who were seeking cooperation and extradition with the member
countries, were required to align their domestic standards with the EU acquis in
order to benefit from the EUs cooperation tools. Even though, in the aftermath
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of 9/11 attacks, a few security-based counter-terror measures (such as the
counter-terrorism Action Plan and the proscribed terrorist organizations list)
were put into practice in the Union, in general the EU authorities were in favour
of a counter-terrorism policy based on liberal democratic norms inside and
outside of the EU.
4.4. The Post-Madrid/London Period
The two consecutive terrorist attacks, in March 2004 in Madrid and in July 2005
in London, had a significant impact in the EU and elevated the terror issue to the
very top of the EUs political agenda. According to Nilsson, after these attacks,
the threat of terrorism was Europeanized and an atmosphere of solidarity was
created among the EU member countries (Nilsson 2006: 81). However, the
initiatives launched before the Madrid bombings had not worked as hoped.
Therefore, the EU policy makers became committed to providing clear strategies
for member countries, which also served as framing policies for the third
countries (Bossong 2008: 41).
A Declaration on Combating Terrorism was announced in March 2004, a
few weeks after the Madrid bombings. This was both a solidarity declaration
made by the EU fighting against terrorism (Bossong 2008: 41) and a warning for
the member countries to adopt and implement counter-terrorism measures
taken after the 9/11 attacks in order to secure collective action (European
Council 2004: 3). Furthermore, it stressed the necessity of transforming the
passive national territorial defence strategies of member countries towards
terrorist threats into the active security and crisis management policy of the
Union, in order to improve the EUs pre-emptive counter-terror capabilities
against the terrorist attacks (Cornish and Edwards 2005: 809; Ekengren 2006:
101). Unlike the previous regulations, for the first time the European Council
endorsed seven strategic objectives in this declaration (Argomaniz 2011: 24;
Bures 2011: 68-69). One of these objectives was to enhance the counter-
terrorism capabilities of third countries. The declaration proposed extending the
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EUs internal solutions to third countries in order to secure policy transformation
(European Council 2004).
The Declaration was also attached with a revised Action Plan on
Combating Terrorism. The plan was enriched with new security measures, and
new deadlines were set for member countries and EU institutions (Council of the
European Union 2004b). The new version of the plan had an extended scope and
covered third countries, rather than being focused only on certain Asian
countries. The measures listed in the Plan relating to third countries were
generally security-based strategies. It proposed that UN resolutions against
terrorism should be ratified by third countries, and their counter-terror
capabilities enhanced, and also proposed implementing technical assistance
programmes within them to achieve good governance and the rule of law
(Council of the European Union 2004b: 72-75). However, the plan did not refer
to the diffusion of civil rights to third countries in the counter-terror context. A
senior EU justice affairs official states that, after the Madrid Bombings, security
became the main concern for the EU rather than ensuring that all individuals can
enjoy their freedoms (Interview_15 2013). In this respect, those countries who
were closely monitored by the EU, such as Turkey, had the opportunity to justify
their hard-line counter-terrorism policies (see chapter 7).
The policy expansion in the area of European security governance, and
the fact that many EU agencies were pursuing the same strategies
independently, necessitated the establishment of a post in the EU whose remit
was to ensure coordination on counter-terrorism matters among the EU
institutions, member countries, and third countries. To this end, a Counter-
terrorism Coordinator was appointed in March 2004 (Alex Mackenzie et al.
2013b). According to his advisor, the coordinators job is not to spread human
rights to third countries in general. However, the coordinator does have the job
of discussing the counter-terror practices of third countries with their national
authorities in order to make their policies more effective, by leaning on human
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and ethnic minority rights and the rule of law. As an example of this, he
examines the list of cases in which Turkish authorities are unable to extradite
terror suspects from member countries. He then informs Turkish authorities of
the reasons why it is not possible to extradite these suspects (Interview_12
2013). Furthermore, he recommends what kinds of EU laws third countries must
adopt to secure the extradition of terror suspects, and to secure active
intelligence sharing (NTV 2010). For instance, in his visits to Turkey in December
2008 and February 2013, the EU Counter-terrorism Coordinator Gilles de
Kerchove emphasized that Turkish authorities must adopt EU promoted data
protection rules to achieve a better level of cooperation between the EU and
Turkey with regard to the PKK (Interview_12 2013; Interview_19 2013; TBMM
2009: 49-51). The coordinator thus plays a mediating role between the EU and
third countries for the adoption of EU promoted liberal democratic norms in the
counter-terror domain.
The Hague Programme was another important step forward in
transforming the counter-terrorism policies of third countries (Council of the
European Union 2004a). The Programme formed a new agenda for the
challenges that emerged after the Tampere Summit in 1999, and highlighted the
necessity of coherence and coordination between the internal and external
dimension of JHA policies (Council of the European Union 2004a: 3). It set a
five-year plan for member countries that aimed to adapt JHA policies in order to
place them under the control of the EUs supranational institutions rather than
national authorities (this has since been ratified in the Lisbon Treaty). In the
programme, terrorism was underlined as one of the security threats facing the
Union, and it was suggested that priority should be given to strengthening the
counter-terrorism capabilities of third countries. In this regard, a few measures
were proposed, such as increasing the funding of capacity-building projects in
third countries, and the revision of existing instruments to provide rapid-flexible
assistance to these countries (Council of the European Union 2004a: 21).
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However, if the external relations section of the Programme is studied in
detail, it can be seen that there was no mention of human rights with regards to
counter-terrorism cooperation. As such, the EU was criticized for lowering its
expectations of third countries (such as the ENP countries) in terms of policies
that protected of human rights, and for replacing them with security related
policies (Balzacq and Carrera 2006: 19; Joffe 2008: 160; Manners 2006: 189).
With respect to the ENP countries, this was not a big issue for the EU, because
these countries have no membership expectations. However, in the Turkish case,
it created a dilemma for the EU. On the one hand, Turkey was seen a strong ally
by the EU in the fight against terrorism. On the other hand, Turkeys human
rights shortcomings was causing rising concerns in the EU, due to Turkeys
possible accession to the Union (Interview_15 2013).
The increasing emphasis on security based strategies in the EU can also
be seen in a new scheme, the Strategy for the External Dimension of JHA
(Council of the European Union 2005b). The Strategy proposed that the Union
should add countering terrorism as one of the elements of its external relations.
It also indicated the necessity of pursuing all of the EUs capabilities towards the
threat of terrorism, and the necessity of improving counter-terror relations with
all countries (Council of the European Union 2005b: 2). In comparison to the
previous strategies, for the first time it was recommended that the external
dimension of JHA policies should be a central priority of the EUs foreign policy
objective (Pawlak 2009a: 34; Wolff 2008: 256). Furthermore, the rationale
behind the Strategy was not to reduce crime rates in third countries, but to
prevent crime coming from third countries to the Union (Mounier 2009: 52).
Unlike the previous strategies, the EU distinguished between the
different norm diffusion mechanisms used by the JHA, in terms of countries and
regions, namely, in terms of the Enlargement countries, the ENP countries, the
US, and Russia (Council of the European Union 2005b: 5-6). This was an
important indication that the EU no longer wanted to follow a one fits all
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approach towards third countries on JHA issues. The role of incentives was
highlighted as providing a more efficient way to ensure the adoption and
implementation of EU norms in third countries. Providing a membership
incentive was praised as the most effective way of transposing EU standards to
third countries (Council of the European Union 2005b: 6). However, in these
years, due to enlargement fatigue, the role of the EUs conditionality strategy
on third countries became more focussed on policy-related conditionality (that
targeted enhancing security capabilities of third countries) (Trauner 2009a). In
that sense, even though the EU could not give credible membership prospects to
countries such as Turkey, due to reasons of absorption capacity, it continued its
political conditionality strategy towards these countries in an attempt to
transform their security policies for the sake of EU security and regional stability
(see chapter 7).
Along with the Strategy for the External Dimension of JHA, the European
Union Counter-terrorism Strategy was also put into practice in November 2005
(Council of the European Union 2005a). This strategy came just after the London
bombings and was intended to facilitate the integration of the EUs fragmented
strategies regarding counter-terrorism policies under one framework (Argomaniz
2009b: 161; Coolsaet 2010: 860; Interview_12 2013). The strategy was built up
from four strategic commitments, namely to prevent, protect, pursue and
respond (Council of the European Union 2005b). Protecting human rights was
the fundamental principle to pursue whilst combating terrorism. Unlike in
previous plans, the external dimension of the counter-terrorism strategy was not
forgotten. In order to deal with the external threat of terrorism, collaboration
with other international organizations and third countries became part of the
strategy. Deepening international consensus, promoting capacity building in
third countries, and enhancing international cooperation, were the aims of
promoting international partnership (Council of the European Union 2005a: 4).
According to an advisor to the EUs counter-terrorism coordinator, this new
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framework helped to fight all terrorist organizations in the EU, which is
something that had not been achieved before (Interview_12 2013).
Correspondingly, in comparison to the previous counter-terror plans, the EUs
threat definition in the Strategy was no longer focused on Al-Qaeda alone, but
also included other terrorist organizations that were considered as a threat to
the Union (Monar 2007b: 297). As such, much more attention was given to the
activities of other terrorist organizations including the PKK.
During the years after the Tampere Summit, two problems were revealed
for those EU policies that were intended to promote the transformation of
counter-terrorism policies in third countries. One of these problems was that the
external dimension of the JHA was under the control of member countries.
Therefore, the efforts made by the EU supranational institutions (such as the
Commission and the Council) to develop a policy were hindered because of the
problems that arise from seeking the unanimous consent of member states. The
other problem that became clear was that the intense security-based strategies
of the EU had human rights shortcomings. In this respect, the Lisbon Treaty has
provided an opportunity to remedy these two weaknesses.
In the pre-Lisbon period, decision making in the second and third pillar
were controlled by national authorities. Therefore, neither the Commission nor
the Council had the power to negotiate with third countries in the field of
counter-terrorism. Since the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, however,
second and third pillar matters have been treated in the same way as the first
pillar, which means community methods are employed for JHA policies. The
Commission and the Council have become the main policy makers in the JHA,
and they have gained the ability to negotiate and sign agreements with third
countries (Argomaniz 2010: 313; Argomaniz and Rees 2013: 232; Kaunert 2010a:
57-58). In this regard, a further step was taken to ensure the internal and
external consistency of the EU policies on JHA matters.
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As for the promotion of human rights, since the Lisbon Treaty, the policy
initiatives of the EU in the counter-terrorism domain and with regard to third
countries has been subject to the judicial review of the ECJ. If any joint counter-
terrorism initiative between the EU and a third country violates the principles of
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (ECFR)13, it will be annulled by the ECJ
(Interview_12 2013). So, third countries seeking cooperation with the EU, such
as Turkey, are required to align their counter-terror policies with the EUs
normative requirements for the continuation of counter-terror cooperation.
Additionally, since the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament has gained
the role of co-legislator (General Secretariat of the Council of the EU 2009: 1).
Institutions such as the Council and the Commission, which are responsible for
preparing the EU policies and agreements, began to exchange their blue print
with the Parliament. The Parliaments interest in putting this blue print on the
agenda means that the Council and the Commission are dealing with these
topics by replying to the Parliament. Therefore, in order to gain the consent of
the Parliament, these institutions have built their policies based on a
commitment to human rights and democracy (Argomaniz and Rees 2013;
Interview_12 2013: 232). If the counter-terrorism proposals agreed on by the EU
and third countries fail to take into account the EUs normative requirements,
there is a risk that the Parliament will be reluctant to give consent to them, or
that it will take the proposal to the ECJ. In that sense, third countries are
demanded to transpose the EU standards into their domestic counter-terrorism
policy in order to secure counter-terrorism cooperation with the EU.
With the opportunities offered by the Lisbon treaty, a new multiannual
agenda, the Stockholm Programme, was put into practice in 2009 (Council of
the European Union 2010). The main aim of the programme has been to revise
the existing security measures in line with new security challenges. For the first
time a Human Rights Action plan covering the external dimensions of freedom,
13
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights was proclaimed in 2000, however it only became legally
binding after the Lisbon Treaty.
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security, and justice policies, has been demanded from the European Council
(Council of the European Union 2010: 35). This was a critical demand from the
Council to ensure the integration of human rights regulations into the security
framework. According to an advisor of the EUs counter-terrorism coordinator,
counter-terrorism capacity building started in the early 2000s in the EU.
Therefore, it was realized by EU political actors that there are shortcomings in
the human rights instruments of the JHA. In that sense, the Human Rights Action
plan is being developed in order to respond to these shortcomings (Interview_12
2013). When the plan is adopted, human rights will become an indispensable
part of the policies in the area of freedom, security, and justice, rather than an
abstract issue evaluated separately under a different policy framework.
In short, after the Madrid and London Bombings, terrorism became a
common problem in the EU and as a consequence the EUs initiatives concerning
third countries came to be based around security oriented concerns rather than
around concerns about human rights and democracy. However, as capacity
building efforts developed over time, the promotion of liberal democratic norms
to third countries became one of the central objectives of EU policies, and the
neglected human rights issue was considered in the Treaty of Lisbon and the JHA
Human Rights Action Plan. In this period, the EU differentiated between its norm
diffusion mechanisms in the JHA area in terms of the geographical location of
target countries. The appointment of a Counter-terrorism Coordinator added
new value to external relations in the EU. The coordinator started to play a
mediating role between the EU and third countries to align their counter-
terrorism policies with the EUs normative standards. With the ratification of the
Lisbon Treaty, joint counter-terrorism interactions between the EU and third
countries became subject to reviews made by the ECJ, and the EP closely
monitored these exchanges as a co-legislator. In this respect, third countries
were required to adopt the EU promoted norms in order to partake in
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cooperation with the EU on counter-terrorism that was not subject to ECJ and EP
supervision.
4.5. Conclusion
As this chapter has clarified, the role of the EU in promoting liberal democratic
norms to third countries in order to transform their counter-terrorism policies
has evolved over time. In this transition, major events such as end of the Cold
War, the 9/11 attacks, and the Madrid and London bombings were influential in
making EU political actors reconsider the shortcomings of the counter-terrorism
policies of third countries. At each critical juncture, the EU actors added new
initiatives, or they revised existing programs and plans targeting third countries.
In consideration of the pre-Tampere period, the structural
transformation of the EU from an economic community to a political union was a
negative factor in the Unions exertion of influence on Turkey. The policies for
the promotion of liberal democratic norms were in a formative stage, which
decreased the efficiency of the EUs norm diffusion mechanisms. Because the
concerns of EU member countries were focussed on illegal immigration and
organized crime during the pre-Tampere period, rather than on terrorism, they
had a low level of interest in developing common policies for the transformation
of the counter-terrorism policies of third countries. As a consequence, there was
no agreed approach to promoting liberal democratic norms in third countries
that bound both member countries and EU institutions. This undermined the
legitimacy of the EU requirements on countries like Turkey. Furthermore, the
reliance on the legislative instruments and monitoring mechanisms of other
international organisations (such as the UN, the CoE, and the OSCE) also
decreased the EUs influence on third countries. So, during the pre-Tampere
years, the EU had weaknesses that meant they did not have the power to act as
a substantial actor in the counter-terror context to promote liberal democratic
norms in Turkey.
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During the post-Tampere years, the EU political actors began to consider
the adoption of policies that targeted the transformation of security policies in
third countries. This was mostly based on the self-interest of the EU (illustrated
by the creation of the AFSJ that eased activities of transnational criminal
networks in member countries), rather than an EU concern to enhance the
security capabilities of third countries. In this regard, the devastating 9/11
attacks gave a window of opportunity to the EU, and many security oriented
counter-terror measures were initiated. After the attacks, there was a
convergence in the threat perception of terror matters between the EU and
Turkey. Terrorism was no longer a problem for Turkey alone. It also became a
major threat to the EU. The addition of the PKK to the proscribed terrorist
organisation list was a crucial step that showed the EU was in solidarity with
Turkey. However, EU cooperation with Turkey against the PKK depended on
Turkey aligning its counter-terrorism policies with the EUs normative standards.
So, during the post-Tampere period, the EU strategies towards third countries
including Turkey embodied both liberal democratic norms and security oriented
policies.
In the post-Madrid/London period, countering terrorism became an
essential issue for the EU, because the EU was also a target of Al-Qaida related
terrorist networks. Security concerns peaked in comparison to the previous
periods. In this regard, until the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, counter-terror
initiatives targeting third countries prioritised security based strategies, rather
than those that attempted to transform their policies using normative means.
The alteration of priorities in the EU gave fertile ground for countries such as
Turkey, where the resumption of PKK attacks in 2004 created a burden for the
political stability of the country, to justify their hard-line counter-terror
measures. This was also dangerous in undermining the EUs normative power
stance, and the legitimacy of its requirements on third countries. However, as
the threat of terrorism in the EU declined after the London Bombings, and
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capacity-building initiatives developed, the promotion of liberal democratic
norms to third countries regained its primacy in the EUs external counter-terror
relations. So, the emphasis given to security in the early years of the post-
Madrid/London period was counterbalanced later on by the promotion of new
initiatives aimed at strengthening liberty in third countries.
In view of these three time periods, the role of the EU in promoting
liberal democratic norms to third countries in the counter-terror context
depends greatly on the level of the terrorist threat it faces. Unless the EU itself
faces terrorism, it is not interested in enhancing the counter-terrorism policies of
other states. However, when terrorism poses a threat to the EU, it develops
security-oriented policies towards the third countries, and its normative
concerns lag behind. However, promotion of liberal democratic norms regains its
priority when the threat of terrorism in the EU diminishes.
In this respect, the norm diffusion pattern of the EU towards third
countries is like a vicious cycle between security and liberty. If the EU were to
face another major terror threat in future, security related concerns would again
prevail. However, the EU political actors would remember to promote liberal
democratic norms to third countries once the terror threat subsides. Therefore,
in the counter-terror domain, the EU is a rational actor only concerned with its
self-interest, rather than in the good of others, and the promotion of liberal
democratic norms in third countries is not a constant process. Rather, it
fluctuates in line with the threat of terrorism in the EU.
Furthermore, whilst promoting liberal democratic norms to third
countries, the EU also pays attention to efficiency of its own legal system, rather
than improving the policies of third countries. If counter-terrorism collaboration
between the EU and third countries fails to fulfil human rights principles, the EU
activities will be at risk of being reviewed by the European courts and the EP, and
EU political actors prefer not to be in such a situation. This also undermines the
legitimacy of its policies inside and outside of the EU. Therefore, the conditions
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laid down on third countries are mostly concerned with keeping the EUs
counter-terrorism policy efficient, and so are only concerned with the counter-
terrorism policies of third countries in a derivative manner.
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5. The Pre-Helsinki Period
5.1. Introduction
The pre-Helsinki period is the first phase in this research in which the EU
influence on Turkish counter-terrorism policy will be analysed. This period starts
with the first PKK attacks in 1984 and ends with the developments just before
the Helsinki European Council in 1999. The most significant feature of this period
is that the PKK attacks towards the security forces and civilians were at their
peak. EU-Turkey relations were at a preliminary stage. The EU was transforming
itself from an economic community to a political union. Except for Turgut Özals
Government, the rest of the Turkish governments were coalition governments.
Furthermore, the Turkish army had a certain level of autonomy in the decision-
making processes related to counter-terrorism policy. It is under these
circumstances that this chapter discusses the question: Why and How did EU
promoted norms fail to be adopted in Turkey in a way that transformed its
counter-terrorism policies towards the PKK in the pre-Helsinki period?
This chapter, and the following two, rely upon the framework outlined in
chapters 1 and 3. To summarise the main elements of this framework: Rule
adoption is the dependent variable. The theoretical framework encompasses the
Conditionality/Socialization mechanisms (see p89 for the former and p100 for
the latter) and their variables Credibility of Conditionality (see p96 above),
Adoption Cost (see p98 above), Legitimacy of EU Requirements (see p104
above) and Domestic Resonance (see p108 above). To transform qualitative
data into scalable values, two parameters: low and high levels have been
identified. These are summarized in chapter 1 (see p 33 above).
In the light of these variables and parameters, this chapter will argue that
due to the low level of the EU conditionality strategy (Low Benefits-High Costs)
and the low level of the EU socialization strategy (Low Legitimacy-Low
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Resonance), there was a low level of rule adoption in the counter-terrorism
domain in Turkey during the pre-Helsinki years. In other words, the EU influence
was low in transforming Turkish counter-terrorism policy towards the PKK.
This chapter starts in section 5.3 with the counter-terrorism practices
that were implemented by Turkish authorities to combat the PKK during the pre-
Helsinki period. This will be followed in section 5.4 with the EU reactions to these
counter-terror practices. In section 5.5, the EU influence on rule adoption will be
scrutinized by looking at the ratification of international laws, domestic
legislative changes, and institution building initiatives. In the final section, 5.6,
the reasons for the low level of EU impact on Turkish counter-terrorism policies
will be discussed in the light of above mentioned independent variables.
5.2. Turkeys Policies for Countering the PKK
When the PKK launched its first attacks on 15 August 1984 in the towns of Eruh
ĂŶĚ bĞŵĚŝŶůŝ ?14 Turkey was in a transition from a military regime to a civilian
government. Martial law had been in force since 1978, mass trials were held in
military courts, and torture was in widespread use by the law enforcement
agencies (Dagi 2001: 18). According to the Freedom of House ratings, Turkey had
been dropped from the rank of being a Free Country (1975-1980) to being a
Partly Free Country since the military coup in 1980, in terms of political rights
and civil liberties (Freedom House 2012). Within these poor democratic
conditions, Turkey was caught unprepared by the PKK attacks. The institutional
security capacity to confront ethnic separatist terrorist organisations was weak
in terms of intelligence capabilities, democratic policing practices, and
cooperation among law enforcement agencies (Interview_3 2012; Interview_27
2013). Furthermore, governing politicians lacked vision on how to deal with
ethnic based terrorism (Interview_24 2013; Interview_27 2013). Therefore,
14 ƌƵŚ ŝƐ ƚŽǁŶ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ^ŝŝƌƚ WƌŽǀŝŶĐĞ ĂŶĚ bĞŵĚŝŶůŝ ŝƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇ ŽĨ ,ĂŬŬĂƌŝ WƌŽǀŝŶĐĞ ? ďŽƚŚ
located in the Eastern part of Turkey.
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Turkish politicians employed a military based counter-terrorism strategy towards
the PKK (Interview_3 2012; Interview_4 2012; Interview_20 2013).
In order to combat the PKK, initially, a Village Guard System was
established in 1985 by amending the Village Law. The new amendment gave the
opportunity to the Turkish state to arm villagers in order to defend themselves
against PKK attacks. According to a former Minister of the Interior, this system
was proposed to the government by the Turkish Army in order to establish a
paramilitary force in the Southeastern region that would support military forces
where the Turkish armys troops were absent or under-deployed (Interview_20
2013). In particular, the system was employed to ensure security in mountainous
ĂƌĞĂƐ ǁŚĞƌĞ dƵƌŬŝƐŚ ƚƌŽŽƉƐ ĂƌĞ ŶŽƚ ĞĂƐŝůǇ ĚĞƉůŽǇĞĚ  ?<ŝƌŝƔĐŝ ĂŶĚ tŝŶƌŽǁ  ? ? ? ? P
129-30). However, during the pre-Helsinki years, the Kurdish tribal leaders, who
were also strong political figures in the Southeastern region, used this system for
their own benefit. They recruited village guards to increase the income of
villagers as well their own wealth (as they confiscated a certain amount of the
guards salary) (Interview_20 2013; Interview_27 2013). According to official
figures, the number of the guards jumped from 14,000 in 1988 to 62,000 in 1995
and reached to its highest level in the late 1990s with around 90,000 recruits
(Kor 2009: 48-49). As a former Minister of Human Rights has emphasized,
villages or tribes who refused to be part of this system were considered as PKK
supporters, or disloyal to the Turkish state (Interview_27 2013). These poorly
controlled paramilitary forces were involved in many human rights violations,
such as extra judicial killings, torture, and village evacuations, and in crimes like
rape, extortion, and bodily harm (E. Hughes 2006: 80; Kor 2009: 48-49).
Furthermore, clashes between allied paramilitary forces and the PKK deepened
intra-Kurdish animosities in the region (Barkey 2007: 357).
The hard-line counter-terrorism measures of Turkey towards the PKK
were followed by the appointment of a regional State of Emergency governor
who was empowered with extraordinary authority. He was assigned to
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coordinate government activities and security institutions in ten Eastern
provinces of Turkey that the PKK aimed to control (Interview_27 2013).15 The
State of Emergency governor was authorized to ban press publications, to
evacuate villages, to impose internal exile, and to suspend demonstrations in
circumstances of serious disruption in the public order (Turkish Ministerial
Council 1987-1990). His action was not subject to any independent judicial
review, which implicitly provided immunity for him (E. Hughes 2006: 81).
However, the governor was only a figurehead of the Turkish Army Generals, and
lacked the power to exert authority on security units (Interview_20 2013;
Interview_27 2013). According to a former Minister of the Interior, the governor
was appointed just to give the impression that the security forces were under
the control of civilians (Interview_20 2013).
As part of the State of Emergency governors authority, village
evacuations were used to ensure security in provinces where PKK raids were
frequent. According to a former Minister of Foreign Affairs, village evacuation
was a result of employing a strategy of area dominance/control whilst struggling
with the PKK. In this strategy, when PKK activities were located in mountainous
areas, security forces controlled these areas forcibly evacuated villages in order
to prevent them being utilized by the PKK for logistics, shelter, and recruitment
(Interview_21 2013). The decisions to evacuate villages were never discussed
with governments. Sometimes government ministers were ill-informed about
them by security forces (Interview_21 2013; Interview_27 2013). According to
some authors who are close to the Kurdish movement, during the 1990s the
number of evacuated villages was 3,500 and the number of Internally Displaced
People (IDP) was 3 million in total (McDowall 2004: 440; Yildiz and Muller 2008:
17). According to the figure given by the Turkish National Assembly Research
Commission in 1997, more than 3,000 villages and hamlets were evacuated and
approximately 450,000 people forced to leave their homes (Turkish National
15dŚĞƐĞƉƌŽǀŝŶĐĞƐǁĞƌĞŝǇĂƌďĂŬŦƌ ?ŝŶŐƂů ?ůĂǌŦŒ ?,ĂŬŬĂƌŝ ?DĂƌĚŝŶ ?^ŝŝƌƚ ?dƵŶĐĞůŝĂŶĚsĂŶ ?/Ŷ
 ? ? ? ? ?ƚǁŽŽƚŚĞƌƉƌŽǀŝŶĐĞƐĂƚŵĂŶĂŶĚbŦƌŶĂŬǁĞƌĞĂĚĚĞ ƚŽƚŚĞƐĞƉƌŽǀŝŶĐĞƐ ?
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Assembly Research Commission 1997). Ministry of Interior figures indicate that
between 1984 and 1999, 945 villages and 2,021 hamlets were emptied, and
358,335 people were displaced (UN Secretay-General's Representative on
Internally Displaced Persons 2006: 12).
Even though the official number of IDPs is not clear, the consequences of
ƚŚĞŝƌ ĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ ĂƌĞ ƵŶĚĞŶŝĂďůĞ ? dŚĞƐĞ /WƐ ŵŽǀĞĚ ƚŽ ĐŝƚŝĞƐ ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ ŝǇĂƌďĂŬŦƌ ?
Adana, Mersin and they were accommodated in shanty towns. According to the
Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) report, these people
suffered from poverty, unemployment, access to education, child labour and
insufficient access to healthcare (Aker et al. 2005). They were also open to
manipulation, which created a fertile ground for the PKK to sign up new recruits.
According to the Child Soldiers Global Report, the PKK had been recruiting
children from IDPs since 1994. It is believed that in 1998 there were 3,000
children among the PKK members (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers
2008: 343). According to a former Minister of Human Rights, at that time
neither politicians nor security forces were aware of the risks that these children
might be future recruits of the PKK (Interview_27 2013).
In order to prevent the PKK attacks in the Eastern part of Turkey, the
military presence in the region was increased. According to the International
Institute for Strategic Studies, troop deployment numbers in the region, which
was normally 90,000, increased to 160,000 in the 1994-1995 period
(International Institute for Strategic Studies 1994: 36). With this increase, one
third of the Turkish Army was deployed against the PKK (Barkey and Fuller 1997:
59). If the other security forces, such as police units, and village guards, are
ŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚ ? ƚŚĞ ƚŽƚĂů ĚĞƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ ƌĞĂĐŚĞĚ ǁĂƐ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ?<ŝƌŝƔĐŝ
and Winrow 1997: 130). Engaging such a massive number of security forces for
fighting terrorism under the state of emergency rules, which are not accountable
to civilian authority, brought with it the use of excessive force towards
sympathizers and members of the PKK.
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In line with the increasing number of security forces, human rights
violations in the Southeastern region followed a similar trend. According to the
Human Rights Foundation of Turkey (HRFT)16, between 1990 and 1998; 1,102
people were killed in extra judicial killings, 1,683 political murders were
committed by unknown perpetrators, 189 people disappeared because of their
political views, and 348 people died when they were in detention. In addition to
these numbers, in the same period there were 13,263 torture cases reported
(Human Rights Foundation of Turkey 2000: 161). These actions mostly targeted
Kurdish political figures in the region. For the extra judicial killings, political
murders and disappearances, it is not easy to identify the real perpetrators. At
the time of these executions/disappearances not only security forces but also
the PKK and the Turkish Hezbollah17 were suspected as being involved in these
ŵǇƐƚĞƌŝŽƵƐ ŬŝůůŝŶŐƐ  ?<ŝƌŝƔĐŝ ĂŶĚ tŝŶƌŽǁ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? Z ? ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ďǇ ĨĂŝůŝŶŐ ƚŽ
investigate and prevent these political murders, Turkish state authorities bear
much of the blame for these human rights violations.
In contrast to the increasing number of human rights violations, the
number of the investigations against the security forces for their abusive actions
was not at the same level. According to the Ministry of Justice figures, from the
beginning of the imposition of a state emergency in July 1987, to November
2002, a total of 1,275 torture allegations against security forces resulted in 60
ĐŽŶǀŝĐƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ ŽŶůǇ  ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞŵ ƌĞƐƵůƚĞĚ ŝŶ Ă ƉƌŝƐŽŶ ƐĞŶƚĞŶĐĞ  ?dĂŶƌŦŬƵůƵ ĂŶĚ
Yavuz 2005: 517). This outcome was also related with procedures regarding the
permission to investigate human rights violation allegations against the security
forces. According to a former Minister of the Interior, during the 1990s, opening
such an investigation against the security forces was difficult for the governors,
because if a governor disputed with security forces, he would most likely be side-
16
The Human Rights Foundation of Turkey reports are mostly funded by the EU or member
countries.
17
An Islamic terrorist organisation active in south-eastern Turkey that targets PKK sympathizers
and state officials.
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lined or banished by the central government to another town, relying on the
reports of the security forces. In this respect, governors were hesitant to get
involved in these kinds of investigations, which undermined their authority on
the security forces (Interview_20 2013).
In order to combat the PKK a new Anti-Terror Law (ATL) was also put into
practice in April 1991. The new law was premised on a broad definition of
terrorist activities that permitted security forces to violate the civil liberties of
terror suspects. Any views linked with the Kurdish issue, or regional autonomy,
were interpreted as undermining the integrity of the state and subject to
counter-terror investigation. In addition to the broad definition, the ATL granted
security forces with broad range of authorities at the expense of human rights.
For example, terror suspects could be taken into the custody for up to 15 days
(30 days in regions where state emergency has been declared) in relation to
collectively committed crimes (CPT 1992: 8). In addition, any written-oral
expression contrary to state arguments, were subject to criminal investigation,
and many newspapers and periodicals were confiscated or banned. According to
HRFT reports, between 1991 and 1998 more than 3,000 newspaper and journals,
and more than 200 books were confiscated. The majority of these publications
raised the Kurdish issue in their content. Decisions for confiscation were made
mostly under the articles of the ATL (Human Rights Foundation of Turkey 1995,
1997, 1998, 2000).
Along with harsh legislative changes, the prosecution of terror crimes
started to be held in State Security Courts (SSC). These courts were established
after the 1980 military coup to try cases against the integrity and national
security of the state. With an amendment of the SSCs procedure in law 3842 in
1992, terror crimes were added under the jurisdiction of these courts. These
courts provided less protection to defendants than ordinary Turkish courts (E.
Hughes 2006: 82). Furthermore, military judges could be assigned to the bench
of these courts. The problem with the assignment of military judges was they
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were all dependant on the Turkish army for their salary, pension, and disciplinary
evaluation, which affected their impartiality. In the following years, the ECtHR
found the presence of military judges to be a violation of the fair trial principles
set out in article 6 of the ECHR (Ilbiz 2009).
Conducting military operations against PKK camps in Northern Iraq was
another major counter-terrorism practice of Turkey between 1984 and 1998.
Except for between 1988 to 1991, when the Iraq administration did not allow the
Turkish Military to engage in cross border operations, more than 20 ground and
air military operations were mounted in Northern Iraq (International Strategic
Research Organisation 2007: 26-27). Even though in these operations hundreds
of PKK members are predicted to have been eliminated, in return no major
success in defeating the PKK was achieved. After the cross-border operations,
the PKK continued to use its camps in Northern Iraq for training, providing
logistics, and for sanctuary. According to senior EU officials, these operations
were considered as a risk to the stability of the EU and the territorial integrity of
Iraq, and to the safety of energy security (Interview_11 2013; Interview_14
2013).
In the early 1990s the first legal pro-Kurdish parties emerged in the
Turkish political arena. The Peoples Labour Party (HEP) was founded in 1990 by
the deputies who were dismissed from the Social Democratic Peoples Party
(SHP) because of attending a conference regarding the Kurdish Institute in Paris.
Two former state ministers, who were also members of the SHP, admitted that
these deputies were dismissed from the party without any legitimate reasons
(Interview_21 2013; Interview_27 2013). Similarly, as Marcus has indicated,
contrary to common assumptions, interaction between these deputies and the
PKK was loose in those years (Marcus 2007: 126-28). However, the
Constitutional Court closed this party because of its promotion of PKK activities,
and because of its having sectarian motives (Constitutional Court of the Republic
of Turkey 1993). Shortly after the closure of the HEP in 1993, a successor party
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(the Democracy Party (DEP)) was formed with the parliamentarians having
resigned from the HEP. This time the PKK sympathizers took an active role in the
party, unlike in the HEP (Marcus 2007: 224). However, the Constitutional Court
closed down the DEP on a similar basis to that used in the case of the HEP
(Constitutional Court of the Republic of Turkey 1994). Its thirteen deputies were
stripped of their immunities by the decision of the Turkish Grand National
Assembly (TBMM) and four of them were sentenced for their links with the PKK
by the Ankara State Security Court. The Peoples Democracy Party (HADEP)
continued to support the Kurdish cause after the closure of the DEP. It was
founded in 1994. In contrast to previous pro-Kurdish parties, the HADEP
maintained a moderate approach and distanced itself from the PKK. Even though
the Party received over 4% of general votes in the 1995 general elections, and
received the majority of votes in five Kurdish populated provinces, it failed to
pass the 10% national threshold to join Turkish Parliament.
In sum, during the pre-Helsinki period, Turkish authorities preferred to
employ hard-line counter-terrorism practices (such as the evacuation of villages,
human rights violations, and banning political parties) to hinder the support of
the PKK. These actions not only targeted PKK members and sympathizers, but
also Kurdish citizens who tried to be neutral between the PKK and the Turkish
state. Due to these harsh security measures, the Turkish state played into the
hands of the PKK. Those who were supporting the application of a peaceful
solution to the Kurdish issue were pushed to support the PKK, and its popularity
in the region increased. The bad reputation of Turkeys hard-line counter terror
practices also went beyond its borders. The EU took these actions seriously when
considering Turkeys prospective EU membership.
5.3. The EU Response to Turkish Counter-Terrorism Practices
From the beginning of the 1980s Turkey- EEC relations were in a stalemate due
to the military coup of 1980. Financial assistance provided by the Community
was blocked. The Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC), which is the only liaising
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organ between the EEC and Turkey, was suspended (Dagi 2001). Poor
democratic conditions and human rights violations in Turkey were criticized by
the EP resolutions. According to the Balfe Report18, which was prepared at the
request of the European Parliament, human rights standards in Turkey were
found to be far below the most elementary standards of European countries in
those years. Turkey was criticized for regularly implementing the death penalty,
not only in the EEC, and but also among the 21 member countries of the Council
of Europe. Furthermore, widespread torture cases in detention centres, the
infringement of the rights of political prisoners, the lack of freedom of
expression and assembly, were all emphasized as poor human rights practices in
Turkey. The report did not recommend the resumption of the parliamentary
relations that existed between Turkey and the Community before the 1980
military intervention, until concrete steps were taken by the Turkish authorities
(Balfe 1985). In view of these circumstances, there was no official way for the
Community to influence Turkish polity, politics, and policies until the late 1980s.
The first major opportunity for the EEC to influence Turkish counter-
terrorism policy came when Turkey applied for full membership in April 1987. At
the time of this application, Turkey was striving to improve its relations with the
oil-rich Middle East countries to increase its exports. However, Turkish
entrepreneurs had little interest in these countries (Interview_17 2013).
Moreover, due to fluctuating oil prices Prime Minister Özal was looking for more
stable markets and financial resources than those that existed in the EEC (Birand
2005: 325; Dagi 2001: 19). Along with the economic motives, Turkeys
application was also based on political reasons. According to one of the former
Turkish ambassadors, Turkey had always been part of European integration,
because it had taken part in NATO and the Council of Europe since the Second
World War. In this respect, Turkish political actors were aware that it would have
been a strategic failure for Turkey, if it were excluded from European
18
British Member of the European Parliament and rapporteur for the European Parliaments
Political Affairs Committee.
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integration. Therefore, Turkey applied for EEC membership (Interview_17 2013).
After Turkeys application, the political pressure of the EEC gradually increased
for Turkey to align itself with the democratic standards of the member countries.
During the first years of Turkeys application, the most important actor
concerned with Turkeys hard-line counter-terrorism practices was still the EP.
After the Single European Act, the Parliament gained the power to authorize the
accession of new member countries to the Community. Therefore, the
Parliament acquired a critical role in judging Turkeys political standards (Dagi
2001: 29). After Turkeys official application, the EP intensified its criticism. For
example, in a resolution adopted in 1988, the terrorist actions of the PKK were
condemned, and Turkey was called to recognize the fundamental human rights
of the Kurdish minority before there could be a resumption the relations
between the EEC and Turkey (European Parliament 1988: 128). However, Turkish
authorities did not take the EP calls seriously, because of the continuing PKK
attacks in the Southeast of Turkey. Furthermore, there was an understanding
among the Turkish political actors that these requirements could be fulfilled in
the long term, but not at that time (Interview_20 2013; Interview_27 2013).
The political background of European parliamentarians was very
influential in passing the EC resolutions. If their electorates self-interest
conflicted with Turkish policies these members tended to be partial against
Turkey. For example, Greek MPs were famous for lobbying and voting in block
for resolutions that targeted Turkey, due to tension between Greek and Turkish
foreign policies (Sugden 2004: 245). Similarly, the growing Kurdish diaspora from
the 1980s developed a transnational network including pro-Kurdish associations
and media in European countries. Turkeys hard-line counter-terrorism policy
and its failure to protect human rights paved the way for the Kurdish diaspora to
legitimize PKKs violent actions (Interview_5 2012; Interview_10 2012).
Therefore, diaspora organisations were used by the PKK for lobbying activities
that targeted members of the EP, and to a lesser extent, members of the
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European Commission (Casier 2011: 202). The EP groups (such as the Confederal
Group of the European United Left (GUE), the Nordic Green Left (NGL) and the
Greens/European Free Alliances (Greens/EFA)) kept the problems of the Turkish
Kurds on the EP agenda (Casier 2011: 203).
When Turkeys application was rejected in 1989 after waiting for two
years, Turkish politicians faced their first disappointment. According to the
Commission of the European Communities (CEC) decision, Turkey was
considered as a highly populated country, and its economic development was
found to be far behind the Community average. In addition, its human rights
situation and its respect for the identity of minorities, were not seen to be at the
required level for a democracy (Commission of the European Communities
1989). However, the Commission did not specify in what terms Turkish human
rights standards were below those of a democratic country. Furthermore, the
PKK and the Kurdish question were not specifically addressed in this decision.
The economic concerns of the EEC seemed to be more significant in this decision
than the poor human rights conditions in Turkey. In this respect, before the Cold
War, the EEC countries greatly prioritised the economic parameters of candidate
countries, rather than their human rights standards, for their accession to the
Community.
Rising violence in the Southeast of Turkey during the early 1990s also led
to a deterioration in relations between Turkey and European countries.
Germany, one of Turkeys largest military suppliers, suspended military
shipments in 1992, 1994 and 1995 as a reaction to Turkeys counter-terrorism
policies towards the PKK (Ron 1995: 36). The depiction of German provided
weapons being used for inhuman counter-terror practices in the European
media alerted the German government to the fact that these weapons were not
being used by Turkey for NATO purposes. However, the arms embargos did not
last for more than a year because of the diplomatic pressure that Turkey applied
to Germany (Criss 1995: 23-24). Similarly, France condemned Turkeys incursion
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into Iraq for counter-terror purposes. However, they continued to sell military
helicopters to Turkey, even when they were aware that these helicopters were
being used for countering the PKK in cross-border operations (Ron 1995: 37). As
these examples indicate, the commercial interests of the member states
overweighed the normative concerns about Turkey. According to a former
Turkish Minister of Human Rights, at that time European countries were aware
that, as a member of NATO, Turkey needed heavy artillery to strengthen its
defence sector. However, their reaction towards Turkey was motivated by their
wish to appease the harsh criticisms of their domestic opponents (Interview_27
2013). But, their inconsistent approach was also creating sincerity issues among
the Turkish politicians (Interview_21 2013).
Turkeys intolerance towards pro-Kurdish parties and Kurdish politicians
were also not welcomed by the EU. When the Constitutional Court closed the
pro-Kurdish party (the DEP), and the Ankara State Security Court imprisoned
their four deputies, the European Commission condemned the imprisonment of
freely elected politicians and urged Turkey to respect human rights (European
Council 1994). However, the only solid reaction from the EU was given by the EP,
in which Leyla Zana (who was one of the arrested deputies) was awarded with
the Sakharov Prize for freedom of thought in 1995. Nevertheless, this attempt
did not influence the Turkish judiciary, and these MPs were not released.
When the European Union welcomed the CEECs to the Copenhagen
European Council in 1993, Turkey was still asked to fulfil requirements laid out in
the Association Agreement of 1963. This was an important indication that the
CEECs were considered more favourably than Turkey in the eyes of the Union.
Furthermore, the CEECs were easier for the EU to absorb given their smaller
populations and links to European culture. Turkey, by comparison, had an
undeveloped economy and high Muslim population. In consideration of Turkeys
disadvantages, the Turkish political elite looked for an alternative way to gain
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membership. The Customs Union was seen as the key to opening the
membership door to the EU (Faucompret and Konings 2008: 35).
When the Custom Union negotiations started between Turkey and the
EU, the Commission and member states were determined to implement an
agreement to develop closer relations with Turkey given Turkeys contribution to
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) (due to its powerful army and
highly populated market potential). Furthermore, the Customs Union agreement
was not a costly decision for the EU, compared with admitting Turkey as a
member. However, the benefits to Turkey from becoming a part of the Customs
Union were far lower than those it would have gained from becoming a member
country. Therefore, leading members of the Union (such as Germany, France,
and UK), and the global companies which have investments in Turkey, lobbied in
favour of Turkey before a member of the Customs Union (Interview_21 2013).
They defended a flexible approach in applying political conditionality to Turkey
(Arikan 2002: 35). However, at the time of these negotiations the EP took PKK
related issues to the EU agenda. In a EP resolution in 1995, allowing Turkey into
the Customs Union with its poor human rights record was considered risky for
the Union (European Parliament 1995a: 100). In another resolution, Turkey was
condemned for its intervention in Northern Iraq. The Parliament urged the
Commission, the Council, and the member countries, to take the necessary
actions against Turkey to encourage it to withdraw its troops from Northern Iraq
and amend its domestic legislation (European Parliament 1995b: 107-08).
However, the EPs efforts to lay down conditions that Turkey must meet before
signing the Customs Union agreement, had limited impact on the Commission
and member states. The only exception was that the EP succeeded in convincing
Turkish authorities to amend article 8 of the Turkish Anti-terror Law, which
previously limited freedom of expression. In the end, even though the EP was
not satisfied with the overall human rights record of Turkey, the Parliament
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eventually allowed Turkey to join the Customs Union due to pressure from
leading member countries and the Commission (Usul 2011: 79-80).
Signing the Customs Union agreement did not liberate Turkey from the
harsh critiques of the EP. In the years following the Customs Union, Turkeys
counter-terrorism practices against the PKK continued to be subject to EP
resolutions. In a resolution in June 1996, the EP called upon Turkey to end
military operations in the Southeast of the country, and negotiate with Kurdish
organizations such as the PKK, without specifying their names. The Turkish
government was also urged to immediately release the imprisoned deputies
(Leyla Zana and the others) (European Parliament 1996a: 209). Just after the
release of this resolution, in September 1996, the European Parliament
announced another resolution emphasizing its disappointment regarding the
human rights situation in Turkey since the formation of the Customs Union. The
EP called on the Commission to suspend funds allocated for Turkey, except for
those to be used for promoting democracy and human rights. Contrary to the
previous resolutions, for the first time, the Southeast of Turkey was described as
Kurdistan (European Parliament 1996b: 188). As these resolutions indicated,
the EU institutions critical approach towards Turkey gradually increased after the
Customs Union, in line with Turkeys progressive integration into the EU. In
another words, the more Turkey became integrated into the Union, the more
frequently the EU institutions found the opportunity to intervene in Turkish
domestic politics.
When the ToA was signed in 1997, Turkeys PKK issue became another
handicap for Turkey in its attempt to become an EU member. The ToA
established an AFSJ that aimed to create a zone for EU citizens inside the Union.
Its purpose was to keep its citizens free from external security threats, and
provide them freedom of movement. In that sense, candidate countries were
required to enhance their law enforcement capabilities, and solve their
instabilities (such as terrorism, organised crime, and human trafficking) before
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being granted membership. The EU did not want to import these security
problems into the Union (Interview_14 2013). At this time Turkeys candidacy
was in consideration, but there were also other candidate countries among the
CEECs (such as Romania, Latvia, Hungary and Slovenia) who were facing ethnic
minority right problems of their own. However, the ethnic minority issues faced
by these countries did not have a terrorism dimension (Interview_14 2013).
Therefore, accepting Turkey into the AFSJ was a costly decision for the EU, when
Turkey is compared with the CEECs. Turkeys problematic ethnic terrorism issue
distinguished it from the CEECs.
In the Agenda 2000, which was published in 1997 as a European
Commission action plan on the upcoming Eastern enlargement, Turkeys
problematic counter-terrorism policies were again highlighted by the
Commission (Commission of the European Communities 1997: 56). In the section
allocated to Turkey, torture, extra-judicial killings, and disappearances were
considered as major problems. It was suggested to Turkish authorities that they
must control their security forces to prevent these cases, and restrain hard-line
counter-terrorism practices by sustaining the rule of law and human rights. They
were strongly urged to seek a peaceful solution instead of adopting a military
strategy (Commission of the European Communities 1997: 56). Based on these
reasons, the Commission excluded Turkey from joining the EU along with the
CEECs,19 and put it into a separate category (Commission of the European
Communities 1997: 57-59).
Along with the EP and the Commission, the European Council also
changed its position towards Turkeys candidacy, despite previously being
supportive of Turkeys admission to the Customs Union. In the Luxembourg
Council in 1997, even though Turkey was seen as eligible for membership, its
name was not put on the short list of candidate countries. Political and economic
conditions in Turkey were found to be inadequate to allow accession
19
These countries were Hungary, Poland, Estonia, Slovenia and Czech Republic.
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negotiations to begin. Turkey was required to align its human rights conditions
with the standards of the EU to improve its relations (European Council 1997).
The President of the European Council, Jean Claude Juncker, defended the
Councils decision by saying that the EU cannot sit at the table with a country
where torture is widespread (Kinzer 1998). According to senior EU officials, the
exclusion of Turkey cannot only be explained by Turkeys hard-line counter
terrorism policy towards the PKK. There were also other reasons which were
influential on Councils decision, such as the fact that Turkey shared its borders
with Middle East Countries, its underdeveloped economy, and its high
population in comparison to the CEECs (Interview_11 2013; Interview_13 2013;
Interview_14 2013; Interview_15 2013; Interview_19 2013). However, keeping
Turkey from becoming a candidate country inevitably disappointed Turkish
political actors once again (Interview_8 2012). As a result of that, Ankara decided
to suspend relations with the EU, rather than revising its counter-terrorism
strategy against the PKK. As a reaction to the EU, Turkish prime minister Mesut
zŦůŵĂǌĂĐĐƵƐĞĚƚŚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌ,ĞůŵƵƚ<ŽŚůĨŽƌƚƌǇŝŶŐƚŽŵĂŬĞƚŚĞhĂ
Christian Club, and he did not participate in the European Conference in
London in March 1998 (T. Smith 2003c: 119).
Turkeys harsh reaction alarmed EU representatives due to the risk of
bilateral relations with the EU and Turkey being interrupted. According to a
senior Ministry for EU Affairs official, and a former Turkish ambassador, leaving
Turkey on its own was a risky decision for the EU, as democracy and human
rights could further deteriorate, and this could have unexpected results for the
EU. Keeping Turkey on track was considered less costly to the EU than excluding
it from the enlargement policy (Interview_17 2013; Interview_18 2013).
Therefore, the EU representatives tried to convince Turkey to engage in
negotiations by holding high profile meetings between March and April 1998.
However, the Turkish side gave a sign that these were empty gestures (Evans
1999). In order to reassure Turkeys political elite of the credibility of its
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promises, the Commission determined to prepare Turkey for candidacy in the
Cardiff European Council in June 1998. The harmonization of Turkish legislation
with the EU acquis was set as a first priority to develop EU-Turkey relations
(European Council 1998). It was decided that Turkeys progress was to be
monitored thorough the progression reports, even though Turkey did not have
candidacy status like the CEECs.
The human rights dimension of Turkeys counter-terrorism measures
against the PKK were evaluated in the section allotted for Political Criteria in
the first progression report in 1998. The report emphasized that the army is not
subject to civilian control, and they sometimes act without notifying the
governments in certain large-scale counter-terrorism operations. The
impartiality of military judges in the State Security Courts was highlighted as
violating fair trial principles and Turkish authorities were called to ensure their
judicial system was consistent with the ECHR principles. Torture, disappearances,
and extra-judicial killings were stated as still being a problem for Turkey. Turkish
authorities were urged once more to find a non-military solution to the PKK
problems, including lifting state emergency rule, and strengthening human rights
protection mechanisms (Commission of the European Communities 1998: 12-
20). This progression report was most detailed version of EUs evaluation on
Turkeys counter-terrorism policy that there had ever been. In this document,
the EU requirements became much clearer, and they were gathered together in
one place, in stark comparison to the previous situation in which the
requirements were spread across a great many European Parliament resolutions.
In short, during the pre-Helsinki Period, the EEC/EU reaction to Turkish
counter-terrorism policy was voiced mostly by the EP through their resolutions.
These resolutions did not address how Turkey should change its counter-
terrorism policy. They were very broad in their wording and open to
interpretation. These requirements were not fixed in the legislative system of
the Community. The EP pressure on Turkey to change its counter-terrorism
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policy was not very influential, due to inconsistency between the EP and leading
member states. Even though the EP argued to suspend relations with Turkey for
its failure on human rights, member states desired the integration of Turkey to
the EU for their self-interest (e.g. because of Turkeys contribution to the ESDP
and its potential market to EU companies). However, support of member
countries for Turkeys integration did not go beyond the Customs Union
agreement. Turkey was affiliated with the Union without its being granted
membership. During the 1990s, the transformation of the EU from an Economic
Community to a political Union also had a negative impact on EU demands. But
by 1998 the demands on Turkey had become much clearer.
5.4. The Impact of the EU on Rule Adoption
Despite the fact that during the pre-Helsinki period the EU was not very
influential on Turkey in changing its counter-terrorism policies, Turkey still
adopted some of the EUs norms. This occurred as a result of the ratification of
EU promoted international laws, the transposition of EU promoted rules into
domestic legislation, and institution building initiatives in line with the EU
requirements.
5.4.1. Ratification of International Laws
The first major attempt to convince the EEC that Turkey was complying with the
European human rights standards came two months before Turkeys
reapplication to the Community in January 1987. The European Convention of
Human Rights is one of the binding conventions for all member countries and
candidate countries that wish to become members, even though it is not part of
the EUs own legal framework. Turkey recognized the authority of the European
Commission of Human Rights (an organ of the Council of Europe) to receive
individual petitions regarding Turkeys human rights violations. The Commission
is responsible for preparing reports about the human rights violation of disputed
countries to the Committee of Ministers, whose decision is binding on all
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signatory states (Aral 2000: 45). The initial application was made for a three-year
period, and it was extended two months before the European Commissions
decision about Turkeys membership (Ulusoy 2007: 482). During the second
extension, Turkey also recognised the compulsory jurisdiction of the ECtHR (Aral
2000: 45). With this decision, Turkey was one of the last members of the Council
ŽĨ ƵƌŽƉĞ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝǌĞĚ ƚŚĞ ƌƵůŝŶŐƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƚ,Z  ?<ĂďŽŒůƵ ĂŶĚ <ŽƵƚŶĂƚǌŝƐ
2008: 458).
After Turkeys decision, victims of misconducted counter-terror
operations could apply to the ECtHR to sue Turkey for their human rights
violations. According to a former Turkish ambassador, this decision came before
Turkeys application to the Community, to impress the European authorities. In
that sense, there was a strong link between the recognition of the ECtHR
jurisdiction, and community membership (Interview_17 2013). However, in its
application, Turkey declared that it could derogate some of the articles of the
ECHR in extraordinary circumstances, such as war and a state of emergency.
This right has been used in 1990, 1991, and 1992 respectively. Turkish
authorities sent a notices of derogation to the Council of Europe on each
occasion to suspend articles 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, and 13 of the ECHR, on the account
for the intense conflict between the Turkish Army and the PKK (Permanent
Representation of Turkey to the Council of Europe 1990).
The second step launched to comply with the international law was the
ratification of anti-torture conventions. Turkey ratified The European
Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
on February 1988. At the time of this decision, Turkey was one of the first
countries to ratify the Convention (Council of Europe 2013). A few months later,
in April 1988, Turkey also ratified The United Nations Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The
ratification of both conventions had been completed when Turkeys membership
application was under evaluation by the European Commission. They were
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targeted to convince the EEC that Turkey was committed to the improvement of
human rights in the country (Interview_2 2012; Interview_17 2013).20 In
practice, however, implementation of both conventions by law enforcement
agencies failed. The CPT released two public statements in 1992 and 1996
against Turkey. Public statements are generally used by the Committee to
embarrass a government by negative exposure, and to force them to align their
policies with the standards of the ECHR. The on-going failure of Turkish
authorities to improve legal safeguards against the torture and ill treatment in
the Anti-terror Departments was emphasized as one of the reasons for the
release of the reports (CPT 1992, 1996).
The first ratifications took place before Turkeys membership application,
and the second before the decision of the European Commission on Turkeys
application was made. They were cosmetic changes made to influence the
Commission and member countries. Therefore, the ratification of neither
convention led to an improvement in human rights standards in the counter-
terror domain. For instance, Turkish authorities derogated some of the articles of
the ECHR, and Turkey lost many cases in the ECtHR in order to continue its hard-
line practices against the PKK (Interview_2 2012). In addition, the CPT posted
two public declarations against Turkey.
Along with these problems, the eagerness of Turkish politicians to ratify
international conventions did not continue after the Commission rebuffed
Turkeys application. Conventions such as the Framework Convention on
Protection of National Minorities, the European Charter for Regional and
Minority Languages, and additional Protocols of the ECHR (e.g. Protocol 6, which
abolishes death penalty) were not ratified by Turkish governments at this time.
20
The difference between the two conventions was they had different institutional mechanisms
for monitoring human rights violations in the contracting states. The UN Committee against
Torture, which monitors the implementation of UN convention, did not have a subcommittee to
visit detention centres until 2002, and it was not allowed make visits without the respective
government's permission. On the other hand, the Council of Europes subsidiary organ, the
Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT), had right to visit the custody facilities with its
independent experts without taking preliminary permission from national authorities.
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In this regard, Turkish political actors pursued a selective approach towards the
international conventions, and preferred to sign up to agreements improving
human rights situation in the country, rather than conventions granting rights to
ethnic minorities. The politicians and bureaucrats who were on duty during the
pre-Helsinki period clearly state that the concerns stemming from the PKK and
the Kurdish Question were the major reasons why Turkish authorities were
reluctant to adopt ethnic minority rights conventions (Interview_17 2013;
Interview_21 2013; Interview_23 2013; Interview_27 2013). In this respect, in
consideration of the ratification of international conventions in the pre-Helsinki
period, the EU impact was low on Turkish counter-terrorism policy.
5.4.2. Domestic Legislative Changes
The first domestic legislative change targeting Kurdish citizens came in April 1991
when the ban on the use of the Kurdish language was lifted. This ban was put
into practice by the military regime in 1983 through the law 2932, which
prescribed imprisonment for those using languages other than Turkish (E.
Hughes 2006: 83). At the time of this legislative change, Iraqi Kurds were also
voicing their expectation of autonomy in Iraq, which increased the risk that
Turkey would face similar aspirations among Turkish Kurds (Associated Press
1991). Turkish politicians also understood that it was impossible to put this ban
into practice in a region where a great majority were Kurdish (Interview_17
2013). Therefore, Özals Government allowed using Kurdish in daily activities,
such as cultural events. However, using Kurdish in education and public services
was not added into these changes, due to the risks of demands for autonomy
that would likely follow. According to a former Turkish ambassador, in this
legislative change, relations with the European Community were more
influential than regional risks in shaping the decision of the Turkish government
(Interview_17 2013).
The second important domestic legislative change was the introduction
of the Code of Criminal Procedure Law (CCPL) in April 1992. The new law
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provided certain rights to suspects that protected them from ill-treatment, such
as the right to notify a relative of ones custody, the right to access a lawyer, the
documenting of interrogation processes, and the right to apply to a judge for
immediate release. Furthermore, the CCPL reduced the maximum detention
period from 15 days to 24 hours. However, terror suspects who were under the
jurisdiction of state security courts were excluded from the protections of the
CCPL (CPT 1992: 8). Even though this legislative amendment made for
improvements in the human rights conditions in Turkey, it did not touch upon
counter-terrorism policy.
The third domestic legislative change was the amendment of article 8 of
the Anti-terror law in October 1995. This amendment was made a few months
before the decision about the Customs Union. The European Parliament required
Turkey to abolish or change this article several times. However, no priority was
given to change this article until the Customs Union (Usul 2011: 95). According to
a former Minister of Foreign Affairs, during the Customs Union negotiations this
legislative change was brought to the table by EU officials and domestic
politicians (who were in favour of amendment) who benefited from the EU
requirements to pass this legislation in Parliament (Interview_21 2013). The
article, which forbade written and oral propaganda against the indivisibility of
state, regardless of method and intent of the perpetrator, was revised after the
amendment, and the phase regardless of method and intent removed from
the article. Also, a new amendment reduced the duration of imprisonment and
created the possibility of converting prison terms into fines. The revision was
applied retrospectively to former cases and 82 individuals were released after
the amendment (Human Rights Watch 1999: 23-24). Even though this
amendment aimed to bring freedom of thought to Turkey, public prosecutors in
Turkey continued to impose the same punishments, but did so under different
Penal Code articles which punish inciting racial, ethnic, or religious enmity (E.
Hughes 2006: 88). In that sense, the legislative efforts of the politicians made
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little difference because the spirit of the changes were not embraced by state
officials and the judiciary.
The final amendment in regards to Turkish counter-terrorism policy came
in March 1997 in the CCPL. According to new changes, the maximum detention
periods were reduced for detainees who were on trial in State Security Courts.
This amendment redeemed the problem with the previous version of the CCPL in
1992. In the new version of the article, detention periods for terror suspects
were reduced by a half. The previous detention periods had been a problem for
Turkey, as their length violated the liberty and security principles set out in
article 5 of the ECHR. In the state of emergency regions, the maximum detention
period of 30 days was reduced to 10 days. Outside of these regions, the
maximum period was reduced from 14 days to 4 days. In both circumstances,
extended detention periods could only be used if a request was made to the
public prosecutor and the agreement of a magistrate obtained. The Government
plan to reduce detention periods for collective crimes gave an impression that it
was mostly influenced by the CPT recommendations, rather than the EP
resolutions. At a press conference in London, the Foreign Minister Tansu Çiller
announced that We courageously take the CPT findings and if they prove true,
we will identify those responsible and punish them (Human Rights Watch 1997:
5). After her speech, the bill was submitted to Parliament and it was passed in
line with the CPT requirements. As indicated by this example, the EUs
monitoring mechanisms and legal frameworks were not well enough developed
to influence candidate countries, and most influence came from the Council of
Europe. Therefore, the clarity of the EU requirements were not as strong as
those of the Council of Europe. Furthermore, concrete recommendations made
by other international organisations reduced the legitimacy of the EUs demands
on Turkey. The EU could not create the perception that they owned these
recommendations, and so their influence on Turkey was limited and their
demands lacked legitimacy.
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During the pre-Helsinki period, Turkey made several domestic legislative
changes to improve the human rights situation in the country. These changes
were not only made to satisfy the EU, but also to improve Turkeys diminishing
reputation in the human rights domain (CPT Public Statements) and to enhance
Turkeys position in the international arena so that they could more easily deal
with anticipated regional crises (e.g. the Refugee Crisis in Northern Iraq). Most of
these amendments were limited in scope. Lifting the ban on Kurdish was only
limited to daily activities, and did not cover educational rights and public
services. In addition, in the first version of the CCPL, terror suspects were
excluded from having rights which protected them from torture. Furthermore,
the implementation of some of the amendments did not bring the expected
results. For instance, article 8 of the ATL was amended to improve the right of
freedom of expression, but public prosecutors continued as before by opening
cases under different penal code articles. In the light of these findings, the
impact of the EU on domestic legislative changes was low in regards to Turkeys
counter-terrorism policy in the pre-Helsinki period.
5.4.3. Institution Building
The first institution to investigate human rights violations, The Turkish
Parliament Human Rights Inquiry Committee (TPHRIC), was established in
December 1990. According to a former head of the TPHRIC, the EU requirements
to establish an independent human rights institution was influential for setting
up this Committee (Interview_25 2013). The committee was tasked with
investigating, monitoring, and reporting human rights violations nationwide. It
consisted of members from the political parties and independent members of
the Turkish Grand National Assembly. The Committee was the first monitoring
mechanism at a national level that protected human rights (Turkish National
Assembly 2013). However, it had an advisory role, rather than an executive role
on human rights inquiries, and its reports were not influential on administrative
units. Furthermore, until the early 2000s the Committee was not
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institutionalized, and the work it did attracted little attention (Interview_25
2013).
During the same period, in 1996, the Missing Persons Bureau was set up
within the Turkish National Police. The Bureau was assigned to investigate
allegations about missing persons who had disappeared after they were taken
into police custody, or who had disappeared during the counter-terrorism
operations in Southeastern Turkey (U.S. Department of State 1996). Although,
the government and the security forces were held responsible for many
disappearances, in general people avoided contacting this government office
(Van Westering 2000: 102-03). The inefficiency of the Bureau was also
emphasized by the Commission in its first progression report in 1998
(Commission of the European Communities 1998: 17).
The High Coordinating Committee on Human Rights was another human
rights institution, which was established in April 1997. According to former
members of the Committee, at the time of its establishment, Turkey was losing
many cases in the ECtHR with regards to its counter-terrorism policies. In order
to reduce the number of cases against Turkey, this committee was established.
Aside from this, it was also thought that establishing this committee would
support Turkeys relations with the EU (Interview_16 2013; Interview_17 2013).
The committee was responsible for coordinating and improving the human rights
situation in Turkey. The Minister of State responsible for human rights chaired
the Committee. There were also representatives from the Prime Ministry, the
Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, who all attended committee meetings. The Committee also held well-
attended meetings in different cities and they regularly invited Human Rights
NGOs (Interview_27 2013). The Committees decisions were recommendatory
for the executive law enforcement institutions. However, the Committee made
notable initiatives when there was a powerful human rights minister in cabinet
(Interview_16 2013). One of the important contributions of the Committee on
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counter-terrorism policy was that it prepared a draft law on the prosecution of
civil servants, which aimed to make the prosecution of security forces easier in
cases where they were involved in torture and ill-treatment (Commission of the
European Communities 1998: 17).
In short, during the pre-Helsinki period, Turkey established a number of
institutions to monitor and improve human rights conditions, and to investigate
human rights violations. However, these institutions were recommendatory
institutions only, and were deprived of executive powers. Therefore, their
influence was limited in the counter-terrorism domain. Furthermore, aside from
the Parliamentary Inquiry Committee, the two other committees that were
formed were linked with state institutions. As such, there were problems
regarding their independence from the institutions they were linked with. In
addition, these committees were part of the same administrative framework as
the law enforcement services, and lacked NGO members, and as a consequence
they were often unwilling to criticise the law enforcement forces. According to
interview results, the EU influence was undeniable in the construction of these
institutions. However, an increasing number ECtHR decisions against Turkey was
another major dynamic, which also undermined the EU influence. Therefore, in
consideration of these circumstances, the EU influence was low in the pre-
Helsinki period in terms of institutions building initiatives.
5.5. The Application of EU Conditionality and Socialization in the
Pre-Helsinki Period
There were internal (domestic level) and external (the EU level) mediating
factors that led to there being a low level of EU impact on Turkish counter-
terrorism policies. In this section these factors will be examined in detail to
understand why the EU requirements did not yield the expected results. In order
to explain policy changes, four sets of factors: Credibility of Conditionality,
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Adoptions Costs, Legitimacy of EU requirements, and Domestic Resonance will
be used.21
5.5.1. Credibility of Conditionality
The most important factor in explaining why the EU was not influential on
Turkeys political behaviour was the EU did not give a clear membership
prospects to Turkey during the pre-Helsinki period. Despite Turkeys positive but
inadequate steps to fulfil the EU requirements (such as recognizing individual
application to the ECtHR, the ratification of anti-torture conventions, amending
the ATL, and establishing human rights monitoring mechanisms), the EU dashed
Turkeys hopes twice, once in 1989 and again in 1997. As discussed earlier (see
section 5.4.), even though the reforms appeared to be cosmetic changes
implemented merely to influence the EU decision, the lack of membership
prospects played a major role in these reforms not being taken further in Turkey.
The second major factor was that the EU was inconsistent in its
application of the conditionality strategy. On the one hand, the EU was trying to
keep Turkey on the enlargement track. On the other hand, it refrained from
entering into full relations with Turkey (Interview_17 2013). This inconsistency
created suspicion among the Turkish political actors that, whatever Turkey did, it
would never become a member of the EU (Interview_1 2012).
Thirdly, there was divergence among the EU institutions and member
countries regarding Turkeys accession to the EU. For instance, divergence
between the EP and member countries was clearer before the Customs Union
agreement. On the one hand, the EP was setting conditions on Turkey to
transform its counter-terrorism policies in order to join the Customs Union. On
the other hand, leading member countries were lobbying in favour of Turkey
joining the Customs Union, whether or not they met those conditions (i.e.
because Turkeys joining the Customs Union was in these countries interests).
21
See chapter three for the details why these independent variables were picked.
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Such a contradiction undermined the EUs conditionality strategy towards
Turkey.
Fourthly, the EUs partial approach against Turkey also undermined the
conditionality strategy of the EU. The EUs subjectivity became obvious during
the CEECs enlargement. Even though human rights conditions in Slovakia,
Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania were at an unsatisfactory level to start
negotiations, the EU were more favourable to these countries (Arikan 2002: 38-
40; Baç 1998: 255). On the other hand, when it came to a decision on Turkey, the
EU refrained from starting negotiations. As indicated earlier, absorbing CEECs
was easier for the EU due to their cultural links, low population, and low budget
cost. However, Turkey had a high population and a different cultural heritage.
Furthermore, the accession of Turkey to the EU would increase the enlargement
budget of the EU (Interview_18 2013).
In consideration of these circumstances, the credibility of EU
conditionality was at a low level during the pre-Helsinki period. Perhaps, if the
EU did not withhold membership prospects from Turkey, the counter-terrorism
policies of Turkey would have been transformed in line with the EU
requirements, and reforms would not have been interrupted.
5.5.2. Adoption Costs
The conflict between Turkish security forces and the PKK was its peak level
during the pre-Helsinki period. So, the PKKs terrorist actions were the major
adoption cost for Turkish governments in adopting the EU promoted human
rights norms. According to the statistics derived from Turkish General Staff,
Turkish National Police, and General Command of Gendarmerie, total fatalities
were 34,070 (5205 public servants, 5222 civilians and 23643 terrorists) in the
ƉĞƌŝŽĚ ĨƌŽŵ  ? ? ? ? ƚŽ  ? ? ? ?  ?bĞŶĞƌ  ? ? ? ? Z ? /Ŷ ŽƌĚĞƌ ƚŽƉƌĞǀĞŶ  W<< ĂƚƚĂĐŬƐ ? ŶĞǁ
counter-terrorism measures (such as the declaration of a state of emergency,
the village guard system, the evacuation of villages, and the Anti-terror Law)
were put into effect, which led to a deterioration in Turkeys human rights
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record. According to a former Minister of Foreign Affairs, during the 1980s and
1990s political environment it was not easy to defend adoption of EU promoted
human rights norms, because every day tens of people were dying. The parties
who were supportive of democratic reforms were accused of being secessionist
and undermining the counter-terrorism struggle (Interview_21 2013).
During the same period, there was a considerable support for a military
solution to PKK terrorism. This support not only emanated from increasing
fatalities, but also from the overlapping demands of the PKK and the EU
requirements from Turkish governments. The leader of the PKK, Ocalan, required
that Kurdish identity must accepted by Turkey (Gunter 1998: 3) and he
demanded that democratic conditions were fulfilled (Gunter 2011: 94). Similarly,
the EP was calling on Turkey to recognize the fundamental rights of the Kurdish
minority (European Parliament 1988: 128) and negotiate with Kurdish
organizations (European Parliament 1996a: 209). Such a match between PKK and
EU demands played into the hands of nationalists and Kemalist elites, and were
used to arouse nationalist sentiments. They claimed that the EU requirements
were targeting Turkeys territorial integrity. As Tocci indicated, the Sevres
Syndrome22 exacerbated these views (Tocci 2007: 69). Therefore, the Turkish
political elite were reluctant to adopt the EU promoted rules in consideration of
the electorate risks doing so posed.
Public statements by pro-Kurdish party politicians also aroused
nationalist sentiments, which also increased the adoption cost of fulfilling EU
demands for Turkish political actors. In a public statement in 1994, the DEP
Chairman Hatip Dicle argued that murder of unarmed cadets is normal in a
state of war (Criss 1995: 27). During the Parliamentary oath taking in 1991,
newly elected Kurdish deputies refused to repeat parts of the oath, i.e. the
ǁŽƌĚƐ SŝŶĚŝǀŝƐŝďůĞŝŶƚĞŐƌŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇĂŶĚŶĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?<ŝƌŝƔĐŝĂŶĚtŝŶƌŽǁ ? ? ? ? P
22
The Sevres Syndrome comes from the 1920 Sevres Treaty, which imposed Kurdish secession to
the Ottoman Empire by Western Allies. Since then, any attempt by Europe for peaceful solution
to the Kurdish Question was considered as a risk to territorial integrity in Turkey.
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 ? ? ? Z ? &ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ? zĂƔĂƌ <ĂǇĂ ? Ă ĨŽƌŵĞƌ W ƉƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ ? ĚĞĨĞŶĚĞĚ ƚŚĞ
Czechoslovakian model for a solution to the Kurdish Question, i.e. that separate
ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ĨŽƌ <ƵƌĚƐ ĂŶĚ dƵƌŬƐ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ďĞ ĨŽƌŵĞĚ  ?<ŝƌŝƔĐŝ ĂŶĚ tŝŶƌŽǁ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? Z ?
These statements were taken to prove that the defenders of hard-line
arguments were right that granting rights to Kurds was risky for the territorial
integrity of the Turkish Republic. Most of these statements were also used by the
Constitutional Court as evidence to close the pro-Kurdish party, the DEP
(Constitutional Court of the Republic of Turkey 1994).
The continuation of hard-line counter-terrorism policies was also
ĨĂǀŽƵƌĂďůĞ ƚŽ ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞů ? ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ <ŝƌŝƔĕŝ ĂŶĚ tŝŶĚƌŽǁ ? ĂĨƚĞƌ ƚŚĞ
declaration of emergency in the Southeast of Turkey, security officers enjoyed
considerable increases in their salaries due to compensation paid by the
government. Furthermore, village guards were paid because of the PKK threat in
ƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶ ?<ŝƌŝƔĐŝĂŶĚtŝŶƌŽǁ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? Z ?dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?ƚŚĞhƉƌŽŵŽƚĞĚƉĞĂĐĞĨƵů
solution was also costly for security officers and village guards.
In the light of these circumstances, the adoption cost of the EU promoted
rules was high during the Pre-Helsinki period for Turkish governments. Increasing
fatalities due to PKK attacks, the overlapping demands of the PKK and the EU
(which were abused by nationalist and Kemalist elites), provocative expressions
of pro-Kurdish politicians, and the demand for the continuation of the status quo
in the Southeastern region for financial benefits, are some reasons why the
adoption of EU promoted rules were costly for Turkish politicians.
5.5.3. Legitimacy of the EU Requirements
From 1987 onwards, the EU voiced its discontent about Turkeys hard-line
counter-terrorism policies, and the mishandling of the Kurdish Question. The
most prominent way in which EU criticism was voiced was in the EP resolutions.
The monitoring mechanisms assessing human rights (such as the progression
reports) were initiated after 1998 at a late stage of the pre-Helsinki Period. The
EP resolutions were not based on a legal framework or standards, which could
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be applied flexibly to each candidate country. The pro-Kurdish associations and
media were lobbying in favour of these resolutions, and some of the EP groups
actively supported the Kurdish argument (Casier 2011: 203). The Turkish
government and the media dismissed the EP resolutions, claiming that they were
based on misinformation and prepared by hypocritical politicians influenced by
the Kurdish diaspora (Interview_21 2013; Sugden 2004: 245) Therefore, during
the pre-Helsinki period, the legitimacy of the EU requirements were not strong
for Turkish political actors in terms of their clarity.
Within the pre-Helsinki period, most of the concrete recommendations
and monitoring mechanisms belonged to other international organisations (in
particularly the Council of Europe and its subsidiary organs such as the CPT and
the ECtHR). The reforms were primarily targeted to respond to the requirements
of these institutions. However, there was an understanding among Turkish
politicians that these reforms would underpin Turkeys EU accession
(Interview_2 2012; Interview_16 2013; Interview_17 2013). Therefore, the
absence of EU ownership of the legal frameworks and monitoring mechanisms
reduced the legitimacy of the EUs requirements.
Inconsistency among the EU institutions and member countries also
undermined the legitimacy of the EU requirements. On the one hand, the EP was
reacting to Turkey for implementing a hard-line counter-terrorism approach
against the PKK. On the other hand, member countries were selling heavy
artillery and military helicopters to Turkey. These kinds of contradictions raised
questions in the minds of the Turkish political elite as to whether the EU was
being sincere in its dealings with Turkey (Interview_21 2013). In these respects,
the legitimacy of the EU requirements were undermined.
Overall, the legitimacy of EU requirements on Turkish counter-terrorism
policies was low during the pre-Helsinki period. This low legitimacy was based on
the weak clarity of the EU requirements, the ownership problem of the EU in
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comparison to the other international organisations, and inconsistency between
the EU institutions and member countries.
5.5.4. Domestic Resonance
Democratic resonance towards the adoption of EU promoted human rights
norms to transform Turkish counter-terrorism policy was not at a promising level
during the pre-Helsinki period. The most important factor in the lack of openness
to adopt the EU promoted rules was that the Turkish army was the leading
decision maker in counter-terrorism policies. They defended a military based
strategy to end PKK terrorism, and governing political parties did not speak out
against the Army (Interview_4 2012; Interview_17 2013; Interview_20 2013;
Interview_24 2013). One study, which shares the opinions of high-level
commanders of the Turkish army, indicated that the high level commanders in
ƚŚŽƐĞ ǇĞĂƌƐ  ?ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ ŽŐĂŶ 'ƺƌĞƔ ĂŶĚ 7ƐŵĂŝů ,ĂŬŬŦ <ĂƌĂĚĂǇŦ Z ŽŶůǇ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ
military strategies against the PKK. They were not interested in granting ethnic
rights to the Kurds, or in improving human rights conditions whilst fighting with
the PKK (Kaya 2012: 533). In that sense, they were not open to EU suggestions to
solve PKK terrorism via peaceful means. On the contrary, they were sceptical of
the EU requirements and believed the EU demands undermined Turkeys
territorial integrity (Interview_24 2013).
Aside from the Turkish army, there was no consensus amongst Turkish
politicians regarding the EU recommendations for a peaceful solution to the PKK
problem. Turgut Özal was the politician most responsive to the EU demands to
promote the ethnic rights of the Kurds, but he lost his life just before the PKK
was convinced to lay down its arms (Çandar 2012: 53). Süleyman Demirel, who
was the successor of Özal, announced that he recognized the Kurdish reality,
ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌŚŝƐ ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐĚŝĚ ŶŽƚ ŐŽ ďĞǇŽŶĚ ŚŝƐ ǁŽƌĚƐ  ?'ƵŶƚĞƌ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? <ŝƌŝƔĐŝ ĂŶĚ
Winrow 1997: 113). Tansu Çilller, who became prime minister after Süleyman
Demirel became President, proposed that a Basque Model be applied in the
Kurdish populated regions. Nevertheless, she retreated from her proposal due to
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the harsh reaction of military commanders and hardliners in her party (Bahcheli
ĂŶĚEŽĞů ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ?<ŝƌŝƔĐŝĂŶĚtŝŶƌŽǁ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ? ?Z ?EĞĐŵĞƚƚŝŶƌďĂŬĂŶ ?ǁŚŽ
shared the coalition with Çiller, attempted to negotiate with the PKK, but he was
overthrown by the so called Post-Modern Coup (Çandar 2012: 53). Mesut
zŦůŵĂǌ ? ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐŝĂŶ ǁŚŽ ǁĂƐ ŽŶĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ůĞĂĚŝŶŐ ĂĚǀŽĐĂƚĞ ŽĨ dƵƌŬĞǇ ? h
membership, was inconsistent in his approach. He neither supported nor
opposed a peaceful solution. Rather, he positioned himself according to the
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ  ?<ŝƌŝƔĐŝ ĂŶĚ tŝŶƌŽǁ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ^ĐŚŝŵŵĞůĨĞŶŶŝŐ Ğƚ Ăů ?
2006: 101). Therefore, resonance among the Turkish political elite, with regards
to the EU requirements, was low.
During the pre-Helsinki period, the Turkish judiciary was not open to
internalizing the EU promoted norms in their decisions (Interview_7 2012). Even
though Turkey recognized the compulsory jurisdiction of the ECtHR in this
period, Turkish courts did not adopt the ECtHR litigation in their decisions. From
the early 1990s, the ECtHR started to rule on the individual petitions against
Turkey. Victims in these cases had generally been subjected to counter-terrorism
operations by the Turkish security forces. However, the increasing number of
ŚƵŵĂŶ ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ƌƵůŝŶŐƐ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ƚ,Z ĚŝĚ ŶŽƚ ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶ ƚŚĞ dƵƌŬŝƐŚ :ƵĚŝĐŝĂƌǇ  ?ĂůŦ
2010). Furthermore, some of the domestic legislative changes made to convince
the EU did not have an impact on judicial decisions. For example, the
amendment in article 8 of the ATL, did not give the expected results for freedom
of expression. The Turkish judiciary used other articles of criminal codes to open
investigations against people who were defending autonomy in the Southeast of
Turkey. Therefore, resonance among the judicial authorities to implement the
EU requirements was just as low as resonance amongst politicians and the
military.
Lastly, during the same period, counter-terror laws gave disproportional
power to security forces, which exceeded the standards of legitimate authority
provided by the human rights norms. An increasing number of human rights
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violations produced strong demands from the public for improvement in human
rights issues. Mass protests undertaken in the name of Saturday Mothers,
Juveniles of Manisa and Minute of Darkness, were signs of these demands.
The so called Saturday Mothers were parents of persons who disappeared in
detention. They gathered every Saturday in Istiklal Street in Istanbul. The
peaceful protests of these elderly women attracted public attention. During the
same period, 16 juveniles were arrested in Manisa (they became known as the
Juvileniles of Manisa) for their links with the terrorist organisation, the
Revolutionary Peoples Liberation Front (DHKP-C). Reports of torture and the
public statement given by MP Sabri Ergül, of the Republicans Peoples Party
(CHP), produced an outcry in the Media and general public (Amnesty
International 1996). In addition to these events, a car crash in Susurluk caused
mass protests in Turkey. A feudal leader whose guards clashed with the PKK, a
death-squad leader wanted for several political killings, and a deputy police chief
of Istanbul Police Department, were found in the same crashed vehicle. This
incident depicts the complicated relation between the state and illegal bodies in
the fight against terrorism. After the accident, protests called for a minute of
darkness to take place across the whole country, in which citizens flashed their
household lights for a minute to protest against the corruption in the political
relations of the Turkish state (Sugden 2004: 247). However, these protests did
not make much difference on the decisions of Turkish political elite.
In the light of these aspects, domestic resonance was low in the Pre-
Helsinki period. Most of the political elite were not open to change and they did
not question existing counter-terrorism policy failures. The EU promoted norms
were not seen as a cure to end PKK terrorism.
5.6. Conclusion
As this chapter has indicated, the EU influence on Turkish counter-terrorism
policies towards the PKK was low during the pre-Helsinki period. Even though
Turkey ratified several international conventions, amended its domestic
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legislation, and established human rights institutions, these initiatives were not
at the required level to fulfil the EU demands. The most important counter-
terrorism policy elements, which caused many human rights violations (such as
village guard system, the state security courts, and the state of emergency in the
Southeast of Turkey) prevailed.
Turkish authorities were selective whilst ratifying the international
conventions. They preferred to ratify conventions promoting human rights
rather than agreements granting rights to Kurds. These international
conventions were generally adopted shortly before decisions were made by the
EU, in order to impress the EU institutions. Furthermore, the implementation of
the EU promoted international conventions was impaired due to on-going PKK
attacks.
Domestic legislative changes during the pre-Helsinki period had the same
destiny as the international conventions. They were generally amended to satisfy
the EU and to improve Turkeys ailing reputation in the international
environment. However, they did not make much difference in improving Kurdish
rights. Moreover, terror suspects were excluded from certain rights whilst they
were on trial. Some of the amendments did not make any difference on the
decisions of the judiciary. Public prosecutors continued investigations by using
other criminal code articles.
The human rights monitoring institutions, which were established in this
period, were deprived of executive powers. As they were part of the same
administrative structure, they were reluctant to criticize law enforcement
agencies. The lack of NGOs in their decision-making processes undermined their
impartiality. The ECtHR influence on building these institutions was higher than
that of the EU, which meant the EU impact was lowered.
The low level of credibility of conditionality was the first reason why the
EU influence was low during the pre-Helsinki period. The EU did not give clear
membership prospects to Turkey within these years. There was also
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inconsistency and divergence among the EU institutions whilst adopting the
conditionality strategy. Furthermore, the EU provided a more favourable
approach to the CEECs in comparison to Turkey, which also reduced the
credibility of its conditionality strategy.
The high adoption costs for Turkish political actors was the other reason
for the low level of EU influence. Increasing fatalities due to PKK attacks did not
give a suitable opportunity for political elites to adopt the EU promoted rules
and it created a political environment that justified a military based solution. The
overlapping demands of the PKK and the EU were open to abuse by the domestic
opposition. Provocative expressions of pro-Kurdish politicians were played into
the hands of hard-line politicians and the security elite. Certain security forces
demanded the continuation of status quo.
The low legitimacy of the EU requirements also undermined the EU
influence. During this period, the EU suffered due to a lack of a legal framework
and monitoring mechanisms to influence Turkey. The progression reports were
launched in 1998. The EP resolutions were mostly influenced by the Kurdish
diaspora and by political groups defending Kurdish views. There was also
inconsistency between the EU institutional requirements and those of member
countries. Furthermore, other international organisations monitoring
mechanisms and their influence on Turkey was caused an ownership problem for
the EU.
The low level of domestic resonance was the last reason for the low level
of the EU influence. As the leading political actor on counter-terrorism policy,
the Turkish army did not pay attention to the rights based counter-terrorism
approach, which was recommended by different EU institutions. During the pre-
Helsinki years, there was no consensus amongst Turkish politicians about
improving human rights conditions in the counter-terrorism domain. This was
also related to the fact there were many short-lived coalition governments
during this time (Interview_21 2013). Therefore, the reform process in the
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counter-terror domain could not be maintained. Along with the Turkish Army,
the Turkish judiciary also prioritized security concerns rather than European
normative values. This also weakened the EU influence on Turkish counter-
terrorism policy. The influence of mass protests to improve human rights
conditions did not make much difference to the actions of Turkish political
actors. In light of these empirical investigations, the results can be summarized
as follows.
Table 2- Overview of Empirical Investigation of the Pre-Helsinki Period
In the view of the main theoretical framework of this research, due to
low level of credibility of conditionality and high adoption costs, the EU
conditionality strategy did not work to transform Turkish counter-terrorism
policies towards the PKK during the pre-Helsinki period. Furthermore, due to the
low level of legitimacy of the EU requirements, and the low level of domestic
resonance, the EUs socialization efforts were weak and did not alter Turkeys
counter-terrorism policies. Therefore, during the pre-Helsinki years neither the
conditionality nor the socialization mechanisms of the EU were influential on
Turkey in changing its counter-terror practices towards the PKK.
Variables
Units
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
DEPENDENT
VARIABLE
Conditionality
(External Incentives Model)
Socialization
(Social Learning Model)
Credibility of
Conditionality
(EU LEVEL)
Adoption
Costs
(DOMESTIC
LEVEL)
Legitimacy of
EU
Requirements
(EU LEVEL)
Domestic
Resonance
(DOMESTIC
LEVEL)
The EU Impact on
Formal Rule Adoption
in the Counter-
terrorism Domain
Pre-Helsinki Period
1984-1999
Low High Low Low Low
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6. The Post-Helsinki Period
6.1. Introduction
The post-Helsinki period is the second period in which the EU influence on
Turkish counter-terrorism policy towards the PKK will be analysed. The period
starts with Helsinki European Council in 1999, when the EU declared that Turkey
would be granted candidate status (like any other prospective candidate
country) as soon as it fulfilled the Copenhagen Political Criteria. It ends with the
Brussels European Council in 2004, when Turkey was accepted as a candidate
country.
Within this period, the capture of the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, and his
order for the withdrawal of PKK members from Turkish territory, are other
significant developments which minimized PKK activities in Turkey. In
comparison to the pre-Helsinki period, this phase can be regarded as being a
more politically stable period. In the first two years of the period, a coalition
government was in power. However, in 2002 the Justice and Development Party
(AKP) succeeded in winning elections as a single party government. Even though
politicians with Islamic roots established the AKP, the party was committed to
the EU goals and the EU required reforms were accelerated during their time in
government. It is under these circumstances that this chapter will discuss Why
and how were EU promoted norms adopted in Turkey in a way that transformed
its counter-terrorism policies towards the PKK in the post-Helsinki period?
Once more, this chapter relies on the research framework outlined in
chapters 1 and 3. For ease of reference, the main elements of it, and where to
find discussion of them, are repeated in the footnote below.23 In the light of
23
This chapter, and the following, rely upon the research framework outlined in chapter 1 and 3.
To summarise the main elements of this framework: Rule adoption is the dependent variable.
The theoretical framework encompasses the Conditionality/Socialization mechanisms (see p89
for the former and 100 for the latter) and their variables Credibility of Conditionality (see p96
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these variables and classified parameters, this chapter will argue that due to a
high level of EU conditionality (High Benefit-Low Cost) the EU influence on
Turkey was high in transforming its counter-terrorism policies towards the PKK.
Furthermore, it will argue that due EU socialization being relatively low in
comparison to EU conditionality (High Legitimacy-Low Resonance), Turkeys
norm adoption was based on cost-benefit calculations rather than the
appropriateness of the EU norms.
The same chapter structure as applied in the pre-Helsinki period will be
pursued in this chapter. Firstly, in 6.2 Turkeys counter-terrorism policy towards
the PKK during the post-Helsinki period will be examined to see whether there
were any changes. Secondly, in 6.3, the EU contribution to the changes
mentioned will be investigated. Thirdly, in 6.4, the details of rule adoption will be
scrutinized to measure the EU influence. In the final section, the reasons for
policy transformation will be explained in view of the independent variables.
6.2. Turkeys Policies for Countering the PKK
One of the major events during the post-Helsinki period that changed the course
of counter-terrorism policy in Turkey was capture of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan
in 1998. He was seized in Kenya whilst under the protection of the Greek
Embassy. Ocalan had been living in Syria since the early 1980s. However, after
Turkish senior army generals and politicians declared their intention to intervene
in Syrian territory to eliminate PKK targets, Ocalan was expelled from Syria
(Marcus 2007: 270). He shuttled back and forth between Greece, Russia, and
Italy to find shelter. However, none of these countries wanted him to stay in
their countries. When he finally fled to Kenya, he was captured by a special
operation coordinated by the US and Turkish intelligence services (Marcus 2007:
278-79). After Ocalan was brought to Turkey, he asked the PKK members to
above), Adoption Cost (see p98 above), Legitimacy of EU Requirements (see p104 above) and
Domestic Resonance (see p108 above). To transform qualitative data into scalable values, two
parameters: low and high levels have been identified. These are summarized in chapter 1
(see p33 above).
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withdraw beyond Turkish borders and avoid using their weapons. The unilateral
ceasefire decreased the number of the PKK activities within the Turkish borders
(Bal and Özkan 2009). According to a former Minister of Human Rights and a
senior Under-Secretariat of Public order and Security official, the capture of
Ocalan was a shocking event for the PKK which led it to reorganize itself by
political means (Interview_10 2012; Interview_27 2013). Reducing the number of
PKK activities brought a window of opportunity to Turkish political actors to
transform Turkish counter-terrorism policy in line with EU requirements.
One of the initiatives was to reconstitute the structure of the State
Security Courts. As indicated earlier, in the pre-Helsinki period, these courts
were tasked with trying terror related crimes, and they provided fewer
protections to terror suspects than ordinary criminals. Furthermore, the
existence of military judges on the judicial bench violated the fair trial principles
of the ECHR (Ilbiz 2009). Based on ECtHR decisions and Amnesty International
reports, the EU required Turkey to bring these courts in line with the standards
of the EU (Commission of the European Communities 2000: 13). In this respect,
Turkish governments unveiled a series of reforms to modify these courts (see
section 6.4.2).
The improving security situation in the Southeast of Turkey enabled a
gradual lifting of the state of emergency in the region. In this respect, the state
of emergency was removed from the provinces on the National Security
Councils recommendation and the decision of the Turkish Parliament
(Commission of the European Communities 2002: 18). When the state of
ĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐǇǁĂƐ ůŝĨƚĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ůĂƐƚ ƚǁŽƉƌŽǀŝŶĐĞƐ  ?ŝǇĂƌďĂŬŦƌĂŶĚbŦƌŶĂŬ Z ŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ?
15 years of emergency rule ended. This decision was welcomed by the EU
(Commission of the European Communities 2003). The lifting of restrictions
under emergency law brought relaxation in these provinces.
The end of the state of emergency brought an opportunity to return
people who were forcibly displaced from their villages during the pre-Helsinki
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period. In this regard, the Return to Village and Rehabilitation Project was
launched in March 1999 (Commission of the European Communities 2003: 40).
Between January 2000 to January 2003, 82.000 people were authorised to return
to their villages under this scheme (Commission of the European Communities
2003: 40). However, this project came under scrutiny of the EU during the post-
Helsinki years and was criticized for its lack of a clear strategy (Commission of
the European Communities 2003: 40). Therefore, in view of the weaknesses of
this project, Turkey entered into a dialogue with the UN Secretary General
Representative for Displaced Persons from June 2002. The recommendations of
the UN Representative were followed by the Turkish government for an efficient
solution for the return of IDPs (Commission of the European Communities
2004b: 19).
The changing circumstances of Turkeys counter-terrorism policies was
also influential on cases of disappearances and extra judicial killings in the
region. Aside from the disappearance of two HADEP officials after their visit to a
police station in 2002, no further disappearance cases have been reported
(Commission of the European Communities 2002: 29). So, the systematic use of
unlawful executions against terror suspects and sympathizers of the PKK came to
an end.
In order to combat torture and ill-treatment, a zero-tolerance policy was
introduced in 2002. This was the beginning of a reform process against cases of
torture. After this initiative, torture matters in Turkey moved in a positive
direction. The number of prosecutions against officials suspected of acts of
torture and ill treatment increased. According to official figures, 2,454 law
enforcement agents were tried in 2003 in relation to allegations of torture or ill-
treatment. Among these 1,357 were acquitted and 854 defendants were
convicted and 138 imprisoned (Commission of the European Communities
2004b: 34). In comparison to the pre-Helsinki governments, there was a strong
commitment by the AKP Government to reduce the perpetration of torture and
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ill-treatment, whilst Turkey was striving to fulfil the Copenhagen Political Criteria
for eventual EU membership (Human Rights Watch 2008: 13). In view of the
changing conditions, the Enlargement Commissioner Gunter Verheugen
approved of the positive developments saying that there are no grounds for
accusing the Turkish authorities of systematic torture (Todays Zaman 2004).
Even though these efforts targeted the reduction of the systematic use of
torture, there were still reported isolated incidents in the Southeast of Turkey
towards persons suspected of acts of terrorism (CPT 2005: 12-14).
In line with the changing political environment, the role and composition
of the NSC changed during the post-Helsinki period. According to a senior
official, the NSC is the chief constitutional institution of the Turkish Republic on
counter-terrorism policy making, and terrorism issues have always been a
priority for the Council (which can be seen its press releases and official
documents) (Interview_24 2013). In the post-Helsinki years, the Turkish Army
intervened in governmental responsibilities by utilizing the NSC meetings. The
EU was opposed to the strong position of the Turkish Army, and required Turkey
to improve civil-military relations in line with EU standards (Arikan 2003: 121;
Commission of the European Communities 2000: 14). Even though the EU
requirements regarding the civil-military relations were not based on EU acquis,
they demanded these reforms under the Copenhagen political criteria, and
relied on best practices in member countries (Interview_24 2013). According to
former and existing NSC officials, without the EU requirements, this
transformation would not have been easy for Turkish governments when the
Army was supremo in Turkish politics (Interview_17 2013; Interview_24 2013).
The AKP government utilized EU required reforms to reduce the militarys role
and its significance on the state system (Cizre 2003: 228).
In order to hollow out the PKKs organizational structure and distance
PKK members from terrorist actions, a Repentance policy was put into action
in 1999. PKK members, who surrendered and disclosed information about their
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organisation, were granted with amnesty. However, the leaders of the PKK and
those members who had killed security forces were excluded from the amnesty
(Commission of the European Communities 1999b: 14). During the amnesty
period, which remained effective from August 1999 to February 2000, 359
applications from PKK members were accepted, and 100 applications were
rejected, and 614 requests were assessed but found ineligible to benefit from
policy (Yilmaz 2012: 81). Four years after the Repentance policy, another
initiative was launched in 2003 under the name of Social Reinsertion. Similarly
to previous policy, PKK members were granted amnesty if they quit their
activities and provided information about the organisation. The command
structure was excluded from this opportunity as they were with the previous
policy. According to Ministry of Justice figures, from 2003 to 2007, only nine out
of 300 PKK members applied for amnesty through the Social Reinsertion policy.
The remaining 291 PKK members were those who were already in jail serving
their sentences (Turkish Ministry of Justice 2008). Although both policies were
antecedently reasonable ways to end PKK actives, in the end only a small group
of PKK members responded to these initiatives (Emrullah Uslu 2007: 163).
In consideration of cultural rights, the post-Helsinki period witnessed
many reforms, which eased the restriction on the use of Kurdish. In this respect,
the Turkish Broadcasting Corporation (TRT) started to broadcast in the Kurdish
dialects of Kirmanci and Zaza from 2004 (Commission of the European
Communities 2004b: 39). State restrictions that limited naming children in
Kurdish were relieved (Commission of the European Communities 2003: 37).
Private Kurdish Language courses commenced in six provinces of Turkey (Van,
ĂƚŵĂŶ ?bĂŶůŦƵƌĨĂ ?ŝǇĂƌďĂŬŦƌ ?ĚĂŶĂĂŶĚ7ƐƚĂŶďƵů Z ?ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ
Communities 2004b: 49). The tolerance towards the use of Kurdish was also seen
in the Newroz celebrations (Kurdish Spring Festival). Posters written in Kurdish to
celebrate the Festival were permitted (Commission of the European
Communities 2004b: 49).
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Along with these positive developments, noticeable improvements in the
conditions of freedom of expression were observed during the post-Helsinki
years. As a consequence of the adoption of EU promoted democratic norms, the
number of prosecutions for various crimes decreased (e.g. for the crimes of
propaganda in connection with terrorist organisation in a way that encourages
violence or other means, propaganda against the indivisible unity of the state,
incitement to racial and ethnic enmity, and insulting the state and state
institutions) (Commission of the European Communities 2004b: 37). According
to official figures, as of May 2004 there were 5,809 persons detained for the
above-mentioned crimes, in comparison to 8,657 in 2000, 8,298 in 2001, 7,745 in
2002, and 6,137 in 2003 (Commission of the European Communities 2004b: 37).
Although these figures indicate that there was progress as regards freedom of
expression, the non-violent expression of opinion has continued to be
prosecuted and punished in Turkey on the grounds of national interest
(Commission of the European Communities 2004b: 38).
The participation of pro-Kurdish parties in domestic politics during the
post-Helsinki period did not change significantly. The HADEP, which is the
successor of pro-Kurdish parties (i.e. the HEP and the DEP), was dissolved by the
Constitutional Court because of its links with the PKK just as the HEP and the DEP
themselves were (Constitutional Court of the Republic of Turkey 2003). After the
HADEP was banned, Kurdish politicians continued their cause by establishing a
new party in 2005 called the Democratic Society Party (DTP).
Cross-border operations targeting the PKK camps in Northern Iraq were
not as intense as in the pre-Helsinki period. There were two major operations
mounted by the Turkish Army between 1999 and 2004. The first operation was
launched in 1999, after the capture of Ocalan. The second operation was
mounted in 2000 using air strikes against PKK camps. After the US invasion of
Iraq these operations were postponed until 2008 (Son Sayfa 2011). These
military operations also led to serious concerns in the EU (Commission of the
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European Communities 2000: 67). However, in the vacuum of authority in
Northern Iraq before the Iraq War in 2003, Turkey failed to develop a
comprehensive tactic for dealing with the PKK (International Strategic Research
Organisation 2007: 27). The PKK at this time had recovered from the shock of
Ocalans capture and strengthened its position in Northern Iraq.
The Village Guard System, which was established to protect mountain
villages from PKK raids, remained unresolved during the post-Helsinki period. In
comparison to the pre-Helsinki period, however, the number of these guards,
which stood at 90,000 during the late 1990s, reduced to 58,000 in 2004.
(Commission of the European Communities 2004b: 51; Kor 2009: 48-49).
Furthermore, since 2000 no new village guards have been recruited (Commission
of the European Communities 2004b: 51). Even though the number of these
paramilitary forces has reduced over time, problems based on their abusive
actions have remained. Some of the village guards occupy evacuated villages and
do not let the rightful inhabitants return. They are also involved in crimes such as
terrorism, smuggling, crimes against individuals, and property related crimes
 ?ĞƔĞ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ? ? Z ?
In sum, during the post-Helsinki period Turkeys counter-terrorism
policies against the PKK were in a transition from hard-line to soft-line. The
previous counter-terrorism policy elements, such as the evacuation of villages,
the state of emergency, extra judicial killings, and state security courts, were
abandoned. In order to improve the human rights situation in the counter-terror
domain, policies such as zero tolerance towards torture and the return to village
projects were implemented. Furthermore, to reintegrate PKK members into
society, those non-leaders who were not responsible for the murder of security
officers, were granted with amnesty. Along with these positive initiatives, there
was also partial or limited progress observed within a few other areas. The
number of criminal cases against propaganda of terrorist organisation and
propaganda against indivisibility of state were reduced. The use of Kurdish in
195
broadcasting, education, and the naming of children was allowed for the first
time since the pre-Helsinki period. The number of village guards was reduced by
almost a half by the late 1990s. However, tolerance towards pro-Kurdish parties
was not at a satisfactory level within this wind of change. In view of these
developments, the capture of the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, and the
withdrawal of PKK militants, provided a positive environment for reforms to be
made in the existing counter-terrorism policies. However, the shift in Turkish
counter-terrorism policies was not only based on internal factors. The EU based
efforts were equally influential as domestic factors.
6.3. The EU Response to Turkish Counter-Terrorism Practices
When Abdullah Ocalan fled from Syria to Europe looking for political asylum, one
of his destinations was Italy. Turkeys demand for the extradition of Ocalan from
Italy was refused based on Turkeys the fact that capital punishment was still
legal in Turkey (BBC 1998). However, granting political asylum to Ocalan was also
risky for Italy due to renewed threats of economic retaliation by Turkish
politicians (Stanley 1998). Therefore, the Italians decided to extradite Ocalan to
Germany, where an arrest warrant was issued for the PKK leader. The German
authorities, however, were not keen to welcome Ocalan. The trial of Ocalan was
considered highly risky for German security due to the possible conflict between
the high number of Turkish and Kurdish people amongst its population. Hence,
they withdrew the warrant for Ocalans arrest, but refused him entry
nonetheless (Marcus 2007: 274-75). The next destination of Ocalan, Greece, was
supportive and provided him with political asylum at first (The Economist 1999).
However, when Ocalans residence in Greece was denounced in newspapers, the
Greeks asked Ocalan to leave the country in order to avoid another hostility
issue with Turkey (Marcus 2007: 277).
As these incidents show, the EU member countries had a dilemma with
regard to the extradition of Ocalan to Turkey. According to a senior EU official, in
the Ocalan case, these member states were under great deal of pressure from
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their own courts not to extradite Ocalan to Turkey because of Turkeys poor
human rights record (Interview_11 2013). In this respect, if they were to
extradite Ocalan, there was the possibility of him being sentenced to death. If
this occurred, the legitimacy of the EUs human rights requirements on Turkey
would be undermined. On the other hand, if they had provided him with political
asylum, the commercial and security-based interests they shared with Turkey
were likely to be endangered. Therefore, they took a middle course that neither
undermined the EUs normative stance, nor opposed Turkey, by compelling
Ocalan to find another country to reside in, which ended up with his capture in
Kenya.
The EUs neutral stance, however, did not rescue the EU from the spill
over effects of PKK violence. When Ocalan was captured in Kenya whilst under
the protection of the Greek embassy, PKK sympathisers in Europe reacted
violently to his seizure. Greek embassies all around Europe were stormed and in
a few of them consulate staff were taken as a hostage (Huggler et al. 1999).
Because of these protests, the EU made a declaration condemning the PKKs
terrorist attacks and called upon the Turkish authorities to continue with their
counter-terrorism policies within democratic parameters. The fair trial of Ocalan
and the EUs stance on abolishing capital punishment was underlined in the
declaration. In order to achieve a peaceful solution and conciliation, the EU
stressed its intention to play an active role in the matter (Commission of the
European Communities 1999a: 8).
The EUs recognition of Turkey as a candidate country in the Helsinki
European Council in 1999 gave a window of opportunity to the EU to transform
Turkeys counter-terrorism policy. In the Councils decision, it was emphasized
that Turkey will be treated on a similar basis as other candidate countries and it
would benefit from pre-accession assistance to stimulate and support its reforms
(European Council 1999: 4). In this way, the EU gave a clear membership
prospect to Turkey that promoted the adoption of EU norms in the counter-
197
terrorism domain. Furthermore, the European Commission was tasked with
preparing an accession partnership with Turkey in order to underline which
democratic reforms were required from Turkey to transform its counter-
terrorism policy. After the Helsinki European Council, the adoption of EU
promoted norms accelerated in Turkey. The details of this will be given in the
next section.
According to the interviews conducted with members of the Turkish and
EU political elite in Turkey and Brussels, the main target of the decision taken at
the Helsinki Council to prepare Turkey for EU candidacy was not the
transformation of Turkeys counter-terrorism policies (Interview_13 2013;
Interview_19 2013; Interview_27 2013). This was because the PKK was not a
serious threat to the EU in comparison to threat it posed to Turkey (Interview_11
2013; Interview_14 2013). However, countering the PKK with democratic means
was one side of the bigger picture of democratization (Interview_11 2013). In
this respect, the EUs impact on democratization in Turkey had a collateral effect
on its counter-terrorism policies (Interview_13 2013).
The first Accession Partnership with Turkey was adopted in March 2001
(European Council 2001c). The Turkish authorities were asked to fulfil short and
medium term priorities, which had an implicit impact on its counter-terrorism
policies. Strengthening legal and constitutional guarantees for the freedom of
expression, preventing torture practices, improving the efficiency and
functioning of the SSCs, abolishing the death penalty, ratifying certain covenants
on civil, political and cultural rights, and removing prohibitions on broadcasting
in Kurdish were a few of these requirements (European Council 2001c: 16-19).
Financial assistance for pre-accession projects were given on the condition that
Turkey fulfilled the EU requirements (European Council 2001c: 22).
A few weeks after the Accession Partnership in March 2001, the first
National Programme for the Adoption of the EU Acquis was put in place (Turkish
Ministerial Council 2001). According to a former Turkish ambassador and a
198
senior Ministry for EU Affairs official, a National Programme was prepared by
looking at different sources, such as EUs Accession Partnership, the Prime
Ministry Strategic Planning Organisations (DPT) reports (Demirok Report24), and
think thank and human rights NGO reports (Interview_17 2013; Interview_18
2013). In this programme, Turkish authorities clarified in detail which legislative
provisions, institutions, and policies need to be amended to gain EU
membership. Most of the proposed amendments were relevant to Turkeys
counter-terrorism policies towards the PKK, such as reviewing anti-terror law
articles, preventing torture cases, reducing detention periods, and lifting the
state of emergency in Southeast Turkey. The first NPAA covered all of the EUs
short and medium requirements stated in the Accession partnership. However, it
did not provide deadlines for their adoption (Usul 2011: 119). According to a
senior Ministry of EU Affairs official, the government did want to bind itself to
deadlines in case it failed to pass the promised legislation on time, which may
have undermined its commitment in the eyes of EU institutions (Interview_18
2013).
The EU also added the PKK on to the designated terrorist organisations
list in May 2002 (Council of the European Union 2002b). Prior to this decision, for
many years, the EU condemned the PKK attacks in Turkey. However, it
contradicted its own rhetoric by treating the PKK as a civil organisation rather
than a terrorist organisation in many European countries. Because of this, the
EUs normative requirements on Turkey to transform counter-terrorism policies
enraged Turkish actors (Emre Uslu and Aytaç 2007: 131-34). So, adding the PKK
to the list was a conciliatory gesture towards Turkey to encourage it to adopt the
EU promoted norms. It increased the legitimacy of the EU requirements on
Turkish political actors by reducing the suspicions of Turkish political actors
24
A Strategic Planning Organisations report prepared by an ad hoc committee headed by Gürsel
Demirok who was the Chair of the Supreme Board of Co-ordination of Human Rights. This report
was written as DPTs 8th five-year development plan which formulates political reforms for
Turkeys EU membership.
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about the sincerity of the EU. Furthermore, it played in favour of reformist
politicians which further aided the adoption of EU promoted norms because they
were able to convince opposition parties and those in nationalist circles
(Interview_1 2012).
In the on-going reform process during the post-Helsinki period, the EU
once again consolidated its intention to grant Turkey candidacy. In the
Copenhagen European Council in 2002, the EU declared that if the European
Commission report in December 2004 confirms Turkeys fulfilment of the
Copenhagen political criteria, negotiations would start with Turkey without any
delay (Council of the European Union 2002c: 5). After this statement, the
reliability of the EU promises given at the Helsinki European Council in 1999
were strengthened. According to the Council decision, the Commission was also
invited to revise the accession partnership in order to make clear which
requirements had been fulfilled, and which were still to be fulfilled (Council of
the European Union 2002c: 6).
The second accession partnership with Turkey was adopted in May 2003
(European Council 2003b). It was divided into three groups namely, priorities
2003/2004 short term and medium term. The EU requirements regarding
Turkeys disputed counter-terrorism practices, were placed in the 2003/2004
priorities, which means Turkey was required to fulfil these reforms within two
years before the Brussels Council in 2004. In the revised version of the accession
partnership, the EU requirements were not too different from those in the
earlier version. As a consequence of the on-going reform process, previous
requirements, such as lifting the state of emergency, were removed from the
document. Furthermore, some of the demands concerning pre-trial detention
(such as a suspects right to access a lawyer, and the right to notifying their
relatives) were specified in more detail (European Council 2003b: 43-44). In this
respect, the more the interactions between the EU and Turkey intensified, the
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more clear the EU requirements became. Increasing clarity of the EU demands
also brought a greater level of legitimacy to them.
In July 2003, a month after the accession partnership, Turkey also
revised its NPAA (Turkish Ministerial Council 2003). The AKP government
emphasized its determination to complete the remaining legislation by June
2004 (Turkish Ministerial Council 2003). In the section allocated to political
criteria, the Turkish government declared its good will towards protecting
human and ethnic minority rights, which was linked with its counter-terrorism
policies. However, contrary to the previous NPAA in 2001, Turkey did not specify
precisely which legislation they intended to alter in order to meet EU
requirements. Furthermore, they did not specify any deadlines for making the
required changes.
The anticipated European Commission recommendation in regards to
Turkeys EU candidacy came in October 2004. In consideration the substantial
legislative and institutional changes Turkey had made (including changed in their
counter-terrorism policies towards the PKK), the Commission decided that
Turkey had sufficiently fulfilled the political criteria. The Commission proposed to
both the European Council and the European Parliament that accession
negotiations with Turkey should begin (Commission of the European
Communities 2004c: 3). According to senior EU officials, at the time of this
decision the Commission was aware that Turkey had to do make further reforms
to fully fulfil the Copenhagen political criteria. However, at that time, the reform
process was on an upward trend, and the Commission aimed to motivate Turkish
political actors to continue making reforms (Interview_11 2013; Interview_13
2013).
Nevertheless, Turkey had another problem to overcome before
negotiations with the EU could start. In order to comply with the Custom Union
Agreement, a state must apply its terms to every EU member state, including
Cyprus. This posed a problem to Turkey due to an unresolved dispute between
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Turkey and Greek Cypriots about Northern Cyprus. In order to start accession
negotiations, Turkey was required to sign an additional protocol (that took
Cyprus and other new member countries into account) that was added to the
Ankara Treaty (Commission of the European Communities 2004c: 4). When
Turkey confirmed that it would sign the Protocol prior to the start of the
accession negotiations, there was no hurdle left for Turkey to jump in order to
be declared a candidate country for the EU (Council of the European Union
2004c: 5; Radikal 2004a). In this respect, in the 2004 Brussels European Council,
the EU decided to start negotiations with Turkey (Council of the European Union
2004c: 6) .
In short, during the post-Helsinki period, the EUs recognition of Turkey
as a candidate country created ideal conditions for the EU to diffuse its liberal
democratic norms to Turkey. Along with clear membership prospects, the EU
also introduced guidelines for Turkish political actors in the form of the accession
partnerships. These clearly stated what kind of reforms Turkey must make to
end PKK terrorism and gain EU membership. Furthermore, the EU also added the
PKK to the designated terrorist organisation list, which eased suspicions over the
sincerity of the EU regarding its position on the PKK. Such a constructive step
increased the legitimacy of the EU requirements on Turkish political actors.
Finally, at the end of this period, the EU rewarded Turkey for its norm
conforming behaviour by giving it candidate status. After this decision, the
credibility level of the EU promises on Turkish political actors was at its peak,
higher than it had ever been before, and higher than it has been since.
6.4. The Impact of the EU on Rule Adoption
As shown in the sections above, the transformation in Turkeys counter-
terrorism policies towards the PKK were not only based on internal factors such
as the capture of Ocalan and the withdrawal of PKK militants, but it also relied
upon EU efforts, such as them giving clear membership prospects. The
combination of both positive internal and external factors provided a fertile
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environment for Turkish political actors to adopt the EU promoted norms. In this
respect, the Turkish governments adopted two extensive constitutional
amendments25 and eight EU harmonisation packages26 to fulfil EU
requirements. These covered domestic legislative changes and ratified several
international conventions (Secretariat General for EU Affairs 2007a). Moreover,
institution-building initiatives continued at the same pace as in the pre-Helsinki
period. Without a doubt, these reforms were made in order to gain EU
candidacy, rather than to fulfil the requirements of other international
organisations (Interview_1 2012; Interview_2 2012; Interview_5 2012;
Interview_6 2012; Interview_8 2012; Interview_9 2012; Interview_24 2013). In
this section, the initiatives that are components of rule adoption will be
examined under the headings of: ratification of international laws, domestic
legislative changes, and institution building attempts.
6.4.1. Ratification of International Laws
The first two international conventions signed in the post-Helsinki period were
the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the UN
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESC). These
two conventions granted rights to individuals, labourers, and ethnic minorities in
participant states. The EU urged all candidate states to ratify these conventions
(Commission of the European Communities 1999b: 48-49). In line with the EU
requirements, Turkey signed both conventions in August 2000, and ratified them
in July 2003. However, Turkish authorities reserved the articles that provide
minorities with the right to be educated in their mother tongue.27 In the
reservation, Turkey stated that the term minority was to be understood in
25
These constitutional amendments took place on 3 October 2001 and 7 May 2004.
26
First EU Harmonisation Package (6 February 2002), Second EU Harmonisation Package (26
March 2002), Third EU Harmonisation Package (3 August 2002), Fourth EU Harmonisation
Package (2 January 2003), Fifth EU Harmonisation Package (23 January 2003), Sixth EU
Harmonisation Package (15 July 2003), Seventh EU Harmonisation Package (30 July 2003), Eight
EU Harmonisation Package (14 July 2004).
27
The suspended articles were article 27 in UN Convenant on Civil and Political Right and article
13 paragraph 3 and paragraph 4 in UN Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.
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accordance with the Treaty of Lausanne, in which minorities were classified on
the basis of their religion. Kurds were thus excluded from the definition and so
were not counted as being a minority (Oran 2001: 222). According to the elite
interviews conducted in Turkey, the security threat posed by the PKK was the
main reason for these reservations (Interview_17 2013; Interview_18 2013). In
other words, the government considered that if educational rights were given to
Kurds, this may pave the way for new Kurdish demands, such as a demand for
self-determination, and secessionist demands (Interview_17 2013). In this
respect, the ratification of both conventions was a positive, but incomplete, step
towards fulfilling the EU requirements.
Turkey also recognized the authority of the UN Human Rights Committee
(UNHRC) by signing the first optional protocol of the ICCPR in February 2004. The
protocol provides individuals with the right to complain about participating
states if their rights under the Covenant have been violated. This complaint
mechanism is the UN version of a similar complaint mechanism contained in the
Council of Europe, and its secondary institution the ECtHR. The Turkish
authorities, however, made a reservation for the article 5/2, which marks out the
authority of the UNHRC. According to the reservation, Turkey was not going to
recognise the jurisdiction of the HRC (i) if the violation was outside of Turkeys
borders, (ii) if the complaint had already been pursued by another international
institution (such as the ECtHR), and (iii) if the alleged violation was outside of the
scope of rights defined in the covenant.28 After the ratification of the optional
protocol of the ICCPR, Kurdish citizens who were deprived of their rights by state
authorities in the name of countering the PKK, gained the opportunity to seek
remedy for their violated rights.
The ratification of international conventions abolishing the death penalty
was another initiative made in the post-Helsinki period. Capital punishment
became an emotive subject in the counter-terrorism domain when the PKK
28
Similar reservations were also made by Germany.
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leader Abdullah Ocalan was captured. The execution of Ocalan was seen as the
right way to end PKK terrorism by many political parties. For example, the
Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), which was the second partner of the 57th
Turkish government, declared its intention to execute Ocalan in its 1999 election
ƉůĞĚŐĞƐ ?ǀĐŦ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? Z ?ůƐŽ ?ŝŶĂŶŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ǁŚĞŶƚŚĞ<WǁĞƌĞŝŶ
opposition, they were supportive of Ocalans execution, but when they came to
power they revised this view (Interview_6 2012). However, despite the strong
opposition to converting Ocalans sentence from the death penalty to life
ŝŵƉƌŝƐŽŶŵĞŶƚ  ?^ĂƌŦŬĂǇĂ  ? ? ? ? Z29, the AKP government adopted the relevant
international agreements abolishing the death penalty. In this context, firstly the
sixth additional protocol of the ECHR (which eliminates the death penalty except
for in times of war or the imminent threat of war) was ratified in July 2003. This
decision was followed by the signing of the thirteenth additional protocol of the
ECHR in January 2004, which abolishes capital punishment in all circumstances.
Furthermore, the second optional protocol of the International Covenant on
Civilian and Political Rights, which abolishes the death penalty, was signed in
April 2004. After the adoption of these international laws, Turkey transposed all
EU promoted international norms regarding the death penalty into its domestic
legislation. If the adoption period of these protocols is taken into the
consideration, they were all adopted very shortly before the EU was to make its
decision whether to grant Turkey with candidate status. In that context, the
possible benefits of candidacy seem to be influential on Turkish political actors,
rather than appropriateness of norms.
As regards to discrimination, Turkey adopted several international
agreements promoted by the EU. These regulations prohibited all sorts of
discrimination among citizens in terms of sex, race, religion, language, and ethnic
origin. In consideration of the Kurdish Question, these international laws
protected the rights of Kurds from discrimination by public authorities. One of
29
In an undetailed survey 72% supported the execution of Ocalan rather than sentencing him to
life imprisonment.
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the PKKs arguments was that Kurdish citizens faced discrimination by the
Turkish state. This argument was eliminated by adopting these international
regulations. In a similar vein, the twelfth additional protocol of the ECHR (which
bans discrimination in participating states) was signed in April 2001 (Commission
of the European Communities 2001: 20). And in addition, Turkey also ratified the
UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in April
200230 (Commission of the European Communities 2002: 25).
In view of the above, during the post-Helsinki period, Turkish authorities
were very keen to adopt EU promoted international laws. The CoE and UN
conventions abolishing the death penalty and eliminating all forms of
discrimination were adopted as required by the EU. Furthermore, the UN ICCPR
and the ICESC were adopted only with a reservation granting rights to ethnic
minorities to be educated in mother tongue. These efforts were found to be
sufficient by the European Commission in order for negotiations to start
(Commission of the European Communities 2004c). In consideration of the time
frame, these initiatives were achieved within five years, which was a speedy
adoption process in comparison to the pre-Helsinki period. Some initiatives, such
as the abolishing of the death penalty took place at a time when the captured
PKK leader Abdullah Ocalans execution was supported by almost two thirds of
the population. So, converting Ocalans death penalty to life imprisonment was a
politically costly decision for the Turkish government, and was only achieved
because of the highly valuable membership incentive offered by the EU.
Therefore, in consideration of the ratification of international conventions, the
EU impact on Turkish counter-terrorism policy was at a high level during the
post-Helsinki period.
30
Turkey put a reservation on Article 22 of the Convention. According to this reservation, any
dispute between Turkey and other countries with respect to the interpretation of the convention
can only be referred to the International Court of Justice with Turkeys consent. In that sense, the
reservation targeted disputed states rather than Kurdish citizens.
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6.4.2. Domestic Legislative Changes
During the post-Helsinki period, two constitutional reforms and eight EU
harmonisation packages were adopted by Turkish political actors. These eight
reform packages modified 218 articles within 53 different Turkish laws (Ilgaz and
Toygür 2011: 7). Even though these domestic legislative changes made for the
democratisation of Turkey, they were also influential on the transformation of
Turkeys counter-terrorism policies.
In order to guarantee fair trial principles for terror suspects and
sympathizers of terrorist organisation, a few legislative changes were made to
reform the State Security Courts. The first legal amendment was in article 143 of
the Turkish constitution in June 1999, which regulated SSC structure. According
to the amended version, the military judges were removed from the judicial
bench of SSCs and replaced by civilian judges (Commission of the European
Communities 1999b: 9). Despite these legal amendments, the EU still
emphasized that the standards of these courts were far behind European
standards in terms of protecting human rights and fundamental principles
(Commission of the European Communities 2003: 22). Moreover, senior
members of the judiciary and some members of the Turkish government called
for the abolition of these courts (Commission of the European Communities
2003: 22). Therefore, article 143 of the Turkish Constitution was completely
annulled in the Constitutional amendment of May 2004 where SSCs were
abolished after being in operation for 21 years. The jurisdiction of terror related
crimes was transferred to new so-called Special Courts, which were
established by amending the Criminal Procedure Law (Commission of the
European Communities 2004b: 23-24).
Strengthening fair trial principles in Turkish courts continued with the
adoption of retrial provisions into the Code of Criminal Procedure Law. In the
event of a contradiction between Turkish court and ECtHR decisions on the same
case, the newly adopted measures allowed a retrial (Commission of the
207
European Communities 2003: 20). According this amendment, if the conviction
of a terror suspect in a Turkish court was found to violate human rights
principles by the ECtHR, the same Turkish court must retry the suspect.
However, the application of the retrial procedure was constrained to cases prior
to 4 February 2003, which excluded the case of Ocalan. According to a senior
official from the central counter-terrorism department of the Turkish police, this
date was set by the Parliament to prevent Ocalans likely retrial (Interview_2
2012). After the new amendment was put into action, its first positive result was
seen in the release of Leyla Zana and her colleagues, who were imprisoned for
their links with the PKK. They were released after a retrial in June 2004
(Commission of the European Communities 2004b: 31). The release of these
deputies after eleven years was an important sign that Turkish authorities had
begun to distinguish between those who were involved in violence, and those
who sought to achieve their cause by peaceful means.
The problematic pre-trial detention period for terror suspects was also
brought in line with the EU requirements. In this vein, article 19 of the
Constitution, which regulates the right to liberty and security, was amended. The
maximum detention period for collectively committed crimes was reduced from
15 days to 4 days (Commission of the European Communities 2001: 101). This
reduction was important for terror suspects, because counter-terrorism
investigations were generally conducted within the framework of collectively
committed crimes. At the time of this amendment, in the provinces where a
state of emergency existed, detention periods could be extended by three more
days. However, after lifting the state of emergency in the Southeastern
provinces of Turkey, no exceptional regulation was left to extend the four days
detention period for terror suspects (Commission of the European Communities
2004b: 55).
Along with the reduction of detention periods, detainees had the right to
inform their relatives when they were arrested, or when their arrest was
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prolonged. According to the amendments in Criminal Procedure Law, detention
information must be delivered to the relatives of the detainee without any
delay and by the decision of the prosecutor (Commission of the European
Communities 2001: 28). This amendment was a positive step to prevent the
disappearance of terror suspects when they were taken into custody.
The access of terror suspect to their lawyers during their detention
period was improved by a few legal amendments. The first initiative on this
matter was that the final paragraph of article 16 of the State Security Courts Law
was abolished. This provision limited the right of detainees to consult with their
lawyer in privacy (Commission of the European Communities 2002: 21). After the
amendment, detainees who were involved terror related crimes could meet with
their attorneys in the absence of any third person. The second initiative was that
the fourth paragraph of article 16 of the State Security Courts law was repealed.
Based on this provision, detainees who were prosecuted under the jurisdiction
of SSCs could only access their lawyer after 48 hours. Remaining in
incommunicado detention conditions increased the possibility that detainees
would be tortured (Commission of the European Communities 2002: 28). After
the legislative change, terror suspects could access their lawyer from the
moment they were arrested, as all non-terror suspects could. Thirdly, verbal
evidence taken from detainees before they could obtain counsel from their
lawyers was deemed to be illegal evidence that could not be used in the SSCs
(Secretariat General for EU Affairs 2007b: 11). Terror suspects gained the right to
deny statements made before they had the chance to consult with their lawyers.
After all these legislative changes, incommunicado detention could not be used
on any terror suspect in Turkey.
In order to improve custodial conditions, a few legal amendments were
also made to prevent the ill treatment of those detained for terror crimes. In this
vein, by amending the articles of the Penal Code, higher penalties were foreseen
for public officials who committed torture and who helped to hide the evidence
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of torture (Commission of the European Communities 1999b: 11). In addition, if
such officials were found guilty, their sentences were excluded from being
suspended or converted into fines (Commission of the European Communities
2003: 26). Furthermore, an amendment in the Civil Servants Law regulated that,
if any civil servant were found guilty of torture or ill-treatment by an ECtHR
decision, they were liable to pay compensation stipulated by the ECtHR ruling
(Commission of the European Communities 2002: 29).
In order to make the prosecution of security forces involved in torture
cases more easy, the permission procedure was also abolished. Public
prosecutors gained the authority to open investigations against law enforcement
officers without gaining permission from their superiors (Commission of the
European Communities 2003: 26). Moreover, torture and ill-treatment cases
were considered urgent cases by courts, which cannot be postponed for more
than 30 days, unless a vital reason exists for delay (Commission of the European
Communities 2003: 26). In view of these domestic legislative changes, great
progress was made in Turkey on the EU requirements to prevent torture and ill-
treatment during the post-Helsinki period.
The harmonisation of Turkish domestic legislation with the EU promoted
norms was also influential on Turkeys freedom of expression provisions.
According to a senior Ministry of EU Affairs official, after the Helsinki European
Council the EU exerted considerable pressure on Turkey to improve the exercise
of freedom of expression (Interview_6 2012). In this context, article 159 of the
Penal code (which forbade expressions that insulted the state, insulted the state
institutions, or undermined the indivisible unity of Turkey) was amended.
According to the new version of the article, such expressions would not incur any
penalties (Secretariat General for EU Affairs 2007b: 15). In line with the
amendment, those who criticized Turkish counter-terrorism policies, and the
practices of security forces, without an intention of insult, and without
secessionist motives, was not subject to criminal investigation.
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In another penal code article (312), the scope of incitement was
narrowed to include only crimes that incited hatred on the basis of differences of
social class, race, religion, sect, or region. Prior to the amendment the EU
expressed its concerns about this article, which constituted a setback for
freedom of expression in Turkey (Commission of the European Communities
2000: 17). After the legislative amendment, incitement became an offence if it is
dangerous for public order (Commission of the European Communities 2002:
32). In consideration of Turkish counter-terrorism policies, if the PKK
sympathizers expressions on the ethic rights of Kurds did not incite violence,
they were excluded from judicial investigation.
The articles of the ATL concerning freedom of expression were also
amended in line with the EU requirements. The wide use of article 7 and 8 of the
ATL by Turkish prosecutors and judges to restrict freedom of expression had
been subject to EU criticism (Commission of the European Communities 2001:
24). Therefore, article 7 of the ATL, was altered. The wording was changed from
those who spread terror-related propaganda to in a manner encouraging
people to resort terrorist methods(Commission of the European Communities
2003: 30). After the amendment was put into effect, an act of disseminating
terrorist propaganda must incite the use of terrorist methods to be considered
as a terror crime (Bjonberg and Richmond 2003: 10). Within the same
framework, article 8 of the ATL was also repealed. According to the revoked
article, the propaganda against the indivisible unity of the state was
considered as a terror crime (Commission of the European Communities 2003:
29). After the annulment, those who suffered from their political views about
autonomy, the Kurdish question, and the cultural rights of Kurds, were
safeguarded from prosecution.
Despite the fact that the above-mentioned amendments in the penal
code and the ATL expanded the limits of freedom of expression in the counter-
terrorism domain, there was a tendency to instead use article 169 of the Turkish
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Penal Code (which codifies aiding and abetting illegal organisations). This
article was interpreted from a broader perspective in order to prosecute cases of
terrorist propaganda, and raised concerns in the EU about the protection of
freedom of expression (Commission of the European Communities 2002: 33). To
counteract the misuse of this article, its scope was narrowed by removing the
words actions which facilitated the operation of terrorist organisation in any
manner whatsoever(Commission of the European Communities 2003: 30). After
the amendment of article 169, the use of this article for prosecuting expressions
that overlapped with the PKK demands became limited.31
As regards to the freedom of the press, two major legal amendments
were put into practice in order to respond to EU requirements. Firstly, article 30
of the Constitution was amended. In the previous version of the article allowed
the confiscation of printing facilities. It was changed and the seizure of printing
equipment has no longer permitted (Commission of the European Communities
2004b: 38). Along with this constitutional change, a new Press Law was adopted
in June 2004. The previous law enabled the closure of publications and the
confiscation of printing machines and written material (such as books and
periodicals). The new law substituted these sentences with fines (Commission of
the European Communities 2004b: 38). After the adoption of the new law, those
press agencies who sympathised with the PKK could only be punished with fines
rather than the harsh measures cited, if they intended to insult state institutions,
create public danger, or encourage terror methods.
The EU influence on Turkish counter-terrorism policy towards the PKK is
also seen in the easing of restrictions on the Kurdish language. The Civil Registry
Law was amended to allow parents to name their children as they wish. Names
consisting of the letters q, w, and x (which are commonly used in Kurdish) and
names offending moral values and those likely to offend the public, were
kept out of the scope of the amendment. The notion of politically offensive
31
For example, article 169 was used to prosecute the students who petitioned for optional
Kurdish language courses at university.
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names was removed from the law, which meant the names of important Kurdish
political figures could be given to children (Commission of the European
Communities 2003: 37). Another restriction, which prohibited the use of
languages other than Turkish in public statements and publications, was
abolished by amending articles 26 and 28 of Turkish constitution (Commission of
the European Communities 2001: 28). These amendments were apparently
made in light of criminal investigations that were made against the use of
Kurdish. After the amendment, no such investigations were made. Broadcasting
in Kurdish was also permitted by the amendment of the Law on the
Establishment of Radio and Television Enterprises. The restriction on
broadcasting in different languages other than the Turkish was abolished
(Secretariat General for EU Affairs 2007b: 9). As a result of this legislative
change, TV channels and radio stations had the opportunity to air Kurdish
programmes, unless they did so in order to spread propaganda on terror,
violence, ethnic discrimination, or in order to undermine the territorial integrity
of Turkey. As for education in Kurdish, the Law on Foreign Language Education
and Teaching was amended. This new amendment provided the opportunity to
learn Kurdish and to open private Kurdish courses (Commission of the European
Communities 2002: 41). However, Kurdish education in state owned schools did
not fall under the scope of the amendment. The ban on establishing an
association to protect languages and cultures other than Turkish was lifted by
amending article 5 of the Associations Law (Secretariat General for EU Affairs
2007b: 7). This amendment provided an opportunity to establish Kurdish Cultural
and Language Clubs in Turkey, which used to be a criminal offense. After all of
these legislative reforms, the arguments, used by the PKK to manipulate Kurdish
citizens, about the restriction on the use of Kurdish were weakened, but not
entirely eliminated.
The political participation of pro-Kurdish parties in the Turkish political
system (which had been restricted due to their links with the PKK), was
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improved. A few amendments were made to the constitution and to the laws of
political parties. According to the new regulations, sanctions towards the
political parties could only be imposed when the executive organs of the political
party intentionally encouraged actions that constituted terror related crimes.
This was not clearly defined in the previous version of article (Commission of the
European Communities 2001: 26). Within the same legislative package, the
constitutional court was given the authority to deprive a political party of full or
partial financial assistance. This was added as an alternative penalty to the
dissolution of political parties, which was the only one that previously existed
(Commission of the European Communities 2002: 37). Furthermore, political
parties gained a right to appeal against the decision of the Public Prosecutor of
the Court of Appeals to dissolve the party. This also did not exist in the previous
version of law (Commission of the European Communities 2003: 33). These
amendments made it difficult to close pro-Kurdish parties. However, the political
participation of Kurdish figures who had been involved in terror crimes was
prohibited (including even those people who had benefited from amnesty law)
(Secretariat General for EU Affairs 2007b: 12). In this context, the leaders of the
PKK lost their chance to participate in politics by legal means.
The ratification of international conventions abolishing the death penalty
also necessitated aligning domestic legislation with these conventions. In the
first constitutional amendment (article 38) considering the death penalty, capital
punishment was abolished except for terror and war crimes. This was a limited
amendment in the eyes of the EU representatives, because the additional sixth
protocol of the ECHR did not permit any reservation on the use of the death
penalty (Commission of the European Communities 2001: 21). When the sixth
protocol of the ECHR was adopted in 2003, another legislative amendment was
put into practise within the third harmonisation package. Capital punishment
sentence were converted into prison sentences, and could only be enforced
during times of war or the imminent threat of war (Secretariat General for EU
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Affairs 2007b: 8). After this amendment, the EU promoted norms regarding
capital punishment were transposed to Turkish legislation. However, when
Turkey ratified the thirteenth additional protocol of the ECHR in 2004, which
abolished capital punishment in all circumstances, another domestic legislative
change became necessary. In this context, the articles permitting the death
penalty in the constitution were revoked, and within 16 different laws the death
penalty was converted to life sentences (Secretariat General for EU Affairs
2007a: 76). After all these legislative amendments the death penalty could no
longer be imposed on Abdullah Ocalan or any other PKK member.
The role of the National Security Council on decision-making in the
counter-terror related issues was curbed in line with the EU requirements.
Article 118 of the Constitution, which defines the role and composition of the
NSC was amended. The number of civilians in the Council was increased from
five to nine, while military representatives remained at five. The government
was no longer required to give priority consideration to the recommendations
of the Council, and instead could merely evaluate them (Commission of the
European Communities 2001: 19). The shift in the constitution also brought an
amendment in the law of the NSC and the Secretariat General of the NSC. The
procedure for selecting the General Secretariat changed, and civilians had the
chance to be appointed to this position. Within the same legislative amendment,
the authority of the General Secretariat to obtain confidential documents and
open sources was revoked (Secretariat General for EU Affairs 2007b: 17). The
representatives of the NSC in the High Education Board (YÖK), the Radio and
Television Supreme Council (RTUK) and the Supervision Board of Cinema, Video
and Music were removed by amending the relevant laws (Commission of the
European Communities 2004b: 15-22). These legislative changes removed the
legal basis that provided the Turkish army with the ability to constrain and
intervene with governmental decision in the name of countering the PKK.
However, military members of the Council continued to express their opinion
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about critical issues (such as promotion of ethnic rights of Kurds) through
informal channels like media statements (Commission of the European
Communities 2002: 25).
In order to find a solution to internally displaced persons, the Law on the
Compensation of Losses Resulting from Acts of Terror and Measures Taken
against Terrorism was adopted in July 2004 (Commission of the European
Communities 2004b: 50). The efforts of UN representative for Displaced
Persons, and the thousands of pending cases in the ECtHR on this subject,
encouraged Turkish political actors to adopt such a legislative act (Commission of
the European Communities 2004b: 50). The new law was aimed at compensating
the losses of people who were displaced during 1990s when counter-terrorism
operations against the PKK were at their peak. In order to asses these peoples
property damage, a compensation committee was established in October 2004.
As Usul has indicated, the adoption of this law was an acknowledgement by the
Turkish state of the incorrectness of its hard-line counter-terrorism policies (Usul
2011: 135). After the law was put into practise, according to official figures, more
than 50,000 applications were processed (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
2007).
In sum, the post-Helsinki period was very productive period for Turkish
political actors in transforming Turkeys counter-terrorism policies in line with EU
requirements. As the details reveal, such extensive legislative amendments
succeeded within five years, in comparison to the inadequate and cosmetic
amendments that had been carried out within the previous fifteen years of the
pre-Helsinki period. The domestic legislation empowering hard-line counter-
terrorism practices was mostly abandoned during this period. These
amendments were made in Turkey during a time when terrorism was still a
sensitive issue in Turkey (despite the fact that Ocalan had been captured and the
PKK militants were out of the Turkish borders). Furthermore, the governments
who achieved these reforms had different ideologies and preferences. In
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consideration of these circumstances, the EU impact on domestic legislative
changes concerning Turkish counter-terrorism policies was high during the post-
Helsinki period.
6.4.3. Institution Building
With respect to monitoring human rights violations, a few institutions were set
up during the post-Helsinki period. The first of these institutions, the Human
Rights Presidency, was established in April 2001 under the administrative
structure of the Prime Ministry. In a press statement, the Prime Minister Bülent
Ecevit indicated that the establishment of the Presidency was one of the
priorities the Government had in its attempt to fulfil the EUs Copenhagen
political criteria (Sabah 2000). Also, according to a former head of the
Presidency, this institution was established because of the EUs influence. In
particular, it was established after the EUs progression reports, and in response
to the EUs accession partnership with Turkey (Interview_16 2013). The
presidency was authorized to monitor the implementation of legislation in the
area of human rights. It was also tasked with organising nationwide awareness
campaigns through media channel, special hotlines, and complaint boxes. All
other secondary human rights bodies (such as provincial human rights boards)
were required to report their activities to the Presidency every four months.
Even though the establishment of the Human Rights Presidency was an import
step for the institutionalization of human rights protection in Turkey, its remit
was only to coordinate state institutions and to make recommendations to them
(Birincioglu 2008: 200-01). Therefore, like all other previous human rights
institutions in Turkey, the Human Rights Presidency lacked executive powers.
Furthermore, according to EU reports, the Presidency had little nationwide
impact on the protection of human rights in Turkey (Commission of the
European Communities 2004b: 32). In order to support activities of the Human
Rights Presidency, three subordinate human rights institutions were established:
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the High Human Rights Board, the Human Rights Consultation Committee and
the Human Rights Investigation Board
As a former head of the Human Rights Presidency has indicated, the High
Human Rights Board (HHRB) was established instead of The High Coordinating
Committee on Human Rights (see section 5.4.3), which was annulled after the
creation of the High Human Rights Board (Interview_16 2013). The HHRB was an
inter-ministerial committee tasked with making proposals that promoted and
strengthened human rights protection in Turkey. It had the authority to invite
representatives of public institutions to set up working groups. This board was
comprised of representatives from the Ministries of the Interior, Justice, and
Human Rights, who were responsible for executing, exercising jurisdiction, and
monitoring Turkish counter-terrorism policies. Therefore, its responsibility was
important to prevent human rights violations in the field of counter-terrorism. As
for protection of human rights, the Boards proposals were influential on
Constitutional changes with regards to freedom of expression, freedom of justice
and state security courts (Interview_16 2013).
The Human Rights Consultation Committee (HRCC) was another board
established because of EU influence (Interview_16 2013). It was responsible for
the exchange of information between government and non-governmental
human rights organisations. It also has a consultancy duty to the Prime Ministry
on national and international human rights matters. This Committee was
composed of representatives from public institutions, human rights NGOs and
individuals who worked in this field. In this context, in comparison to the
previous human rights monitoring boards, NGOs were provided seats on this
board (Commission of the European Communities 2004b: 32). According to a
former head of the Human Rights Presidency, the Committee only held its first
meeting in 2003, even though it was established two years earlier in 2001, and it
only met six times (Interview_16 2013). The termination of the Board occurred
because of a quarrel between members of the Board and the Human Rights
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Presidency with regards to the report prepared in 2004 for ethnic and religious
minorities (Birincioglu 2008: 191; Interview_16 2013; Radikal 2004b). In this
respect, the HRCC influence to enhance human rights protection lasted only a
year.
The Human Rights Investigation Board (HRIB) was authorised to make
spot checks on the facilities of law enforcement agencies for alleged human
rights violations. This board was composed of representatives from Ministries of
the Interior, Justice, Foreign Affairs, Education, and Health. The intention was
that each member of the Board would contribute to the investigation report
from their point of view. The Committees possible inspections on detention
centres of counter-terrorism branches could have been a positive step towards
the prevention of human rights abuses (Birincioglu 2008: 197-99). However, the
HRIB was never activated (Birincioglu 2008: 199; Interview_16 2013). So, the
HRIB had no impact on preventing human rights violations in counter-terrorism.
Along with the central institution, Provincial and Sub-provincial Human
Rights Boards were also established as part of EU harmonisation reforms
(Interview_16 2013). These boards were established in every city and town in
Turkey and are in charge of monitoring human rights violations on behalf of the
Prime Ministry. By 2004, 81 provinces in Turkey and 931 sub-provinces had such
a board (Commission of the European Communities 2004b: 32). When they were
first established, there were law enforcement representatives on each Board.
However, in order to change the image of the Boards, law enforcement
representatives were replaced with elected state officials (mayors) and NGO
representatives (from the bar association, or the chamber of commerce) and
media representatives (Birincioglu 2008: 202). Despite the fact that some human
rights NGOs refused to participate in meetings, complaining that their
requirements were not taken seriously by governors (Interview_16 2013), these
boards expanded human rights protection from the centre of Turkey to its
periphery.
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With regards to the efficiency of the EU reform process, a Reform
Monitoring Group (RMG) was set up in 2003, in which ministers from EU Affairs,
Justice, Internal Affairs and Foreign Affairs had a seat. According to a senior
Foreign Affairs Official, the group was tasked with observing and overcoming
those problems among the different ministries which stemmed from the
implementation of human rights reforms (Interview_8 2012). The Justice and
Interior Ministries were responsible for counter-terrorism policy adjustments.
On the other hand, ministers of EU and Foreign Affairs were tasked with the role
of ensuring good EU relations. Therefore, the Reform Monitoring Group started
to play a constructive role in altering Turkeys counter-terrorism policies in line
with the EU demands. For instance, if there was a problem with the adoption of
an EU required reform (e.g. if some Courts failed to provide a free interpretation
service to suspects who cannot speak Turkish), the RMG would take a decision
that influenced these courts to implement the reform (Interview_18 2013). In
this respect, even though the RMG is not a major institution in counter-
terrorism, it has implicit role in influencing state institutions to adopt EU based
reforms.
The institution building initiatives for the monitoring and protection of
human rights also took place within the state institutions concerned with
counter-terrorism policy. In this respect, a human rights investigation office was
established within the Ministry of the Interior (Commission of the European
Communities 2004b: 17). According to a senior Ministry of Interior official, the
establishment of this unit was intended to show the EU that the Ministry was
serious about investigating human rights allegations. Its function is to inspect
human rights allegations in all law enforcement agencies, such as the police and
the gendarmerie, on behalf of the Minister of the Interior. The Ministry of the
Interior Investigation Office is stronger than and superior to the domestic
investigation units within these law enforcement agencies. If an investigation
office finds any breach of human rights within these departments in relation to
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counter-terrorism, it forwards the case to the courts for judicial prosecution
(Interview_22 2013).
Another human rights institution was established within the Turkish
Gendarmerie Command in April 2003. The Human Rights Violations Investigation
and Assessment Centre was set up as part of an EU project to support the
implementation of human rights reforms in Turkey (Commission of the European
Communities 2004a: 16). It is responsible for investigating and evaluating
complaints and applications about allegations of human rights violations taking
place in the Gendarmerie units (The Turkish Gendarmerie Human Rights
Violations' Investigation and Evaluation Center 2013). After the Centre started to
function, victims who were subject to human rights violations under the
Gendarmerie counter-terror branches had the right to complain about the
officers who were responsible for these abuses.32
In sum, during the post-Helsinki period, a similar productive trend can be
observed in the ratification of international conventions and domestic legislative
changes as is seen in institution building initiatives. The Human Rights Presidency
and its sub-committees, the Reform Monitoring Group, and human rights offices
within the Ministry of Interior and Gendarmerie, were established to strengthen
the monitoring and investigation of human rights violations. However, the
efficiency of some of these institutions is questionable. Some have operational
difficulties (HRCC and HRIB), others lack executive powers (Human Rights
Precedency), and still others have coordination problems (Provincial and Sub-
provincial Human Rights Boards). Despite this, for the first time human rights
NGOs have had a seat within human rights committees. Furthermore, human
rights monitoring mechanisms have been extended to provincial and sub-
provincial levels, which is a promising development for the expansion of human
rights protection nationwide in Turkey. According to elite interviews conducted
32
During the fieldwork conducted in 2012 and 2013 in Turkey, interview requests from this unit
were declined. Therefore, there was not enough evidence gathered to indicate the efficiency of
this unit.
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in Turkey, the EU influence on the establishment of these institutions was clear
during the post-Helsinki period. In that sense, the EU influence on institution
building initiatives to transform Turkish counter-terrorism policy was high during
this period.
6.5. The Application of EU Conditionality and Socialization in the
Post-Helsinki Period
The high level of EU influence on the ratification of international conventions,
domestic legislative changes, and institution building initiatives to transform
Turkish counter-terrorism policies was an outcome of EU level and domestic
level factors. In this respect, these factors will be clarified under the credibility of
conditionality, adoption costs, legitimacy of EU requirements, and domestic
resonance headings.33
6.5.1. Credibility of Conditionality
Starting with the Helsinki European Council in 1999, the EU gave a clear
membership prospect to Turkish authorities. In the Helsinki European Council,
Turkey was declared as a candidate state destined to join the Union on the
basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States (European
Council 1999: 4). Such a strong promise was not given to Turkish governments
prior to this. Therefore, after the Helsinki Summit, the adoption of EU promoted
reforms accelerated (Interview_1 2012; Interview_6 2012; Interview_8 2012).
The EUs motivating approach also enforced by positive statements made
during the other European Union Councils. In the European Councils held in
Laeken in December 2001, Seville in June 2002 and Thessaloniki in June 2003,
Turkeys efforts to comply with the EU promoted norms were praised and
Turkish authorities were encouraged to continue the reform process (European
Council 2001a: 3, 2002: 7, 2003a: 11). Therefore, the EUs seriousness about
33
See chapter three for details of these independent variables.
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Turkeys candidacy during the post-Helsinki period was supported by
encouraging messages.
The EUs strong indication of Turkeys candidacy was also consolidated by
another promise made in the Copenhagen European Council in December 2002.
According to the Presidency Conclusion, If the European Council in December
2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission,
decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union
will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay (Council of the
European Union 2002c: 5). With this decision, the EU not only consolidated its
intention on Turkeys candidacy but also committed itself to a precise deadline,
which increased the credibility of conditionality on Turkish political actors to
adopt EU promoted norms.
Lastly, the consistent attitude of the EU towards Turkey was also
strengthened by its fulfilling promises made at the Helsinki and Copenhagen
European Councils. Firstly, the Commission affirmed that Turkey had sufficiently
fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria, and secondly, it recommended that
the European Council start negotiations with Turkey in the Brussels European
Council in June 2004 (Council of the European Union 2004c: 5). In view of these
decisions, the credibility of EU conditionality increased.
The credibility of EU conditionality was high during the post-Helsinki
period. The high level of credibility stemmed from the consistent and impartial
attitudes of the EU towards Turkey. Furthermore setting a date for candidacy
was also influential on accelerating rule adoption in the counter-terrorism
domain.
6.5.2. Adoption Costs
The capture of the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in 1999 was one of the factors
that reduced the adopt cost of EU promoted norms by Turkish political actors.
His capture restrained PKK members from continuing their attacks (Interview_10
2012; Interview_27 2013; Çandar 2012: 69). After his seizure, rather than
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escalating PKK violence Ocalan preferred to make statements for the democratic
solution of the Kurdish Question (Gunter 2004: 201). Even though these
statements were hard for PKK sympathizers to accept, it increased the moral
superiority of Turkish governments and security forces on defeated PKK forces.
Therefore, the adoption of the EU promoted norms was easier for Turkish
political actors.
Abdullah Ocalan also ordered the leaders of the PKK to withdraw their
militants from Turkey to Northern Iraq. As a tightly disciplined and rigidly
hierarchical organisation, the deputies of Ocalan obeyed his order without
dissent (Emrullah Uslu 2007: 163; Van Bruinessen 2000: 287). Withdrawal of the
PKK from Turkish borders improved the security situation in the Southeast of
Turkey (Commission of the European Communities 2004b: 19). Moreover, due
to the reduction in clashes between Turkish security forces and PKK members,
the number of fatalities declined from 38,871 in the pre-Helsinki period to 936 in
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society. Therefore, a suitable environment occurred for Turkish political actors to
adopt EU promoted liberal norms on counter-terrorism.
In consideration of these three factors, the adoption cost of the EU
requirements was low for Turkish political actors during the post-Helsinki period.
Until the decision of the PKK to resume its attacks in 2004, the EU promoted
norms, which transformed counter-terrorism practices in Turkey, were adopted
rapidly without any major objection from opposition parties and those in
nationalist circles.
6.5.3. Legitimacy of the EU Requirements
During the post-Helsinki period, the EU requirements on Turkey to transform its
counter-terrorism policy, were much clearer than in the pre-Helsinki period.
From 1998 onwards, the EU started to issue progress reports for Turkey as it did
for every other candidate country. Turkeys inappropriate counter-terrorism
practices towards the PKK were monitored in these reports (European Council
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1998: 22). Even though the first progression reports suffered from a lack of
detail, in parallel with developing interaction with Turkey, the content of the
reports expanded over time and provided in-depth findings. Along with the
monitoring reports, within the same period, an accession partnership and its
revised version was issued by the EU detailing what Turkish authorities should do
to transform counter-terrorism policy. In response to accession partnerships, the
Turkish governments adopted two NPAA, which meant Turkish authorities were
aware of the EU requirements. Therefore, considering the progression reports
and the accession partnerships, the clarity of the EU requirements on Turkey
increased during the post-Helsinki period.
The EU demands revealed in the progression reports and accession
partnerships also overlapped with the requirements of other international
organisations such the UN, the CoE, and the OSCE. The content of the CPT
reports about detention centres and the exercise of torture, the UN
representative report for the IDPs, and the recommendations of the OSCE
HCNM, coincided with EU requirements. Furthermore, the EU was using the
finding of other international organisation in its progression reports to evaluate
the transformation of Turkeys counter-terrorism policies. In this context, Turkish
actors were socialized by the efforts of other international organisations as well
as by the EUs conditionality strategy. Because the EU relied both on the
assessments of other international organisations and its own evaluation, the
legitimacy of the EU requirements during the post-Helsinki period increased.
Within this period, the EU was consistent in its requirements on Turkey to
adopt right-based counter-terrorism policies towards the PKK. In this respect,
the EU member countries refrained from extraditing Abdullah Ocalan to Turkey,
due to the risk of him being given the death penalty. If he was sent to Turkey,
the EU demands from Turkey to abolish the death penalty would be
undermined, which would in turn have undermined the EUs normative power
stance. Along with the refusal of Ocalans extradition, the EU added the PKK to
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the designated terrorist organisation list. Prior to this decision, the EU had
condemned the PKK attacks in Turkey, but no concrete steps had been taken to
prevent PKK activities in Europe. Therefore, Turkish political actors had
questioned the sincerity of the EU. After this decision, the legitimacy of the EU
requirements on Turkish political actors increased. Furthermore, the EU gave the
impression to Turkish political actors that the more Turkey adopted the EU
promoted liberal democratic norms and implemented them, the more the EU
would be supportive of Turkeys struggle against the PKK.
In view of these factors, during the post-Helsinki period, the legitimacy of
the EU requirements for the transformation of Turkish counter-terrorism policy
was at a high level. This outcome was based on the clarity of the EU demands in
the progression reports and accession partnerships, its consistent manner in
normative and security matters, and its coinciding demands with other
international organisations.
6.5.4. Domestic Resonance
During the post-Helsinki period Turkish political actors openness to transform
Turkish counter-terrorism policy in line with the EU requirements were in a
fragmented state. The controversy among the political actors about adopting the
EU promoted norms was obvious. The reformist elites, who were defending the
necessity of Turkey joining the EU, supported adopting the EU promoted norms
for countering the PKK within democratic parameters. On the other hand, veto
players were arguing to continue with hard-line counter-terrorism until the last
PKK member surrendered.
As for politicians, during the post-Helsinki period, there were two
governments in power. The first government (May 1999/November 2002) was
formed by the Democratic Left Party (DSP) (i.e. the social democrat party), the
Motherland Party (ANAP) (i.e. the centre-right nationalist party) and the MHP
(i.e. a party that based its policies on Turkification). Within this coalition the DSP
and the ANAP supported the adoption of EU norms, and were aware that if the
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norms were not adopted, Turkey would be forced out of the enlargement
process (Baç 2005: 23). On the other hand, the MHP clearly expressed its
opposition to the reforms, and claimed that they endangered national
sovereignty and the security of country (Önis 2003: 16). Therefore, in the first
years of the post-Helsinki period, the reforms were adopted in a selective
manner (e.g. whilst the death penalty was abolished, terror crimes were
excluded, which did not fulfil the EU requirements). In that sense, the
appropriateness of the norms was not influential on the decision process of this
government.
The second government, the AKP, came to power with a majority in
November 2002. The AKP viewed the EU accession as necessary in securing its
political survival, given the risks of being overthrown by secular institutions such
as Turkish Army and high judiciary (Keyman and Düzgit 2007: 75). In order to
accomplish this objective, the AKP aimed to eliminate the factors that were
blocking Turkeys accession to the EU, such as its hard-line counter-terrorism
policies. Therefore, they rapidly adopted the EU promoted norms in order to to
start accession negotiations. However, their willingness to transform Turkish
counter-terrorism policies was not based on recognizing the failure of previous
counter-terrorism policies. Rather, it was motivated by rational reasons, i.e. that
they would benefit by acceding to the EU.
The position of the Turkish army on the adoption of EU promoted norms
was not stable during this period. On the one hand, they supported Turkeys EU
membership for geopolitical necessities (Demir 2002; Hurriyet Daily News 2000).
And they also pioneered lifting the state of emergency in the Southeast of
Turkey by recommending the AKP government to do so. On the other hand, they
clearly indicated their opposition to granting cultural rights to Kurds. For
example, in the National Security Council meeting in 2000 the army
representatives argued that Kurdish cultural rights are a tactic of separatist
ƚĞƌƌŽƌŝƐŵ ?ǇĚŦŶůŦ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? Z ?/ŶǀŝĞǁŽĨƚŚĞƐĞŽƉŝŶŝŽŶƐ ?ĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞƉŽƐƚ ?,ĞůƐŝŶŬŝ
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period, the Turkish Army evaluated the EU promoted norms through a security
perspective, rather than believing they are required for a peaceful solution to
end ethnic separatist terrorism. Therefore, because the PKK had been defeated
by military means, the appropriateness of the EU norms to transform Turkish
counter-terrorism policy was not at the centre of Turkish Armys interests.
The role of the Turkish judiciary in the adoption of EU promoted norms
was not progressive like most of the other Turkish political actors. For example,
in spite of amendments made for improving freedom of expression by Turkish
governments, there was a tendency in the Turkish judiciary to use other legal
provisions to prosecute terror suspects for their non-violent opinions. Also, the
constitutional court preferred to close HADEP for its links with the PKK, despite
the constitutional amendments, which made the dissolution of political parties
more difficult. In view of these decisions, the appropriateness of the EU
promoted norms was not greatly influential on the Turkish judiciary in order to
expand civil liberties in the counter-terrorism domain.
The public demand for EU candidacy was extremely high during the post-
Helsinki period, which gave the necessary support to Turkish politicians to adopt
EU promoted norms. In the TESEV survey conducted in 2002, 64% of participants
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Similarly, in another survey conducted by the German Marshall Fund, the
support for Turkeys EU membership was 73% in 2004 (The German Marshall
Fund 2010: 24).35 However, the desire for EU membership was not based on
improving civil rights in Turkey, but rather on the demand for economic
development, the reduction of corruption, and freedom of movement in the EU.
According to a 2002 TESEV survey, 76% of the participants were not aware of
what the Copenhagen Political Criteria was about. Furthermore, the support
for lifting bans on Kurdish was only 39% (56% against) and converting the death
34
This survey was made through face to face interviews with 3,060 voting citizens in 17 Turkish
provinces and 25 towns.
35
The survey consisted of telephone interviews with 1000 randomly selected adults.
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these figures indicate, even though the Turkish public was supportive of the EU
membership for economic reasons, their support did not extend to the changing
of counter-terrorism policies towards the PKK.
In view of these reasons, domestic resonance to change Turkish counter-
terrorism policy was low during the post-Helsinki period. For the reformist
politicians, who supported the EU membership, material benefits such as
membership status, economic development, and securing political survival, were
the main reasons of rule adoption, rather than the appropriateness of the EU
norms. For the Turkish veto players, security reasons outweighed the normative
requirements of the EU.
6.6. Conclusion
In light of the evidence gathered in this chapter, the EU influence on Turkeys
counter-terrorism policy was high during the post-Helsinki period. The old
counter-terrorism policies of the pre-Helsinki period (such as the evacuation of
villages, the state of emergency rules and institutions, extra judicial killings, and
state security courts) did not continue during this period. On the contrary, new
policies such as a zero tolerance policy towards torture, a repentance policy for
PKK members, and a return to village project, were implemented to redress the
failures of the previous counter-terrorism policies. Furthermore, Kurdish
politicians imprisoned for their political views were released, and restrictions on
Kurdish were eased. However, inadequate progress was seen on the village
guard system, and on the dissolution of pro-Kurdish parties. The overall
performance of Turkish political actors was at sufficient level.
In order to make these policy changes, Turkey adopted the EU promoted
international agreements, such as the CoE and the UN conventions abolishing
the death penalty and eliminating discrimination. The UN conventions on civil
and political rights were adopted (except for a reservation of granting
educational rights to minorities in their mother tongue). Furthermore, during the
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same period two constitutional changes and eight legislative harmonization
packages were adopted, which included legal provisions for altering the counter-
terrorism procedures of the security forces. A similar trend was also seen in the
establishment of new central and local human rights institutions to monitor the
implementation of EU promoted norms and prevent human rights violations.
Such a comprehensive change in Turkeys counter-terrorism policies was based
on EU-level and domestic factors.
The high level of credibility of conditionality was the first reason for the
changes. The EU provided a clear membership prospect to Turkey after the
Helsinki European Council in 1999. Further official statements made in several
European Councils during the post-Helsinki period also consolidated the good
intention of the EU. At the end of this period, the EU rewarded the efforts of
Turkish political actors by giving Turkey candidate status. In that sense, the
consistent and encouraging approach of the EU increased the credibility of
conditionality.
The low level of adoption costs was the second reason for the
transformation in Turkish counter-terrorism policies. The capture of the PKK
leader, and his order for PKK members to withdrawal from Turkish territory,
reduced PKK activities in Turkey. Because of this, the adoption of EU promoted
norms became easier for reformist Turkish political actors. They could
counteract the criticism of opposition parties and those political elites who
opposed the policy changes.
The high level of legitimacy of the EU requirements is the third reason
that facilitated the adoption of EU promoted norms. By using progression
reports and accession partnerships the EU requirements were much clearer than
the demands made in the pre-Helsinki period. Furthermore, the EU
requirements mentioned in these documents overlapped with UN and CoE
demands, which increased their legitimacy for Turkish political actors. Also, the
EUs consistent approach in supporting Turkeys counter-terrorism struggle (so
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long as Turkey continued to adopt EU promoted norms) is another reason why
the legitimacy of the EU requirements increased.
The low level of domestic resonance was the only negative factor that
might be considered as weakening the EU influence during the post-Helsinki
period. Except for the AKP government, other political actors who were
influential on counter-terror policy, were not supportive or has no strong opinion
about, the EU based reforms. Indeed, the AKP government itself was only
supportive for self-interested reasons to do with its political survival. It did not
recognise the shortcomings of Turkeys counter-terrorism policy. In that sense,
the low domestic resonance variable is inadequate to explain the policy
transformation in the counter-terrorism domain. In the absence of domestic
resonance, the progress made in adopting EU promoted norms indicates that
Turkish political actors adopted them for rational reasons rather than the
appropriateness of norms themselves. Therefore, the norm adoption behaviour
of Turkish political actors was based on the EUs conditionality mechanism,
rather than its socialization efforts. According to these empirical findings, post-
Helsinki results are summarized as follows.
Table 3- Overview of Empirical Investigation of the Post-Helsinki Period
Variables
Units
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
DEPENDENT
VARIABLE
Conditionality
(External Incentives Model)
Socialization
(Social Learning Model)
Credibility of
Conditionality
(EU LEVEL)
Adoption
Costs
(DOMESTIC
LEVEL)
Legitimacy of
EU
Requirements
(EU LEVEL)
Domestic
Resonance
(DOMESTIC
LEVEL)
The EU Impact on
Formal Rule Adoption
in the Counter-
terrorism Domain
Post-Helsinki
Period 1999-2004
High Low High Low High
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7. The Post-Brussels Period
7.1. Introduction
The post-Brussels period is the last period in which the EU influence on Turkish
counter-terrorism policy towards the PKK will be analysed. It starts with the 2004
Brussels European Council, when Turkey was upgraded to the status of a
candidate country, and on-going negotiations with the EU had started. During
the same year, the PKK also resumed its attacks in Turkey. The post-Brussels
period ends in 2013, when negotiations with Turkey and the PKK for a peaceful
solution had started. As for Turkey, it was in a stable period, in which the AKP
had won two consecutive general elections (in 2007 and 2011), and had a single
party majority government.
The post-Helsinki period was a challenging time for the EU due to the
2004 Madrid and 2005 London terrorist attacks that took counter-terrorism to
the top of the EUs security agenda. Furthermore, the debt-crisis between 2008-
12 was another major event that negatively influenced the EUs enlargement
policy. It is under these circumstances that this chapter will seek to answer the
question: Why and how were EU promoted norms adopted in Turkey in a way
that transformed its counter-terrorism policies towards the PKK in the post-
Brussels period?
Once more, this chapter relies on the framework outline in chapters 1
and 3, and its main elements are again repeated in the footnote below for ease
of reference.36 In view of these variables and parameters, the main argument of
36
This chapter rely upon the research framework outlined in chapter 1 and 3. To summarise the
main elements of this framework: Rule adoption is the dependent variable. The theoretical
framework encompasses the Conditionality/Socialization mechanisms (see p89 for the former
and p100 for the latter) and their variables Credibility of Conditionality (see p96 above),
Adoption Cost (see p98 above), Legitimacy of EU Requirements (see p104 above) and
Domestic Resonance (see p108 above). To transform qualitative data into scalable values, two
parameters: low and high levels have been identified. These are summarized in chapter 1
(see 33 above).
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this chapter will be: due to the weakening EU conditionality strategy (Low
Benefits-High Costs) the speed of rule adoption in the counter-terror domain
reduced in Turkey. However, norm adoption continued as a result of the
socialization efforts made by the EU, which is based on the appropriateness of
the EU promoted norms (High Legitimacy-High Resonance).
Similarly to the earlier empirical chapters, this chapter starts in 7.2 with
Turkeys counter-terrorism policies towards the PKK to point out whether there
is policy change or not. This will be followed in 7.3 by the EUs policies towards
Turkey to emphasize the role of the EU in effecting those changes. Then 7.4 gives
an in-depth analysis of rule adoption to reveal the evidence of the EUs impact.
In the final section, 7.5, the factors influential on domestic policy transformation
will be highlighted to answer why and how the EU was influential on the
changes.
7.2. Turkeys Policies for Countering the PKK
Turkeys democratization initiatives during the post-Helsinki period (which
targeted Kurdish citizens) made for the sake of the EU membership, were a
strong challenge for the PKK. These reforms enhanced the position of the AKP in
the Southeast of Turkey. In the 2004 local elections, the pro-Kurdish party
Democratic People's Party (DEHAP) lost a majority of votes to the AKP in the ten
Southeast provinces, which was seen a threat to the hegemony of the PKK on
Kurdish citizens (Congar and Cagatay 2004; Tezcür 2010: 781-82). Furthermore,
an internal crisis appeared within the organisation, and some of the high profile
members of the PKK such as Osman Ocalan37 quit the organisation, arguing that
Turkeys EU candidacy made it possible to obtain the objective of the PKK
through political means (Çandar 2012: 76). In order to regain power in the region
and engage its militants with action, the PKK announced an end to the ceasefire
in June 2004.
37
Abdullah Ocalans brother.
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After the decision was made to resume attacks, the PKK used different
tactics to escalate instability all around the country. They started to target
security forces by ambushing them with remote controlled bombings (Yavuz and
Özcan 2006: 110). On several occasions, they attempted suicide bombings in
urban areas (BBC 2007). They kidnapped security personnel, civilians, and
sometimes elected politicians (Todays Zaman 2012e). Furthermore, the PKK
provoked violent demonstrations in the Southeast of Turkey and called for
Kurdish citizens and especially children to partake in civil disobedience (Ozeren
2012). In response to these terrorist tactics, it became necessary for Turkish
political actors to intensify security measures towards the PKK. According to
senior officials from different Turkish government institutions, these new
counter-terror measures were not a return to the hard-line counter-terrorism
policies of Turkey in the pre-Helsinki period, but were rebalancing a neglected
security dimension of counter-terrorism policy (Interview_3 2012; Interview_7
2012; Interview_9 2012; Interview_10 2012).
One of the measures put into effect was amendment on the ATL. Prior to
this legislative amendment, the Chief of Staff Hilmi Özkök complained about the
EU requested democratic reforms arguing, Despite our curtailed authorities we
are combating terrorism. He required necessary legislative changes from the
AKP government (such as the power to fire directly and without hesitation at
persons who do stop when warned, and more authority for the surveillance of
terror suspects) (Çetin 2005). In line with the requirements of law enforcement
agencies, the provision defining terrorism was widened, the list of terrorist
offences was extended, and the authorization of security forces to use weapons
against suspects who do not obey the stop command was added to the existing
law. Based on newly amended articles, carrying emblems and signs belonging to
terrorist organisation became a terrorism offence. In addition, detainees
suspected of committing terrorist offences were faced with restrictions. Their
access to an attorney could be delayed by a magistrate decision for the first 24
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hours, and security officers may attend meetings between terror suspects and
their lawyer under certain circumstances (Commission of the European
Communities 2006: 6).
The widening definition of terrorism in ATL had an impact on counter-
terror investigations in the region. One of the important incidents was the so-
called Stone Throwing Children Cases which led to the arrest of minors aged
between 12 and 18 for attending PKK sponsored demonstrations and resisting
security forces by throwing stones. According to Minister of Justice figures, the
total juveniles convicted for terror-related crimes increased from 17 in 2005 to
1,023 in 2010. Most of these children were those who were pushed to the
forefront in demonstrations against security forces in the Southeast of Turkey
(Ministry of Justice 2012).
In another wave of investigation, arrests were made against the PKK
organised Kurdish network, the Koma Çiwarken Kurdistan (KCK). The KCK was
established as an umbrella organisation, which unifies all Kurdish groups in
Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran. The PKK and the pro-Kurdish parties were placed
under the KCK administrative structure. According to Özcan, the KCK was
influential on local administrations, such as municipalities under the
management of pro-Kurdish parties, to provide logistical support and
recruitment to the PKK (Özcan 2012). In order to collapse the KCK network and
interrupt the support of the PKK, by 2012, 2,146 people were tried, and 992
people were arrested (among which 274 were locally elected and pro-Kurdish
party affiliated representatives) (Radikal 2012). However, the EU was not happy
with the arrest of these people for their non-violent opinions (Commission of the
European Communities 2009: 30). According to senior EU officials, the EU
concerns about KCK were all about the judicial procedure of the investigation,
such as the rights of defendants, rather than KCK itself (Interview_11 2013;
Interview_13 2013). Furthermore, in an interview with a senior Ministry of
Justice official, he admitted that Turkey did not use an appropriate strategy to
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prove the connection between the PKK and the KCK members to convince the EU
(Interview_1 2012).
The escalation of PKK attacks in Turkey also pushed Turkey to re-apply
ground military operations to their camps in Northern Iraq. Since the last ground
military operation in 2000, the Turkish Army did not pass Iraq borders in order to
counter the PKK (International Strategic Research Organisation 2007: 27).
However, in 2007 The TBMM authorised the Turkish Army to conduct cross-
border operations in Northern Iraq to eliminate PKK targets. Based on this
authorisation, the Turkish Army began aerial bombardments against the PKK
camps and Turkish troops passed beyond the Northern Iraq Border in 2008. After
Turkeys cross-border counter-terrorism operation, the EUs High Representative
for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, made a public statement
that We understand the concerns of Turkey but we think this action is not the
best response(Reuters 2008).
Along with the cross-border operations, a number of security measures
(such as road blocks and checkpoints) were reinstated in the Southeast provinces
(Commission of the European Communities 2005a: 38). Furthermore,
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Siirt and Hakkari provinces where military operations were carried out against
PKK targets. Public entry to these areas was restricted temporarily to prevent
fatalities, and the army was provided with the authority to make unlimited
searches within these areas (Commission of the European Communities 2008:
27; Todays Zaman 2012d). Some of the human rights organisations regarded this
implication as a new form of the State of Emergency (Human Rights Foundation
of Turkey 2009).
The downward trend in reported cases of torture and ill-treatment
continued during the post-Brussels period. The reforms of the post-Helsinki
period regarding the access to a lawyer, the medical examination of alleged
torture cases, had shown positive results (Commission of the European
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Communities 2007: 13). Turkish political actors efforts were also praised by the
President of the Council of Europe Committee for the Prevention of Torture
stating that it would be difficult to find a Council of Europe member State with a
more advanced set of provisions (Commission of the European Communities
2005a: 22). However, despite these positive improvements, there were still
reported torture and ill-treatment cases, particularly in the Southeast of Turkey,
and especially outside of official places of detention (Commission of the
European Communities 2007: 14, 2008: 68).
With regard to the impunity of security forces, the post-Helsinki period
revealed a mixed picture. On the one hand, the wrongdoings of security forces in
the name of counter-terrorism were penalized. For example, two non-
commissioned military officers responsible for bombing a bookstore in
bĞŵĚŝŶůŝ38 (which was owned by a former PKK member) were sentenced to 40
years imprisonment (Todays Zaman 2012a). A Gendarmerie intelligence colonel,
(who was responsible for 20 extra-judicial killings during the 1990s) was arrested
and stood trial39(Reuters 2010). In another case, prison guards and police
officers received imprisonment on the grounds of torturing to death a person
while he was in custody, who distributed a left-wing magazine. In relation to this
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for his death on behalf of government (BBC 2008). On the other hand, there
were concerns about the lack of prompt and impartial investigations against
security forces. For instance, in 2004, a father and his 12-year-old son were killed
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Mardin. Although the forensic reports indicated that there was not enough
evidence that the boy and his father fired at the police, the court concluded that
the police did not use excessive force and acquitted them (Human Rights Watch
2007: 19). In 2011, 34 civilians in Uludere died in a military strike due to a failure
of intelligence, which mistook Kurdish smugglers with PKK terrorists (The
38bĞŵĚŝŶůŝŝƐĂĚŝƐƚƌŝĐƚůŽĐĂƚĞĚŝŶ,ĂŬŬĂƌŝŝŶƚŚĞ^ŽƵƚŚĞĂƐƚŽĨdƵƌŬĞǇ ?
39
At the time of writing this thesis the trial was not completed.
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Economist 2012). The absence of effective, transparent, and swift investigation,
and no direct apology either from military or civilian authorities raised concerns
as to whether Turkey was returning to its abandoned hard-line counter-
terrorism policies.
The so-called Special Courts established during the post-Helsinki
period to replace the State Security Courts were also abolished in the post-
Brussels period. The Special Courts, which were responsible for high profile cases
such as Ergenekon40, Sledgehammer41 and KCK, were criticised for long
term trials and for arresting suspects without considering other preventive
measures. Furthermore, the breaking point for these courts came when the
prosecutors of the court invited the head of National Intelligence Service (MIT)
Hakan Fidan to testify about clandestine talks with the PKK (Hürriyet Daily News
2012). After all these developments, with the sudden decision of the AKP, these
courts were abolished and instead Regional High Criminal Courts were
established in 2012. Prosecution of terror related crimes passed to these new
courts. However, the on-going above-mentioned trials were carried out in
Special Courts until the final verdict was reached. Within this context, the
Prime Ministers authorization was also required for launching an investigation
towards the high profile officers appointed by the Prime Minister, such as MIT
members and high ranking army generals (Todays Zaman 2012c). This
amendment was considered to constitute an arbitrary immunity for certain
public officials (Commission of the European Communities 2012: 13).
The promotion of freedom of expression during the post-Brussels period
was not in a steady pattern. Even though reforms were made to safeguard
freedom of expression, there was a tendency in the judiciary to interpret the
existing law in a restrictive manner, or to use alternative provisions to continue
prosecutions if necessary (Commission of the European Communities 2011: 25).
Furthermore, debatable decisions of judges in similar cases were undermining
40
A clandestine network accused of plotting to overthrow the AKP government.
41
A suspected coup attempt in 2003 with the aim of unseating the AKP government.
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the efforts to enhance the exercise of freedom of expression (Interview_1 2012;
Interview_26 2013). In line with this controversial situation, an open debate took
place during the post-Brussels period regarding the investigations against the
journalists, academicians, human rights activists, and students. The amendment
of terror-related laws to distinguish between them incitement of violence and
the expression of non-violent ideas, was the major topic in this debate.
Despite the problems in the freedom of expression, the improving trend
on the use of Kurdish in broadcasting and education continued during the post-
Brussels period. As for broadcasting, in the first years of the post-Brussels period,
there were time restrictions (one hour a day) on broadcasting in Kurdish. With
the exception of music programmes, subtitle and translations in Turkish were
obligatory for the programmes. Therefore, live broadcasting in political debates
and general entertainment was technically cumbersome. Furthermore,
educational programmes teaching Kurdish were also not allowed (Commission of
the European Communities 2006: 21-42). However, these restrictions were lifted
over time. For example, a new TV channel called TRT 6 was established in the
state owned Turkish Broadcasting Corporation in 2009. Unlike the previous
broadcasting initiative in 2004, this channel was allocated only for broadcasting
in Kurdish and broadcast 24 hours a day (Commission of the European
Communities 2009: 28). Along with state owned channels, private radio stations
and TV channels were licenced to broadcast in Kurdish. The restrictions on
subtitles, translation into Turkish, and educational programmes, were lifted.
Moreover, the Supreme Election Board (YSK) allowed the use of Kurdish in
election campaigns (Commission of the European Communities 2011: 8-39).
In terms of education in Kurdish, the private Kurdish courses, which were
allowed during the post-Helsinki period, did not bring the expected outcomes.
Most of these courses were closed due to a lack of financial resources,
restrictions on curriculum, problems regarding the appointment of teachers, and
most particularly due to limited demand (Commission of the European
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Communities 2005a: 37). However, during these years, in order to undermine
the PKK manipulation of Kurdish citizens, positive steps were taken for education
in Kurdish. In this context, YÖK authorised the Mardin Artuklu University to
establish the Living Languages Institution for post-Graduate education in
Kurdish in 2009, and an undergraduate department in 2011 (Hürriyet Daily News
2011b). This initiative was followed by opening Kurdish Language departments in
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Zaman 2012b) and Tunceli University in 2011 (Todays Zaman 2011b). Moreover,
with a new educational reform in 2012, from the fifth grade in public schools,
pupils have been provided with Kurdish classes for two hours per week, if there
is enough demand for the course (Ministry for EU Affairs 2012: 43).
The return of IDPs continued to be encouraged by compensating these
peoples losses during the post-Brussels period. According to official figures,
from 2004 to 2012, 361,391 applications were submitted to the Damage
Assessment Commission, 305,758 of these applications were assessed, 166,158
cases were paid compensation, and 139,600 applications rejected. By September
2012, the total amount paid to claimants was 1,230,000,000 Euros (Commission
of the European Communities 2012: 35; Internal Displacement Monitoring
Centre (IDMC) 2012). Even though such a huge compensation was a positive step
towards recovering the losses of IDPs, on the other hand there were other
factors that remained unresolved for the easy return of these people, such as
economic underdevelopment, the absence of basic infrastructure, the lack of
capital, limited employment opportunities, and a deteriorating security situation
in the region (Commission of the European Communities 2006: 23).
Apart from IDPs, the situation of village guards was not resolved during
these years. According to official figures, more than 45,000 village guards were
still paid by the government (Commission of the European Communities 2011:
42; Grand National Assembly of Turkey the Committee on Human Rights Inquiry
2013: 129). However, in an amendment adopted in 2007 on Village law the
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government was authorised to recruit 60,000 additional village guards, which
indicates there was likely no intention to abolish the existing village guard
system (Hürriyet Daily News 2009). Furthermore, with the possibility of peaceful
conciliation between Turkey and the PKK, the future of these guards was
uncertain due to the lack of a comprehensive plan to abolish the village guard
system (Guardian 2013). According to a senior Ministry of Interior official, if PKK
terrorism were to end, these guards would be considered for employment in
different state institutions, or they could continue their duty as law enforcement
agents in villages outside of the counter-terror struggle (Interview_22 2013).
The intolerance towards the pro-Kurdish parties was not much different
from the pre-Helsinki and the post-Helsinki periods. Similar to the previous party
closure cases against the pro-Kurdish parties, the DTP, which is the successor of
the HADEP, was closed by the Constitutional court on the grounds of ties that
DTP politicians had with the PKK, and their activities against the indivisibility of
Turkey. In its decision, the Court also stripped two MPs of their political
immunity and their parliamentary seats. Furthermore, thirty-seven party
members were banned from politics (Constitutional Court of the Republic of
Turkey 2009). However, the sincerity of pro-Kurdish politicians on the dissolution
of political parties, raised questions during this period. In the constitutional
amendment of 2010, an article making the party closures difficult was dropped
from the constitutional amendment package. The governing AKP was not able to
find 330 votes to pass the threshold, and the support of pro-Kurdish parties
support was necessary to introduce this article to referendum. However, the
pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), which was established after the
DTP closure, boycotted the voting, even though they suffered several times from
party closures (Karabat 2010).
In order to end PKK terrorism by peaceful means, two important
initiatives took place during the post-Brussels period. The first initiative
Democratic Opening process started in March 2009. In his personal statement,
241
the President Gül42 stated that there is a convergence of ideas between state
authorities regarding a peaceful solution to the Kurdish question (Karabat 2009).
Similarly, in the brochure prepared for the Democratic Opening, Prime
DŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ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of young people (Justice and Development Party 2010). In order to turn these
good intentions into practice, MIT continued with clandestine peace negotiations
with the PKK (Hürriyet Daily News 2011a). As a result of these talks, 34 Kurds
came from Northern Iraq, eight of whom were PKK members, and rest of them
were from the PKK dominated Makhmour Refugee Camp (International Crisis
Group 2011: 8). Thousands of people at the Habur border gate welcomed these
people and this meeting turned into a victory celebration for the PKK, which
raised the anger in the West of Turkey. Furthermore, 14 soldiers were killed by
the PKK during the peace process (BBC 2013). Therefore, the AKP government
stepped back from this initiative, due to its high political costs.
The second initiative Resolution Process was started in October 2012
with negotiations between the head of MIT and the captured PKK leader
Abdullah Ocalan (Selvi 2013). According to an agreed plan, four stages
(Ceasefire-Withdrawal-Democratic Reforms-Lay down arms) were determined
for reconciliation (Can 2013). Moreover, a Wise People group was set up, which
consisted of 63 well-known people coming from different professions (such as
academicians, artists, and business people) to prepare a report for public
demands and proposals for solutions about the peace process (Weekly Zaman
2013). The process is still underway at the time of writing. If the expected results
go to plan, Turkeys problem, of almost thirty years, will come to end.
According to elite interviews conducted in Turkey and Brussels, the EU as
an institution has not had a direct role in these negotiations. Public demand was
the major trigger to start talks with the PKK (Interview_6 2012; Interview_11
2013; Interview_13 2013; Interview_14 2013; Interview_19 2013; Interview_23
42
Abdullah Gül was the Minister of Foreign Affairs before becoming Turkish President on 28
August 2007.
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2013; Interview_26 2013). However, some member countries such as the UK
took part in the first negotiations as a mediator (Interview_23 2013;
Interview_26 2013). Also, a few workshops were held in the UK, Spain, and
Belgium to develop benchmarks on how to end ethnic separatist terrorism
(UK/IRA-Spain/Euskadi Ta Askatasuna-ETA) and good governance in multi-ethnic
societies (Belgium-Flemish/Walloon) (Interview_19 2013; Interview_26 2013).
Furthermore, the EUs counter-terrorism coordinator offered to take an active
role in these negotiations for reconciliation in his visit to Turkey (Interview_12
2013; Interview_19 2013). In this respect, the EU has an implicit role in these
negotiations by its socialization efforts, rather than its conditionality strategy.
In sum, the counter-terrorism policy of Turkey towards the PKK during
the post-Brussels period was neither reckless (as in the pre-Helsinki period), nor
in a positive trend (as in the post-Helsinki period) in terms of protecting human
rights. Even though Turkish political actors continued to transform counter-
terrorism policy in line with the EU requirements, and sought a peaceful way for
reconciliation, the speed and enthusiasm to adopt reforms reduced in
comparison to the post-Helsinki period. In this context, resumption of the PKK
attacks and sponsored mass protests in the Southeast of Turkey were a few
reasons why security based policies often outweighed the civil rights dimension
of countering terrorism. However, the diminishing EU influence on Turkey was
the other reason for the weakening reform process, which should be taken into
account.
7.3. The EU Response to Turkish Counter-Terrorism Practices
When the European Council consented to Turkeys candidacy in December 2004
in the Brussels European Council, Turkey-EU relations moved to a negotiation
stage. The European Commission presented a draft Framework in June 2005, in
which the methods and principles of negotiations between Turkey and the EU
were clarified (Commission of the European Communities 2005b). According to
the negotiation framework, the Council has the right to suspend negotiations in
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case of serious human rights breaches, which means the EU can use punitive
measures if necessary. On the other hand, accomplishment of EU required
reforms does not guarantee that Turkey will be accepted into the EU. The
negotiations with Turkey were emphasized as an open-ended process, in which
the final outcome is not guaranteed. The Unions absorption capacity and the
general interest of both parties will be taken into consideration at the time the
decision is made about Turkeys membership. In this context, the EU
membership was the top motivational factor for reformist Turkish politicians,
and it was used against the veto players whilst adopting the EU required norms
to transform Turkish counter-terrorism policy (Interview_2 2012; Interview_6
2012; Interview_7 2012; Interview_9 2012). However, in a situation of unknown
membership prospects, reformist Turkish politicians were left empty handed by
the EU in their efforts to combat Eurosceptic political groups. These Eurosceptics
had neutral position during the post-Helsinki period because of the possible
membership prospect. Therefore, the decision to make the negotiations open-
ended was an unpromising decision for the reformist politicians to carry through
democratic reforms to transform Turkeys counter-terrorism policies.
The additional protocol of the Ankara Treaty, which Turkey promised to
sign in 2004, became another challenge between Turkey and the EU. This
protocol extends the benefits of the Customs Union agreement between Turkey
and the EU to ten new member countries, including Cyprus. The problem lying
behind the signing of the additional protocol was that Turkish Cypriots
supported, and the Greek rejected, the UN-sponsored Annan Plan in 2004 that
proposed the reunification of Greek and Turkish communities. Prior to the
referendum, the US, and the EU representatives, claimed that any side who
rejected the plan would face negative consequences (Interview_8 2012;
Interview_11 2013; Interview_18 2013). However, after the referendum, while
Greek Cypriots were rewarded with EU membership, the Turkish Cypriots
suffered from international isolation (Gordon and Taspinar 2006: 63). After this
244
decision, Turkey put a reservation in the additional protocol that by signing the
protocol they would not grant recognition to the Republic of Cyprus. Turkish
authorities emphasized that the recognition of Cyprus depended on the
reunification of the Greek and Turkish sides (European Parliament 2005b).
According to a senior Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, the failure of the
EU to fulfil its promises in the Cyprus issue made Turkish political actors more
sceptical of the EUs promises in further agreements (Interview_8 2012).
Even though the European Parliament responded to Turkeys decision by
postponing a vote on the additional protocol, the European Council started
negotiations in October 2005 (Commission of the European Communities 2005a:
3-5). According to Commissioner Rehn, who was responsible for enlargement
policies, the decision to start negotiations was aimed at ensuring the EUs
leverage on Turkey for the continuation of reforms remained in place (European
Parliament 2005a). However, the efforts to continue negotiations did not last
long. The Turkish side refused to compromise on opening its ports to Cypriot
aircrafts and ships until the abolition of EU restrictions on Turkish Cypriots. On
the other side, the Cypriot Republic threatened to use its veto power against the
accession of Turkey to the Union. In order to find a solution to this stalemate and
carry on negotiations, the European Commissions proposal was accepted to
freeze eight-trade related acquis chapters43 and close negotiated chapters, on
the condition that Turkey lifted restrictions on Cyprus (Lavenex and
Schimmelfennig 2007: 147-48). After this decision, Prime Minister Erdogan
criticized the EU for being unjust towards Turkey (BBC 2006). In addition, the
Minister of Foreign Affairs Gül emphasized his frustration with the words that
we have entered a new era in our relations with the EU but things are still on
track(Zaman 2006).
43
These chapters were 1-Free Movement of Goods, 3-Right of Establishment and Freedom to
Provide Services, 9-Financial Services, 11-Agriculture and Rural Development, 13-
Fisheries, 14-Transport Policy, 29-Customs Union and 30-External Relations
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The devastating terrorist attacks in Madrid and London prioritised
security based policies within the EU. Some of the countries, such as UK,
hardened their counter-terror measures. For instances, it became possible to
extend the detention period for terror suspects (which used to be 7 days) to up
to 28 days with the approval of magistrates in the UK (Wade 2010: 408). Similar
counter-terror measures were required from the Turkish government by the
Turkish Army on the basis of those actions by European countries (Çetin 2005).
After these demands, the former Minister of Justice Cemil Çiçek made a public
statement that we are analysing the legislative amendments in UK with regards
to countering terrorism (Yetkin 2005). The amendments made in 2006 on ATL
came just after these debates. According to a senior counter-terror official, after
the resumption of PKK attacks, the Government representatives asked them
what kind of legislative changes are required to strengthen counter-terrorism
policies. The legislative changes made in EU countries have not been taken by
Turkey, but it may have triggered their demands (Interview_26 2013). In this
respect, security based policies in the EU were used by Turkish law enforcement
agencies to justify their demands.
The difficulties against Turkeys membership were not only limited by the
Cyprus issue during the post-Brussels period. There was also an increasing
opposition in the Union regarding Turkeys membership. One factor was that the
existence of more than 70 million Muslim people in Turkey was perceived a
threat to European culture (Aarts and Van der Kolk 2006: 244-45). According to
the EU Barometer Survey, approval of Turkey to the EU was only around 38%
between the years 2005 and 2008, which was one of the lowest rates amongst
candidate countries (Scheuer and Schmitt 2009: 562). In this respect, the
likelihood of Turkeys membership inspired fear among EU countries that
Turkeys admission might transform the identity of the EU and make it a more
Muslim Europe (Bowley 2004; Dahlman 2004: 571). Furthermore, when the
Dutch and France voters rejected the referendum held for the Treaty
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Establishing a Constitution for Europe in June 2005, possible Turkish membership
was one of the reasons for the rejection. The size of projected Turkish voting is
expected to alter the power balance in the EU, which is mostly determined by
the population of member countries. In that sense, the EU countries worried
that Turkey would be the second strongest country after Germany in the EU, in
terms of having seats in the European Council and the European Parliament
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There were also economic factors that did not favour Turkey. According
to 2004 figures, Turkeys Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in purchasing
power parity was only 29% of the EU average (Commission of the European
Communities 2005a: 45). Such a big difference between the EU average and
Turkey created the worry in most of the wealthy European countries that they
would face a flow of immigrants from Turkey if it were granted with membership
(Aarts and Van der Kolk 2006: 244-45). In that sense, Turkeys membership
created a dilemma for the EU. If Turkey were admitted to the EU, absorbing it (as
it is a less developed country) would be costly for the EU. On the other hand, if
they refuse Turkeys membership, the credibility of the EUs promises would be
undermined.
In order to overcome this problem privileged membership was offered
as an alternative incentive to Turkey by German Chancellor Angela Merkel and
French President Nicolas Sarkozy (Kardas 2009). According to privileged
membership, Turkey will be integrated into the EUs regional alliances, and its
supranational structures, without having full membership status and the full
benefits of membership (Leggewie 2009). However, Turkey already had these
privileges (such as Customs Union and the ESDP), which empties the value of this
offer for Turkey (Interview_11 2013). Furthermore, the privileged membership
was not offered to previous candidate countries, and this type of membership
does not exist in the TEU, which raises the question of why Turkey should
consent to such a low-benefit offer. In parallel to these concerns, Prime Minister
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Erdogan responded to this offer by saying that Turkey cannot accept the position
France and Germany have taken, because it is impossible for Turkey to accept a
type of membership that does not exist in the EU acquis (Financial Times 2009).
According to senior EU and Turkish officials, this proposition has not been taken
seriously either by the Turkish side or by other EU member states and
institutions (Interview_11 2013; Interview_13 2013; Interview_18 2013). It has
only served to weaken the EUs conditionality strategy in the eyes of Turkish
politicians.
Whilst Turkeys membership was a serious topic in the EUs political
agenda, the third revised accession partnership was adopted in January 2006
(European Council 2006). The accession partnership set short-term and medium
term priorities for Turkey just as the previous versions did. All the EU
requirements regarding what Turkish political actors should do to end PKK
terrorism by peaceful means, were placed in the short-term priorities section.
Turkey was expected to accomplish these within one or two years. However, in
response to this accession partnership, Turkey did not prepare the NPAA,
considering it to be unnecessary (AB Haber 2006).
In February 2008, two years after this decision, the fourth version of the
accession partnership, which updated the 2006 version, was adopted. Although
it was slightly different from the 2006 programme, the EU requirements on
Turkey to continue democratic reforms as a remedy to PKK terrorism were the
same, and they were identified as being a short-term priority for Turkey.
However, in contrast to the previous case, Turkey adopted the NPAA in
December 2008, promising to adopt EU promoted human rights norms and
expand the rights of its citizens. The decision to prepare NPAA was based on
overcoming the laziness of state institutions, in order to speed up the reforms by
setting targets, and to indicate that Turkey is determined to be member of the
EU (AB Haber 2006). However, Turkish attempts to open the suspended acquis
chapter did not end in line with the expectations of Turkish political actors.
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By 2012, only 13 acquis chapters had been opened to negotiations, and
one chapter (Science and Research) was provisionally closed. Even though
screening meetings for chapters 23 (Judiciary and Fundamental Rights) and 24
(Justice, Freedom and Security), which are influential on Turkish counter-
terrorism policy, were completed by 2006, the screening reports of these
chapters had not been submitted to Turkey by 2013 (Ministry for EU Affairs
2012: 12). According to the EU senior officials, the failure to submit these reports
was not related to the Commission. Even though the Commission had prepared
these reports, member countries did not reach an agreement to open
benchmarks, because of the Cyprus veto (Interview_11 2013; Interview_13 2013;
Interview_14 2013; Interview_19 2013). In this respect, the Cyprus veto also
weakened the EUs conditionality strategy towards Turkey to transform its
counter-terrorism policy.
Due to the blocked acquis chapters, and the unresolved Cyprus problem
between the EU and Turkey, another approach called Positive Agenda was
launched in May 2012. The aim of this process was to create new momentum in
stagnated Turkey-EU relations. Within this framework, it was agreed that eight
working groups would be established, which are responsible for aligning Turkish
policies with those of the EU in various areas, such as counter-terrorism, visa
liberalization, migration, energy and trade (Aktar 2012: 37). If the stalemate
between Turkey and the EU can be overcome in the future, these policy areas
will be ready for negotiation, which will save time in securing Turkeys accession
to the EU. According to the Enlargement Commissioner Füle, the Positive Agenda
was not a process replacing Turkeys membership negotiations. Rather, it was a
process that complements accession negotiations and motivates reform
processes in Turkey (Füle 2012). Similarly, as senior EU officials indicate, this
process was invented to keep up the conversation with Turkey, and had limited
shelf-life (Interview_11 2013; Interview_13 2013; Interview_14 2013). However,
from the Turkish side, there was still suspicion about this process. In an interview
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with a senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, Positive Agenda is considered as
being artificial respiration in continuing negotiations. He also remarked that
there were some concerns that this process might have replaced the EUs
conditionality strategy towards Turkey, which would not be desirable for Turkish
political actors in the long run (Interview_8 2012).
In sum, during the post-Brussels period, the likelihood of Turkeys EU
membership increased identity and economic based concerns in the EU.
Furthermore, the tension between Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus caused
stagnation in negotiations. In order to overcome these problems privileged
membership and positive agenda was proposed to Turkey in order to keep
negotiations alive, and hold Turkey on the EU track. Within this context, the
transformation of Turkeys counter-terrorism policy towards the PKK was not the
highest priority for the EU in comparison to the problems of absorbing a less
developed country with a large Muslim population. The fact that democratic
reforms continued during the post-Brussels period, even though Turkeys
membership prospects were less certain, reduced the need for the EU to provide
clear membership prospects to Turkey.
7.4. The Impact of the EU on Rule Adoption
As indicated in the previous two sections, the resumption of PKK attacks and the
vague membership prospects were two negative factors against the alignment of
Turkish counter-terrorism policy with the EU requirements. Even though these
two reasons were strong hurdles for reformist Turkish political actors, during the
post-Brussels period rule adoption continued in line with the EU demands.
Within this context, there was one extensive constitutional amendment, and
four judicial packages. Furthermore, several international conventions that are
part of the EU acquis were either signed or ratified by Turkey. In order to reveal
the EU impact during the post-Brussels period, these rule adoptions will be
examined within three sub-sections: ratification of international laws, domestic
legislative changes and institution building initiatives.
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7.4.1. Ratification of International Laws
The Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment (OPCAT) was one important
agreement, and was signed in September 2005 and ratified in September 2011.
The EU urges all member countries and candidate countries to be a party of the
convention (Council of the European Union 2009: 2). This protocol establishes
independent international (the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and
other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (SPT)) and national
preventive mechanisms (NPT) for visiting places where people are deprived of
their liberty (such as detention centres and police stations) without the consent
of the authorities. The SPT and NPT prepare confidential reports guiding the
relevant state authorities on how to enhance the protection from torture. If the
contracting state refuses to cooperate with these institutions, the UN Committee
against Torture (CAT), which is an umbrella institution of SPT and NPT, make a
public statement against the country.44 After ratification of OPCAT, along with
the Council of Europes Committee of Prevention of Torture, another mechanism
began to monitor torture cases in Turkey to protect the rights of terror suspects.
During the post-Brussels period, the ratification of human rights
conventions, which were signed in the post-Helsinki period, were continued.
Within this context, in 2006 the Second Optional Protocol of UN ICCPR and the
thirteenth Protocol of the ECHR (which abolish the death penalty in the party
states) were ratified (Commission of the European Communities 2006: 10). In
addition, the First Optional protocol of the ICCPR, which provides a control
mechanism in contracting states for human right violations, was ratified in
November 2006 (Commission of the European Communities 2007: 11). In view of
these decisions, Turkish political actors continued the unfinished reform trend of
the post-Helsinki period during the post-Brussels period.
44
Turkey signed the CAT protocol in 1988. See section (5.4.1) for further details.
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Even though promising steps were taken by Turkish political actors to
adopt the EU promoted international norms, there were still unfulfilled EU
requirements. For instance, Turkey did not lift its reservations on UN ICCPR and
ICESC regarding the educational rights of minorities. Furthermore, Turkey was
still reluctant to sign the Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities (FCPNM) or the ECRML (Commission of the European Communities
2012: 31). According to a senior Ministry of Justice official, adoption of these
conventions was considered risky for the integrity of Turkey, and there are some
concerns that the PKK might manipulate these conventions to justify demands
for autonomy in the future (Interview_5 2012). Therefore, in the absence of
membership prospects, Turkish political actors hesitated to adopt these
conventions due to their possible high future costs.
In sum, despite there being unratified and reserved provisions in
international conventions, Turkey carried on adopting the EU promoted
international conventions during the post-Brussels period. However, due to the
lack of EU membership prospects, the speed in adopting these conventions
reduced considerably in comparison to the post-Helsinki period. Furthermore,
Turkish political actors were reluctant to adopt EU promoted ethnic minority
conventions due to the risks of the PKKs demands for autonomy. In view of
these circumstances, the ratification of EU promoted norms was neither as high
as in the post-Helsinki period, nor as low as in the pre-Helsinki period.
Nevertheless, it was comparatively better than the pre-Helsinki period. Due to
the two-level parameter (High-Low), which was identified in the beginning of
study, the EU impact on Turkish counter-terrorism policy is considered high
during the post-Brussels period in terms of ratification of international laws.
7.4.2. Domestic Legislative Changes
The adoption of a new penal code was one of the important initiatives tin
transforming Turkish counter-terrorism policies during this period. Prior to this
decision, the European Commission suggested to Turkey that it renew its existing
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eighty year old penal code to bring the code in line with EU standards
(Commission of the European Communities 2004c). In response to the
Commissions recommendations, the new penal code was adopted in June 2005.
The new code foresees severe punishment for law enforcement agencies if they
torture or ill-treat terror suspects. For instance, the punishment for perpetrators
of torture increased from 10 years to 15 years. In cases of the death of a victim,
life imprisonment is given to offenders. Furthermore, the statute of limitations
for the offence of torture was lifted. In this respect, law enforcement officers will
be prosecuted for torture crimes whenever their action is discovered in future
(CNN-TURK 2013).
Along with the Penal Code, the New Code of Criminal Procedure Law and
the New Regulation of Apprehension, Detention, and Statement Taking (RADST)
came into force in June 2005. This legislation provided new rights to people who
are being prosecuted for charges related to terrorism. For instance, a free
interpretation service was provided for defendants who cannot speak Turkish
(Commission of the European Communities 2005a: 15). This was a major
development in the prosecution of PKK members, who often can only speak
Kurdish, or sometimes refuse to speak Turkish. Furthermore, security forces
were obliged to inform persons who are detained of the reason for their
detention, and of their legal rights (such as right to legal counsel). If the law
enforcement agency failed to do so, defendants were given the right to claim
compensation for violation of his or her rights (CNN-TURK 2013). The new RADST
also brought medical examination to suspects before they are taken into
custody, and also on their release (Commission of the European Communities
2005a: 22). This provision was a vital preventive measure for possible torture
and ill-treatment cases, whilst terror suspects are in custody.
With regards to the abolition of Special Courts, articles 250 and 252 of
the CCPL were revoked in the third judicial reform package in 2012. As earlier
indicated, these courts were authorized to prosecute major offenses such as
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organised crime, terror, and drug trafficking. Instead of these courts, Regional
High Crime Courts were established under article 10 of the ATL, which were
tasked with hearing terror cases. According to the new article 10 of the ATL, also,
a Freedom Judge is assigned to make decisions regarding preventive measures
such as search, seizure, arrest, and detention. In the past, these decisions were
handled by the judge responsible for hearing the case (Ministry for EU Affairs
2012: 16). This new amendment aimed to ensure the impartiality of judges on
deciding the preventive measures, which were criticized during the high profile
cases such as Ergenekon, Sledgehammer and KCK for the length of
detention periods, early-bird police raids, and the collection of evidence
(Hürriyet Daily News 2012).
Restrictions on the use of languages other than Turkish in prisoner visits
were also lifted by amending the provision regulating visits of imprisoned
people. Prior to this amendment, PKK prisoners were not allowed to speak
Kurdish with their families. The EU criticized this arrangement more restrictive
than security reasons can justify (Commission of the European Communities
2009: 17). According to a senior Ministry of Justice official, this amendment was
made in response to EU requirements (Interview_1 2012). After the amendment
was put into practice, communication was not only ensured for convicted PKK
members with their families, but also the EU requirement on this issue were
fulfilled. Furthermore, one of the PKK arguments on the restrictions on Kurdish
was disposed with. Within this context, also, a draft law amending the Law on
the Execution of Sentences and Security Measures was forwarded to the Turkish
National Assembly, to provide the right to be defended in another language
(Ministry for EU Affairs 2012: 43). This amendment aimed to lift the restrictions
over the defendants to make their defence statement in Kurdish, which became
a crisis during the KCK investigation. The defendants prosecuted under the KCK
investigation asked to be allowed to submit their statement in Kurdish. However
these requests were rejected during the trial (Todays Zaman 2011a).
254
The legislative amendments made to the ATL were another important
dimension of domestic legislation during the post-Brussels period. As indicated
earlier, the resumption of PKK attacks after 2004 caused a few amendments in
the ATL. Within this context, articles 3 and 4 of the law, which define terror
offences, were extended. According to article 7, covering up ones face in order
to hide ones identity, and carrying emblems or signals of a terror organisation,
became terrorist-related offences. Article 10 of the ATL narrowed the right of
access to a lawyer, which is limited to only one lawyer, and may be denied for 24
hours by the decision of a magistrate. Moreover, if there is strong suspicions on
the mediating role of a lawyer between a suspect and a terrorist organisation,
security officers may attend meetings between the suspect and their legal
counsel (Commission of the European Communities 2006: 6). However, these
new provisions raised concerns when the so called Stone Throwing Kids were
prosecuted. In this respect the EU urged Turkey to find an immediate solution to
the problem (Commission of the European Communities 2009: 16-73).
In response to increasing EU criticisms, article 5 of the ATL was amended
in 2010. In the previous form of the article, children who are between the ages
of twelve and eighteen were prosecuted in the same way as adults. However,
the new amendment excluded minors from being tried under the same article as
adults, and they were no longer sentenced for being members of terrorist
organisations. Furthermore, according to the amended articles 9 and 13 of the
ATL, minors accused of committing terror-related crimes are to be tried by
juvenile courts rather than the Special Courts (or with its new name Regional
High Crime Courts). Their sentences can also be postponed, converted into
alternative sanctions, or suspended (Commission of the European Communities
2010b: 79-80). In an interview with a senior official from the Central Counter-
Terror Department of Police, he admitted that these amendments were made in
response to EU critics (Interview_2 2012).
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As for freedom of expression, the post-Brussels period witnessed many
legislative amendments. The problematic article 301 of the penal code (which
penalises insulting Turkishness, the state, or state intuitions) was amended. The
EU criticized the Turkish judiciary for interpreting this article in a restrictive
manner and emphasized the need for amendment (Commission of the European
Communities 2005a: 36). Prior to the amendment, the non-violent opinions of
journalists and other individuals about Turkeys counter-terrorism policy towards
the PKK, could be prosecuted under this article. However, after the amendment,
the wording of the provision was changed to limit the scope of article, and the
upper limit of the penalty was reduced (Commission of the European
Communities 2008: 15). Moreover, permission from the Ministry of Justice was
required for launching an investigation, which made it complicated to open cases
for non-violent opinions. As a result of this decision, the number of trials reduced
considerably. For instance, in 2010, only 10 out of 403 applications were upheld
by the Ministry of Justice (Ministry for EU Affairs 2012: 32).
Within the same context, further articles within different laws were
amended to improve the protection of freedom of expression in the counter-
terror domain. For example, according to article 7 of the ATL, participants in
terrorist organisation sponsored gatherings would no longer be prosecuted as
members of terrorist organisations. Rather, they would be investigated under a
minor crime, such as the violation of attending an unlawful gathering. This
amendment was a positive step in distinguishing investigations between PKK
sympathizers and PKK members, who used to be prosecuted within the same
legal framework. In addition, persons who were charged with committing a
crime on behalf of an unlawful organisation would no longer be prosecuted as
being a member of a terrorist organisation, unless the organisation was involved
in armed violence. In that sense, the KCK members who were not affiliated with
the PKK were not prosecuted with being members of the PKK. Instead they were
only convicted with their illegal action of supporting the PKK. Article 6 of the ATL,
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which penalized publishing and disseminating the leaflets and statements of
terrorist organisations, was no longer considered a crime unless it incited
violence (such as encouraging the use of explosives, property damage, physical
injury, and resisting security forces). In this vein, this amendment freed
democratic or non-violent opinions of PKK members and sympathisers from
investigation.
Concerning the freedom of the press, several articles, which were used
against journalists in the name of countering terrorism, were amended.
According to article 285 of the penal code, the penalty for the dissemination of
information (which disrupts confidentiality of investigation) would not be
increased if the press or other media tools had been used. Thereby, sharing
confidential information about counter-terror investigations with the media was
no longer used to increase the penalty. Within the same context, article 288 of
the penal code, which penalised attempts to influence the judiciary was made
more explicit to narrow the interpretation of the article. Furthermore, the
penalty of imprisonment in article 288 was converted to fines, which meant
journalists who criticize a counter-terror investigation would only be subject to
criminal fines rather than imprisonment. Article 6 of the ATL, which enabled the
temporary suspension of periodicals, was repealed (Ministry for EU Affairs 2012:
33). After the amendment, the courts were stripped of their authority to ban
publications under counter-terror investigations.
Increasing individual applications against Turkey in the ECtHR was often
emphasized by the EU as a problem for Turkey in reaching the democratic
standards of the EU. Therefore, in order to improve the protection of human
rights and reduce the number of individual applications to the ECtHR, individual
application processes to the Turkish Constitutional Court (TCC) were introduced
by amending the Constitution in 2010. The new regulation gave rights to
individuals to apply to the TCC if they did not satisfy previous judicial remedies.
(Commission of the European Communities 2012: 14). From the counter-terror
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dimension, the new application processes paved the way for the victims of
counter-terror policies to seek further remedy if they faced human rights
violations as a result of acts of negligence by public authorities (Ministry for EU
Affairs 2012: 14).
The use of Kurdish in electoral campaigns was allowed during the post-
Brussels period by amending the Law on Fundamental Principles of Elections and
Electoral Registry in April 2010. In the years before the amendment, the EU was
criticized Turkey for not allowing other languages in political life (Commission of
the European Communities 2008: 26). After the amendment, it was no longer
possible to claim that the use of Kurdish in election campaigns constituted
terrorist propaganda.
In order to monitor the unlawful actions of law enforcement agencies
and increase the transparency in these units, a draft law was submitted to the
Parliament in October 2012. The new law proposed the establishment of a
monitoring commission formed from state representatives and civilians. This
Commission is expected to examine and investigate complaints about security
forces for their illegal actions (such as torture, ill-treatment, and excessive use
force) (Ministry for EU Affairs 2012: 14). However, the selection of members of
the commission by the Government increases concerns about impartiality of the
Commission (Hürriyet 2013).
Within the Constitutional amendment in 2010, article 20 of the
constitution was amended, which codifies the protection of personal data.
Following this amendment, in June 2012, a draft law on the Protection of
Personal data was also submitted to Parliament. As indicated earlier (see chapter
4), data protection was required by the EU to allow non-member countries to be
part of Eurojust for their terror-related extradition demands (Council of the
European Union 2002d). Moreover, as the EUs counter-terror coordinator Gilles
de Kerchove has emphasized, data protection regulations are necessary for
intelligence sharing between the EU and Turkey on PKK matters (NTV 2010). In
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that sense, the adoption of EU promoted norms by Turkey is not only based on
normative reasons, but also depends on counter-terror cooperation between
Turkey and the EU.
In sum, during the post-Brussels period the return of the PKK to terror
based strategies caused a hardening in counter-terror legislation in Turkey. In
this context, the ATL was amended several times in line with the requirements of
security forces. However, improving human rights protection was not
abandoned as it was in the pre-Helsinki period. If the amended counter-terror
articles ended up with unexpected human rights violations, these legislative
mistakes were redressed. The EU was the most important actor influential on
these reforms due to its demarches, progression reports, and accession
partnerships. In consideration of these circumstances, the EU impact on Turkish
counter-terrorism policy was high during the post-Brussels period in terms of
domestic legislative changes.
7.4.3. Institution Building
As indicated in the pre-Helsinki period, the Turkish Parliament Human Rights
Inquiry Committee was the first monitoring mechanism in Turkey established to
protect human rights. However, this institution was subject to EU criticism for its
lack of influence on administrative units and for having no legislative role
(Commission of the European Communities 2005a: 20, 2006: 12). In order to
improve the standards of the Committee, the law establishing TPHRIC was
amended in December 2011. According to the amendment, the Committee was
authorised to examine notice of motion and draft laws regarding human rights,
either as a main or as a secondary committee (Ministry for EU Affairs 2012: 14).
After the amendment, the committee had the right to intervene in legislations
relevant to Turkish counter-terrorism policies, if draft legislation contradicted EU
promoted human rights norms (Interview_25 2013). Therefore, the Committees
impact on the protection of human rights was reinforced during the post-
Brussels period.
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The establishment of the Ombudsman institution was another important
step in improving human rights protection in Turkey. The Ombudsman45 upholds
complaints of citizens regarding public services, and makes recommendations to
state institutions to provide an appropriate remedy. The EU encourages the
establishment of such institutions in member and candidate countries to ensure
accountable, fair, and transparent public administration (European Ombudsman
2010). In this regard, the AKP government initially amended the constitution in
2010 to establish such an institution. Afterwards, in June 2012, a law establishing
the Ombudsman entered into force (Ministry for EU Affairs 2012: 13). According
to the Turkish Ombudsman responsible for human rights, this institution was
established in line with the EU requirements and the Sweden Ombudsman
model was adopted (Interview_25 2013). The Ombudsmen are exempt from
orders and instructions from governments, and any other political entities.
Moreover, a special budget was allocated to the institution to maintain its
independence. In the context of Turkeys counter-terrorism policies, the
Ombudsman started to play a role in resolving any disputes between the state
and its citizens that arise from the undesirable consequences of counter-terror
investigations and operations.46
The reconstruction of the Human Rights Presidency was another major
initiative made during the post-Brussels period. As was revealed earlier (see
section 6.4.3), the Presidency was established under the Prime Ministry in 2001.
However, the EU found this institution inefficient due to its limited budget, its
dependency on the government, its failure to consult on its legislative actions,
and its non-operating sub-committees (such as Human Rights Consultation
Board) (Commission of the European Communities 2005a: 21, 2006: 12). In
response to EU objections, the Law on the Turkish National Human Rights
45
The Ombudsman institution originated in Scandanivian countries and it is adopted by other
European countries.
46
The Ombudsman institution only deals with the cases which have not been prosecuted by the
Judiciary. For instance, if security forces damage a property whilst conducting a terror operation,
the householder can complain to the Ombudsman and require a compensation for his loss.
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Institution was adopted in June 2012 (Interview_16 2013; Interview_25 2013).
According to the new law, no one may order or instruct this institution about
matters that fall under its responsibility. In addition, the Presidency has its own
budget, property, and personnel to protect its autonomy (Ministry for EU Affairs
2012: 13). Moreover, the national preventive mechanism of OPCAT with regards
to preventing torture and ill-treatment in Turkey (see section 7.4.1), has been
given to the mandate of the Presidency (Ministry for EU Affairs 2012: 13). Even
though, after the amendment, the EU voiced its concerns about the
independency of the institution (which does not fully comply with the UN Paris
principles regarding the status and functioning of national human rights
institutions) (Commission of the European Communities 2012: 19), in
comparison to the post-Helsinki period the role of the Presidency to prevent
human rights violations has strengthened (Interview_16 2013).
As for monitoring the abusive actions of security forces, the
establishment of an independent institution started in 2008. The new institution
is expected to monitor and investigate complaints such as torture, ill-treatment,
and the use of excessive power against the security forces. Similar to the
Ombudsman and Human Rights Presidency, the Law Enforcement Complaints
Agency is considered to be an independent institution having its own budget,
and it is protected from political intervention. The EU has provided 3.5 million
Euro support to establish this institution (Aksam 2013). If the project can be put
into practice, Turkeys counter-terrorism policy will be under the monitoring of
another national human rights institution.
In sum, during the post-Brussels period the institution building initiatives
to protect human rights in Turkey in the counter-terror domain continued. In this
respect, a new Ombudsman was established and a project establishing a Law
Enforcement Complaints Agency began. Furthermore, the structural problems of
the TPHRIC and the Human Rights Presidency regarding their independency,
limited budget, and their limited role in legislative actions, was resolved. Within
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this reform process, the EU critics and the EU provided funds were influential on
change. Therefore, in consideration of these circumstances, the EU impact on
institution building initiatives to transform Turkish counter-terrorism policy was
high during the post-Brussels period.
7.5. The Application of EU Conditionality and Socialization in the
Post-Brussels Period
As was revealed in the earlier sections, the EU influence on Turkish counter-
terrorism policy was high during the post-Brussels period, in terms of the
ratification of international laws, domestic legislative changes, and institution
building initiatives. However, internal and external factors influential on this
change neither resembled the conditions of the pre-Helsinki period, nor the
post-Helsinki period. In order to indicate the difference, in this section the EU
impact on Turkish counter-terrorism policy will be analysed in terms of 4 factors:
the credibility of conditionality, adoption costs, the legitimacy of EU
requirements and domestic resonance.47
7.5.1. Credibility of Conditionality
The most controversial fact during the post-Brussels period, which challenges
the idea that the EU influence on Turkey was high, is that the EU did not provide
clear membership prospects to Turkey. When the negotiation framework was
revealed, the negotiations on Turkeys accession were left open-ended, and their
outcome was uncertain. With this decision, the EU had the opportunity to
extend negotiations using any excuse relating to Turkeys counter-terrorism
policies, by claiming that Turkey did not fulfil the EU requirements. Furthermore,
even if Turkey fulfils the EU requirements, the absorption capacity of the EU was
another problem in giving Turkey its membership. In other words, the
transformation in Turkeys democracy as well as its counter-terrorism policies,
does not guarantee membership, unless Turkeys admission is considered safe by
47
See chapter three for details of these independet variables.
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the EU. Therefore, the uncertain membership prospects is one of the reasons
that the EUs credibility of conditionality was undermined in the post-Brussels
period.
During the same years, the EU approach towards Turkey was unfair in
terms of fulfilling its promises. As indicated earlier (see section 7.3.), when the
Turkish Cypriots voted in favour of the Annan Plan and the Greek Cypriots were
against to it, Turkish political actors were expecting the EU to reward the Turkish
Cypriots by lifting isolations. However, contrary to expectations, the Greek
Cypriots were granted with EU membership, whereas Turkish Cypriots were
faced with continued isolation. This decision was a wake-up call for Turkish
political actors to be cautious in believing the EU promises before transforming
their domestic policy.
The inconsistency of the EU towards Turkey was also another reason that
weakened the EUs credibility of conditionality. Instead of membership and
negotiations, Turkey was offered privileged membership and positive
agenda, which does not exist in the acquis and has never been applied to any
other country. Increasing opposition in the EU to Turkeys membership seems to
be the reason of such new initiatives. However, whatever the reason might be,
the double standards applied to Turkey was not helpful to Turkish political actors
who supported the EU required reforms to transform Turkish counter-terrorism
policy. Their arguments, made on the basis that Turkey would enter the EU if its
counter-terrorism policies reached the democratic standards of the EU, failed
due to the EUs self-refuting approach.
Concerning the above-mentioned reasons, the credibility of EU
conditionality was low during the post-Brussels period. The EU did not provide
clear membership prospects to Turkey to change its domestic policy.
Furthermore, a partial and inconsistent approaches towards Turkey undermined
the EU influence. Therefore, during the post-Brussels period credibility of
conditionality was not the reason for the changes.
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7.5.2. Adoption Costs
The resumption of the PKK attacks was the major factor, which increased the
adoption cost for the Turkish political actors to transpose the EU rules. According
to figures derived from different sources, 3,394 people (1,025 security forces,
147 civilians, 2,222 PKK members) died during the post-Brussels period as a
result of the struggle against terrorism (Grand National Assembly of Turkey the
Committee on Human Rights Inquiry 2013: 54-65; Habera 2012; Kanal 7 2012;
bĞŶĞƌ  ? ? ? ? Z ? /Ŷ ĐŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ƉŽƐƚ ?,ĞůƐŝŶŬŝ ƉĞƌ ŽĚ ? ƚŚĞ ŶƵŵďĞƌ ŽĨ
fatalities tripled, which was 936 people during that period. Furthermore, the PKK
was involved in many kidnapping cases in the Southeast of Turkey, targeting
security forces, civilians, and sometimes elected politicians. The PKK sponsored
violent demonstrations also increased tension in the region. Therefore, in the
on-going PKK violence, adoption of the EU promoted norms was politically costly
for the AKP government, due to criticism from opposition parties that the
government was incompetent in dealing with the PKK.
Along with the PKK attacks, the provocative actions of sympathizers were
creating an electoral cost to the AKP government in following up the EU
recommendations to find a peaceful solution to PKK terrorism. For instance, the
so-called Democratic Opening process was cancelled after the Habur Crisis
which erupted in 2009, when joyful demonstrations were held for the return of
thirty-four Kurds, including eight PKK militants. According to a survey at the time
of Democratic Opening, the public support for a peaceful solution reduced
from 69.8% (6-7 June 2009) to 45.6% (22-23 August 2009) after this incident
(Tamirak 2009).48 Furthermore, based on a poll which measures the popularity of
the political parties in Turkey, during the Democratic Opening, whilst the AKPs
popularity reduced by 4% (42.7% July 2009  38.8% October 2009) the popularity
of the MHP (Nationalist Party) increased by 2% (15.9% July 2009  18% October
48
The survey was conducted with 1260 voting adults through face to face interview, within 11
ƉƌŽǀŝŶĐĞƐ ŽĨ dƵƌŬĞǇ  ?ĚĂŶĂ ? ŶŬĂƌĂ ? ƵƌƐĂ ? ŝǇĂƌďĂŬŦ ? 7ĕĞů ? 7ƐƚĂŶďƵů ? 7ǌŵŝƌ ? <ĂǇƐĞƌŝ ? DĂůĂƚǇĂ ?
Manisa, and Trabzon)
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2009) (Konsensus Research Concultancy 2009).49 As these figures indicate, even
though the government party was open to peaceful processes to end PKK
terrorism, the provocative demonstrations led them to reject EU suggested
initiatives due to unbearable political costs.
During the post-Brussels period, the adoption cost of the EU promoted
norms by Turkish political actors was high. The resumption of the PKK attacks
and provocative demonstrations of PKK sympathizers were the causes of the
political cost. Within this context, it was difficult for the government to
transform counter-terrorism policies in line with the EU requirements. In that
sense, the adoption cost variable is inadequate to explain the change in Turkish
counter-terrorism polices towards the PKK in the post-Brussels period.
7.5.3. Legitimacy of the EU Requirements
The EU requirements from Turkey to reform counter-terrorism policy were as
clear as they were in the post-Helsinki period. The progression reports were
regularly issued by the European Commission and indicated the responsibilities
Turkey had. Furthermore, during the same period two accession partnerships
were formed that highlighted priorities for Turkish political actors. Nevertheless,
Turkish political actors sometimes failed to react to these documents. For
instance, Turkey did not prepare NPAA in 2006, considering it to be unnecessary.
Also, the AKP deputy Burhan Kuzu, who was the head of the Parliamentary
Constitutional Commission, threw the 2012 EU progression report across the
room on a TV programme, for being an unfair way to evaluate human rights
ƌĞĨŽƌŵƐŝŶdƵƌŬĞǇ ?/ŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌŽĨhĨĨĂŝƌƐŐĞŵĞŶĂŐŦƐ ?ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞĚ
his displeasure about the 2012 progression report, saying that the EU is delaying
Turkeys accession to the EU (BBC Türkçe 2012). However, these reactions were
basically targeting the conditionality strategy of the EU rather than the clarity of
the EU requirements. Therefore, within this period, the legitimacy of the EU
49
The survey was conducted with 1,550 adults over 18 by telephone interviews in 81 provinces
of Turkey.
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requirements was strong enough to guide Turkish political actors in terms of
clarity.
The overlapping requests of the EU with other international organisations
also increased the legitimacy of the EU requirements during the post-Brussels
period. For instance, the EU shared the same point of view with the VCCE with
regards to the closure of pro-Kurdish political parties. The EU criticized Turkey
for the articles governing the closure of political parties based on the report of
the VCCE, arguing that these articles are incompatible with the article 11 of the
ECHR protecting freedom of assembly and association (Commission of the
European Communities 2009: 30). Also, the EU encouraged the implementation
of the Ministry of Justice Human Rights Action plan, which was prepared in
cooperation with the Council of Europe, to reduce ECtHR judgements against
Turkey (which are relevant to counter-terror policy) (Commission of the
European Communities 2012: 14). In consideration of these examples, the EU
requirements were supported by the initiatives of other international
organisations to transform Turkish counter-terrorism policy. This increased the
legitimacy of the EU requirements.
In terms of consistency, the EU displayed a mixed picture during the post-
Brussels period. Some of the hard counter-terror measures of the EU countries
(such as UK) were used by Turkish security actors to justify their hard counter-
terror policy demands on the government. The legal amendments made in 2006
on ATL were made in the light of these debates (see section 7.3). Therefore,
inconsistency between the implementation of some member countys counter-
terror policies, and the EUs normative requirements on Turkey, was an
undermining factor in the legitimacy of the EU demands. On the other hand,
during the interviews with the senior ministry officials in 2012, in answer to a
question of how the government perceived the legitimacy of the EUs human
rights requirements, they clearly indicated that there is no problem of legitimacy
with these norms. For instance, according to a senior Ministry of Justice official,
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the government considers EU promoted human rights norms to be fully
legitimate (Interview_1 2012). In another example, a senior Ministry of Foreign
Affairs official emphasized that even though we lost our membership
expectations from the EU, we used EU promoted human rights norms as a
guidance or check-list for better governance (Interview_8 2012). In view of
these opinions, it can be concluded that the Turkish political actors did not
question the legitimacy of EU promoted human rights norms. However, when
adopting hard counter-terror measures, they used the actions of some EU
countries to justify policy change.
Even though some member countries hard-line counter-terror measures
undermined the legitimacy of the EU requirements from Turkey, the EUs
demands on improving human rights standards in Turkey were still legitimate in
terms of clarity, coinciding requirements with other international organisations,
and in their appropriateness. Therefore, the legitimacy of the EU requirements
was high within this period.
7.5.4. Domestic Resonance
The mixed picture seen in the post-Helsinki period concerning the openness of
Turkish political actors to adopt the EU promoted norms continued during the
post-Brussels period. On the one side, some of the political elite supported the
adoption of EU promoted human rights norms to transform Turkeys counter-
terrorism policies. On the other side, the EU promoted norms were not
internalized by some political actors, which created implementation problems.
The AKP was the single party in government during the post-Brussels
period. Thus, it was the major political actor in the adoption of EU promoted
human rights norms. During these years, despite the absence of a clear
membership incentive, the AKP government determined to carry on the reform
process in line with EU requirements. For instance, in an interview with Prime
Minister Erdogan in 2007, he stated that if Turkey would not be accepted to the
Union, we carry on the reform process under the name of Ankara Criteria
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rather than Copenhagen Criteria(Hürriyet 2007). Erdogans reference to the
Ankara Criteria was not something officially recognised as laying down
democratic standards in Turkey. Rather, it was a statement of goodwill made by
Turkey regarding the adoption of EU promoted norms. Along with Erdogans
statement, most of the senior officials from different ministries shared the same
view during the interviews held in 2012. According to these officials, the
appropriateness of the EU promoted norms became the main reason for rule
adoption in Turkey after 2007, rather than the rational reason of gaining
membership benefits (Interview_5 2012; Interview_6 2012; Interview_8 2012).
Moreover, as one of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials emphasized, the EU
based reforms are used to legitimize human rights reforms in Turkey. They are
used to counteract the harsh criticism of opposition parties, who represent the
adoption of EU promoted human rights norms as a concession to the PKK
(Interview_8 2012). In that sense, during the post-Brussels period, resonance
was high on the government side, to adopt the EU promoted norms considering
their appropriateness.
The position of the Turkish army to support adoption of the EU promoted
norms for a peaceful solution was better than the previous two periods. In a
statement of President Gül, after the National Security Council meeting
regarding the Democratic Opening, he indicated there is a consensus among
the state authorities for a peaceful solution to the Kurdish problem (Karabat
2009). Even though he did not specify the state authorities, he addressed the
Turkish Army by implying that the government and the military share the same
point of view. Also, during these years, the Turkish army acknowledged that
defeating the PKK with military means was not possible (Çandar 2012: 19), which
was an unspoken approval for continuing democratization reforms in order to
end PKK terrorism. Therefore, during the post-Brussels period, the openness of
the Army to adopt the EU promoted norms was high in comparison to the other
periods.
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During the post-Brussels period, the judiciary continued its old habits. It
interpreted the ATL and criminal code articles in a restrictive manner. Despite
the legal amendments safeguarding freedom of expression, the non-violent
opinions of Kurdish journalists and pro-Kurdish politicians were charged with
being the propaganda of terrorist organisations. Moreover, the judiciary failed to
apply the ECHR provisions and the ECtHR judgements, even though these rules
and rulings were superior to the domestic law (Commission of the European
Communities 2012: 14). Due to these shortcomings, the Turkish Council of
Ministers adopted an action plan in 2010 to align standards of the judiciary with
the EU countries (Commission of the European Communities 2010b: 9). This
indicates that there was much to do to improve standards. In consideration of
these reasons, resonance amongst the judiciary to implement the EU promoted
norms was not at a satisfactory level, just as it was not in previous periods.
The public demand to adopt the EU promoted norms was high. However,
during the post-Brussels period the motivation for adopting the EU required
norms was different. For instance, in a survey conducted in July 2012
expectation of EU membership amongst the Turkish citizens dropped to 17%,
(from 34% in 2011) (German Turkish Foundation for Education and Scientific
Research (TAVAK) 2012).50 In comparison to the post-Helsinki figure, which was
73% in 2004 (The German Marshall Fund 2010: 24), there was a strong
pessimism in the public that EU membership was not possible in the near future.
However, in contrast to these figures, there was a strong demand from the
public to adopt the EU promoted norms and to find a peaceful solution to the
Kurdish question. For instance, in the 2010 constitutional referendum, which
was made to fulfil the EU requirements, 57.88% of the constituents voted in
favour of the amendment, and 42.12% voted against it (Turkey's High Election
Board 2010). Furthermore, public support for Democratic Opening and
50
The survey was conducted with 1,110 people between ages of 18 and 60, within the period of
20-30 July 2012, in 8 major cities of Turkey (Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Antalya, Kayseri, Gaziantep,
Artvin and Trabzon)
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Resolution Process, which are negotiation processes between Turkey and the
PKK, reached 60% (ANAR 2013; Tamirak 2009).51 As these figures show, despite
the low EU membership expectations, nearly 60% of the citizens supported the
continuation of EU promoted reforms, and negotiations with the PKK for a
peaceful solution. In that sense, domestic resonance was high in the public
during the post-Brussels period.
In view of these factors, general domestic resonance was high during the
post-Brussels period. Even though the Turkish judiciary did not support
democratic reforms, the government, the Turkish Army and the public supported
a peaceful solution of the PKK terrorism, which is in line with the EU
requirements. In contrast to the post-Helsinki period, the demand on the
adoption of EU promoted norms was not based on membership expectations,
but rather on the appropriateness of the norms.
7.6. Conclusion
As explicated in the previous sections, the EU influence on Turkey to transform
counter-terrorism policy was high during the post-Brussels period. Even though
some of Turkeys counter-terror measures deteriorated, the mainstream reform
continuity on human rights sustained to transform Turkish counter-terrorism
policies in line with the EU requirements.
In order to transform counter-terrorism policy, Turkey either signed or
ratified the EU promoted UN and CE conventions. Furthermore, one
comprehensive constitutional change, four judicial packages, and the ninth EU
harmonization package was adopted during these years, which included EU
required reforms. Also, institutions such as the Ombudsman were established,
and some institutions, like the Human Rights Presidency, gained independence in
monitoring the counter-terror policies of Turkey to prevent human rights
violations. In comparison to the previous periods, the high level of the EU
influence was based on different factors.
51
The ANAR survey was conducted with 5,500 voting citizens in Turkey by face to face interviews.
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The credibility of conditionality was low. The EU did not provide a clear
membership prospect to Turkey as a tangible incentive for the adoption of EU
norms. Issues such as open-ended negotiations, the absorption capacity of the
EU, privileged membership, and positive agenda, undermined the EU influence.
In view of these reasons, the credibility of conditionality was not the mediating
factor that explains the EU influence on changing Turkish counter-terrorism
policies.
The adoption cost was high. The resumption of the PKK attacks and
provocative actions of their sympathizers increased the adoption cost to the AKP
government. Under these circumstances, it was difficult for the AKP to confront
the criticism of opposition parties and those in nationalist circles. Therefore, the
adoption cost variable was inadequate to explain the adoption of EU promoted
norms in the field of counter-terrorism.
The legitimacy of the EU requirements was high. The EU requirements
were clearly stated by the progression reports and accession partnerships. The
demands of other international organisations on Turkey coincided with the EU
requirements. Furthermore, in terms of human rights norms, Turkish political
actors regarded these norms as a guidance or checklist to be fulfilled by Turkey
for better right-based counter-terrorism policies. In that sense, the legitimacy of
the EU requirements was the first variable that explains the EU influence on
Turkish counter-terrorism policies during the post-Brussels period.
The domestic resonance for adoption of the EU required norms was high
during these years. Except for the Turkish judiciary, the other political actors
(such as the AKP government, the Turkish Army, and the public) were keen to
adopt these norms. In the absence of a membership incentive, the
appropriateness of the EU norms was the main reason of rule adoption. In the
light of these factors, the domestic resonance was the second variable that
explains the EU influence on Turkeys counter-terrorism policies. In view of these
findings, post-Brussels results are summarized as follows.
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Table 4- Overview of Empirical Investigation of the Post-Brussels Period
If these variables are analysed from the theoretical framework, due to
the low level of credibility of conditionality, and the high adoptions costs, the EU
conditionality strategy was not influential on policy change in Turkey during the
post-Brussels period. However, the high level of legitimacy of the EU
requirements, and the high level of domestic resonance, indicates that Turkish
political actors gave high credence to the EU norms being appropriate rules for a
peaceful solution to PKK terrorism. Therefore, the socialization efforts of the EU
were the main mechanism that influenced Turkish counter-terrorism policies in
the post-Brussels period.
Variables
Units
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
DEPENDENT
VARIABLE
Conditionality
(External Incentives Model)
Socialization
(Social Learning Model)
Credibility of
Conditionality
(EU LEVEL)
Adoption
Costs
(DOMESTIC
LEVEL)
Legitimacy of
EU
Requirements
(EU LEVEL)
Domestic
Resonance
(DOMESTIC
LEVEL)
The EU Impact on
Formal Rule Adoption
in the Counter-
terrorism Domain
Post-Brussels
Period 2004-2013
Low High High High High
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8. Conclusion
In an attempt to reveal the EU impact on the counter terrorism policies of
candidate countries, this research has conceptualized and empirically
investigated the EU influence on Turkeys counter-terrorism policy towards the
PKK. The reason for selecting Turkey is that, since the Copenhagen Criteria was
set up in 1993, Turkey has been the only candidate country that has strived to be
member of the EU whilst fighting ethnic separatist terrorism. Due to the special
status of Turkey, analysing Turkey tells us which internal and external dynamics
are influential on the changing political behaviour of candidate countries in
relation to their counter terrorism policies and in their engagement with the EU.
Within the two major aspects of counter-terrorism policy, this research
has focused on the liberty aspect rather than the cooperation aspect. The EU
impact on Turkeys counter-terrorism policies has been examined through the
concept of rule adoption, which encompasses the ratification of international
human and ethnic minority rights conventions, domestic legislative changes for
enhancing the civil rights of terror suspects and sympathizers, and institution
building initiatives for monitoring and protecting human rights in Turkey. By
relying on these legislative changes, this study has argued that when the EU has
diffused its norms to Turkey in order to transform its democracy, it has been
implicitly influential on the transformation of its counter-terrorism policies.
In the absence of another country to compare Turkey with, the single
case study of this research has been disaggregated into three periods. The first
period starts with first attacks of the PKK in 1984 and ends with the 1999
Helsinki European Council, when Turkey was admitted to the position of being a
candidate country. The second period begins with unilateral ceasefire of the PKK
in 1999 and ends with the 2004 Brussels European Council, when the EU entered
into accession negotiations with Turkey. The third period starts with the Turkey-
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EU accession negotiations and the resumption of the PKK attacks in 2004. It ends
in 2013 when negotiations with the PKK and the Turkish Government began.
In order to conceptualize the EU impact, this study has benefited from
utilising two norm diffusion mechanisms: the Conditionality and the
Socialization mechanisms. According to the conditionality mechanism, it has
been argued that the EU sets political conditions on Turkey in order to transform
its democracy along with its counter-terrorism policies. These conditions are
such that if Turkey fulfils them, it is awarded with membership, and if it fails to
fulfil them, membership is withheld. In relation to conditionality, the EU norm
diffusion pattern is a top-down process, in which the EU influence is the major
determinant of rule adoption. However, conditionality has some shortcomings in
explaining rule adoption in the absence of clear EU membership prospects, and
the presence of high political adoption costs. In this respect, the socialization
mechanism has been used as an alternative mechanism to explain the EU impact
on Turkey. According to the socialization mechanism, during social interactions
between Turkey and the EU, Turkish political actors learn that EU promoted
norms are convenient tools for solving their existing ethnic separatist terrorism
problems. Therefore, they adopt these norms in consideration of their
appropriateness, rather than because a membership incentive is provided by the
EU. In view of the socialization mechanism, norm diffusion is a bottom-up
process, where domestic political actors are the key determinants on rule
adoption, rather than the EU.
In order to examine the efficiency of both norm diffusion patterns, a set
of four factors (internal and EU-level), based on the External Incentives Model
and the Social Learning Model have been used to understand the EU impact.
The first of these factors, the credibility of conditionality, focused on whether
the EU provided a membership prospect to Turkey. The second factor, adoption
costs, concentrated on PKK related issues (such as the ceasefire, and the number
of fatalities) and their political cost for domestic actors. The third factor, the
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legitimacy of the EU requirements sought the answer to the question of whether
the EU demands from Turkey were clear, consistent, and shared with other
international organisations. The fourth factor, domestic resonance, examined
the openness of Turkish political actors for adoption of the EU rules. In this
context, the political stance of the government, the army, the judiciary and the
general public was taken into consideration to measure the EU impact.
Considering the difficulties of measuring the qualitative data, in the study
two parameters were identified (high and low) to transform the qualitative
data into scalable values. No medium value was used in order to refrain from
making an arbitrary division.52 In view of the empirical investigation, the
following results have emerged.
Table 5- Overview of Empirical Investigation
According to the empirical findings of this study, the EU has succeeded in
being influential on the transformation of Turkeys counter-terrorism policies in
post-Helsinki and post-Brussels periods. The EUs success story in Turkey, after
52
See section 1.1. for much details about variables and their measurement parameters.
Variables
Units
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
DEPENDENT
VARIABLE
Conditionality
(External Incentives Model)
Socialization
(Social Learning Model)
Credibility of
Conditionality
(EU LEVEL)
Adoption
Costs
(DOMESTIC
LEVEL)
Legitimacy of
EU
Requirements
(EU LEVEL)
Domestic
Resonance
(DOMESTIC
LEVEL)
The EU Impact on
Formal Rule Adoption
in the Counter-
terrorism Domain
Pre-Helsinki Period
1984-1999
Low High Low Low Low
Post-Helsinki
Period 1999-2004
High Low High Low High
Post-Brussels
Period 2004-2013
Low High High High High
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the 9/11 attacks, puts the EU in a special category for diffusing norms that relate
to counter-terrorism. After the 9/11 attacks, whilst many countries were
adopting security oriented counter-terror measures, Turkey behaved differently
by enhancing the civil liberties of its citizens. After this time, the EUs role was
undeniable. If this result is assessed through a global counter-terror framework,
it indicates that the EUs normative power to exert influence on third countries,
sometimes even in opposition to global trends, is very strong. Therefore, if the
EU political actors wish to use their normative power potential to transform the
counter-terrorism policies of third countries, Turkey is an example of a specific
case that can be used to guide them. They can employ similar norm diffusion
mechanisms in other countries.
According to the findings of this study, by using its democratization tools
the EU can transform third countries counter-terrorism policies in line with civil
and human rights principles, if convenient domestic and EU-level factors are
met. If this proposition is evaluated from a polity, politics and policies dimension,
the EU has the ability to alter the domestic policies of third countries by using
polity tools. In this respect, if the EU has civil and human rights concerns about
the counter-terrorism policies of third countries, it is not necessary to impose
any direct policy prescriptions on these countries (which might lead to the
discontent of domestic political actors that the EU is intervening in their
existential problem without considering the security concerns of that country).
Instead of relying on such a direct interference, by using democratization
methods the EU can produce a soft transition and relieve the political tension in
the target country whilst transforming their counter-terrorism policies. In this
way, the EU can give an impression to the domestic political actors in that
country that it is only concerned with the democratization of that country, and
not with its hard-line counter-terrorism policies, which helps to support the
cause of reformist politicians, and leads to a more robust reform process.
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The transformation of Turkeys counter-terrorism policies also reveals
that the EUs norm diffusion mechanisms are not only based on a top-down
process, in which the EU impact is intrusive, but also rely on a bottom-up
process, where domestic demand plays a significant role on policy adjustment.
However, the bottom-up norm diffusion process in Turkey was achieved only
after a preliminary top-down norm diffusion process was put into action, which
triggered the reform process by giving Turkey a strong membership prospect. In
this regard, if the EU political actors aim to transform the counter-terrorism
policies of other countries, they should trigger the policy transformation by
starting with a top-down norm diffusion process rather than a bottom-up
approach. When a top-down norm diffusion process cannot be carried on
further, there is still a chance that reforms may continue in the target country if
a bottom-up approach based on domestic demand is used. Otherwise, relying on
only a bottom-up approach in a target country may unnecessarily prolong the
reform process. Creating an atmosphere in which domestic political actors are
open to adopting new norms is a long-term process; one that may take longer
than the EU political actors expect.
In the light of the Turkish case, this study has found that norm diffusion
to Turkey in the counter-terror context has been achieved within different time
periods and by using different norm diffusion mechanisms. In the pre-Helsinki,
period neither the conditionality nor the socialization mechanism were
influential in changing Turkeys counter-terrorism policies. In the post-Helsinki
period, conditionality was the main mechanism for the transposition of EU rules.
In the post-Helsinki period, socialization was the main influence on Turkish
political actors to align their counter-terror measures with the EU standards.
The inefficiency of the EU norm diffusion mechanisms during the pre-
Helsinki period was found to rest on several reasons. During these years, the EU
did not provide a membership prospect to Turkey. Furthermore, the PKK attacks
were a major obstacle for the Turkish political elite in the light of electoral
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concerns and the strong opposition of veto players. In addition, the legitimacy of
the EU requirements had weaknesses in terms of their clarity, consistency, and
because other international organisations were much influential on Turkey than
the EU. Also, domestic political actors did not see that pursuing hard-line
counter-terrorism policies were not the solution for ending PKK terrorism.
In the post-Helsinki years, however, conditionality was successful in
transforming Turkeys counter terrorism policy. One of the reasons for this
success was that the EU provided a clear membership prospect to Turkey. This
membership prospect was a high value incentive for Turkish political actors,
which had not been offered in earlier years. The second reason was that during
the same period the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan was captured, and the
organisation declared a unilateral ceasefire. The reduction of PKK activities after
the ceasefire was a positive factor that initiated the adoption of EU promoted
norms by the Turkish political elite. This was because it was then easy for them
to counter the criticism of opposition parties and those in nationalist circles.
If these two reasons are evaluated using the logic of consequence and
the conditionality mechanism (which are based on making cost-benefit
calculations) the likely benefits that were delivered by a high membership
prospect outweighed the political costs due to the PKKs declining violent
activities. In view of this result, it could be concluded that if the EU provides
membership prospects to those countries in its neighbourhood where the
domestic political cost of terrorism is small, they are likely to adopt EU promoted
liberal democratic norms.
In the post-Brussels period, socialization was the prominent norm
diffusion mechanism used to explain the EU impact. The major reason why
socialization worked was that domestic resonance was higher than in the other
periods. According to the empirical findings, the majority of Turkish political
actors understood that ending PKK terrorism by military means was not possible.
Therefore, they supported the adoption of EU promoted norms, which were
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considered to be an appropriate way to solve the PKK problem by providing
greater freedom to Kurdish citizens. This decision was taken when there was no
clear membership prospect, and PKK attacks has been resumed. In consideration
of this empirical finding, it could be concluded that the EU can be influential on
the countries around the Union, if domestic political actors of those countries
realize that they can solve their terrorism problems by adopting EU promoted
norms.
In comparison to the other mediating factors, domestic resonance is the
strongest of all for the transposition of EU norms to third countries. If domestic
resonance is high, neither a membership prospect, nor terrorist attacks, are
important for domestic political actors in adopting EU norms. The domestic
demand for democratic change is more influential than rational calculations.
Therefore, if the EU has nothing to offer target countries (material incentives) to
transform their domestic policies, they should focus on improving the openness
of domestic political actors by intense socialization. However, reaching an
sufficient level of openness might take time, and EU actors need patience.
Along with the high domestic resonance, the legitimacy of the EU
requirements was high during the post-Brussels period. In this respect, the EU
requirements stated in progression reports and accession partnerships were
clear. In addition, the EU demands overlapped with the requirements of other
international organisations. However, the legitimacy of the EUs requirements
were at the same level within both the post-Helsinki and post-Brussels periods,
due to them possessing similar features. Therefore, in these periods it is not easy
to determine the role of the legitimacy of EU requirements variable.
In this context, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeiers proposition regarding
the legitimacy of EU requirements have some shortcomings in explaining norm
diffusion to candidate countries. Once the requirement of the EU on a candidate
country reach a certain level of legitimacy (in terms of clarity, consistency, and
overlapping demands with other international organisations), it is difficult for
279
that legitimacy to deteriorate. This is especially so when interactions between a
candidate country and the EU are at the accession negotiations stage. The
candidate country cannot object or refuse to adopt EU requirements at this
stage by complaining that they are not legitimate. If they do so, there is always a
risk that the negotiations will be interrupted. However, the EU still needs to be
careful, because legitimacy can be reduced even at this stage if there is an
inconsistency in how EU countries themselves apply the norms. In such a case,
candidate countries can use this as a justification for their own hard-line policies.
Therefore, using the variable of the legitimacy of EU requirements for non-
candidate countries, rather than candidate states, could give better results. In
addition, using this variable for non-candidate countries will increase the
theoretical validity of this variable.
In consideration of post-conditionality literature, which is concerned with
the rule adoption patterns of CEECs after the EU accession (Dimitrova 2010;
Epstein and Sedelmeier 2008; Meyer-Sahling 2011; Schimmelfennig and Trauner
2009), Turkeys rule adoption behaviour can also be evaluated within a similar
context, despite Turkey still possessing candidate status. As Epstein and
Sedelmeier propose, in the absence of EU conditionality (lack of membership
prospect-high adoption costs) norm continuity in the target country is less likely
to happen (Epstein and Sedelmeier 2008). However, as observed in the Turkish
case, despite the absence of a clear membership prospect and high adoption
costs, reform continuity succeeded in Turkey to transform counter-terrorism
policy. This sustainability was achieved, neither to utilize EU-provided financial
and technical incentives, nor because of the protection of reforms by Turkish
courts.53 However, during the reform continuity, there was not any government
53
See for further discussion Frank Schimmelfennig and Florian Trauner, 'Post-Accession
Compliance in the Eu's New Member States', European Integration Online Papers (EIoP) (13,
2009).
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alteration.54 Rule adoption for the transformation of Turkish counter-terrorism
policy appeared to constitute a socialization process in which domestic political
actors considered the EU as promoting norms as an appropriate way of solving
domestic problems and responding to strong public demands for peaceful
solution to PKK terrorism. In this respect, the findings of this research may add
value to post-conditionality literature by providing an alternative explanation to
reform continuity in a candidate country despite the declining accession
conditionality.
As for the number and speed of the democratic reforms considered, it
was found that they were higher in the post-Helsinki period than the post-
Brussels period. Turkish political actors adopted many more rules in the post-
Helsinki period, despite the fact that this period was shorter than the others.
This outcome clearly indicates that the conditionality mechanism was a more
efficient mechanism than the socialization mechanism in transforming Turkeys
counter-terrorism policies. In this respect, it could be said that if the EU wants to
quickly transform the counter-terrorism policies of a country in its vicinity, it
should employ the conditionality mechanism, and support it with a membership
incentive. Conditionality will give better results in terms of the speed and
quantity of reforms. Otherwise, if the socialization mechanism is relied upon, the
speed and number of reforms will decrease, as was experienced in the Turkish
case.
During the empirical analysis, this research also found that, in regards to
the efficiency of rule adoption, Turkish political actors did not fulfil their duties,
as they were required to, despite the high number of adopted norms. For
instance, they were reluctant to adopt some of the ethnic minority conventions,
and they placed reservation on some articles of these conventions (i.e. those
which granted rights to Kurds, such as education in mother tongue). In addition,
54
See for the impact of domestic constellations and government alterations in post-
conditionality. Jan-Hinrik Meyer-Sahling, 'The Durability of Eu Civil Service Policy in Central and
Eastern Europe after Accession', Governance, 24/2 (2011).
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they pursued a selective approach, for example, by adopting human rights norms
rather than ethnic minority conventions. This unwillingness was based on the
likelihood of the PKK making demands for autonomy on Turkey. The scepticism
among the Turkish political elite indicates that granting ethnic rights might give a
window of opportunity to Kurds to further their goal of establishing an
independent state. In this respect, both the conditionality and the socialization
mechanism have some limitations. If a candidate state considers that the
adoption of EU promoted norms would create an existential threat to the
territorial integrity of country, they are unlikely to adopt them. In light of this
result, it could be concluded that the conditionality and socialization
mechanisms do not guarantee that the EU requirements will be fully fulfilled by
third countries.
The high level of rule adoption with regards to the transformation of
counter-terrorism policies may also suffer if institutional capacity is not at a
sufficient level. Based on the empirical investigation of this research, it was
observed that despite the ambition of some Turkish governments to adopt the
EU promoted norms in order to gain EU membership, and despite the
appropriateness of the norms, the attitude of the judiciary and public
administration hindered the genuine adoption of norms. That is, because of the
attitudes of these actors, although reforms were made, they were sometimes
only made on paper, and not put into practice. Furthermore, in order to
overcome the weaknesses of institutional capacities, governments have to make
further reforms repeatedly. In this context, in order to transform the counter
terrorism policies of third countries, EU authorities should also follow a parallel
strategy, based not only on formal rule transfer, but also on investing in
initiatives for improving the institutional capacities of those countries. Also,
reformist domestic political actors in the target countries should spend time on
increasing the capacity and efficiency of their institutions for better rule
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adoption and policy implementation. This will save their time and energy whilst
fulfilling the EU requirements.
The lack of institutional capacity to adopt EU reforms also has negative
consequences for the image of third countries. According to the empirical
findings of this study, Turkish domestic political actors had a tendency to adopt
politically costly EU promoted rules just before an important decision was made
by the European Council regarding Turkeys accession. These last minute
changes indicate that Turkish political actors aim to increase their bargaining
power towards their European counterparts at the time of their decision. On the
other hand, these last-minute attempts have the risk of undermining the efforts
of Turkish political actors, in the sense that they will be viewed as cosmetic
changes rather than as being internalizations of the reforms. Therefore, the
adoption of EU reforms should take place at a steady pace, over a long term. This
would improve the image and reliability of Turkish political actors in the eyes of
their European counterparts.
This study also revealed that the stance of some domestic political actors
with regards to the adoption of EU promoted norms has been changeable. For
instance, the position of the Turkish armed forces was in transition during the
three periods. During the pre-Helsinki years, they were in the position of veto
players, and resisted the adoption of liberal democratic norms. In the post-
Helsinki years, they played a more moderate role, and were neither for or
against the EU reforms. However, in the post-Brussels years they implicitly
supported a peaceful solution of PKK terrorism, and made no objections to
government policies aimed at achieving such a solution. Therefore, one cannot
generally categorize the political stance of veto players as being against the EU
reforms. As Dimitrova argued, veto players preferences can be configured if
norm adoption is necessary for the new status quo (Dimitrova 2010). In line with
improving relations with the EU and the social learning process, these domestic
political actors may have a different political stance at different times.
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In terms of EUs norm diffusion motives in the counter-terrorism domain,
this study also found that the norm diffusion role of the EU is based on the self-
interest of the EU. When terrorism became an imminent threat for the Union,
the counter-terrorism policies of neighbouring countries became a priority for
EU political actors. However, after the threat of terrorism subsided, their interest
in the counter-terrorism policies of third countries waned. So, the EU behaves as
a rational actor and is only concerned with its self-interest, rather than the well-
being of others. Therefore, the findings of this study contradict the literature
which argues that the EU diffuse its norms for altruistic reasons (Aggestam
2008: 8; Bicchi 2006: 287; K. Smith 2003b: 130-31).
Furthermore, this research also shows that the EU has a potential power
to transform the counter-terrorism policies of third countries by normative
means. Even though, on particular occasions (such as after Madrid and London
Bombings) the EU initiated security based strategies towards third countries,
these external policies had a limited influence on candidate countries, such as
Turkey, where the EUs normative requirements were seen as a guidance for
better governance. Therefore, a shift in the EUs normative stance to a more
security centric stance does not make any difference to candidate countries
because of their intense engagement with the EU, and the incentive of likely
membership. In this respect, the empirical findings of this research contrast with
the findings of other studies by arguing that the increasing focus of the EU on
security issues undermined its normative power (Joffe 2008; Manners 2006; Oz
2010; Van Reisen et al. 2004).
In view of the theoretical framework, the explanatory role of the
conditionality and socialization mechanisms on the transformation of Turkeys
counter-terrorism policies is an important theoretical finding, which could be
applied to other countries in the vicinity of the EU where terrorism creates risks.
In this respect, employing similar mechanisms to the ENP countries could bring
similar transformation as those experienced in Turkey. As was revealed in the
284
literature review chapter (chapter 2), the EU employs the conditionality
mechanism to these countries to transform their counter-terrorism policies in
line with EU requirements. However, the absence of membership prospects
weakens the efficiency of the EUs norm diffusion role on ENP countries. In order
to overcome this problem the EU may give membership prospects to the ENP
countries. These membership prospects, however, may have similar features as
in Turkey, such as being based on open-ended negotiations and the EUs
absorption capacity. If the negotiations with the ENP countries are expanded in
the long term, then the social interaction between the ENP countries and the EU
may also have socialization effects on these countries. During this interaction,
they can learn that the EU norms are appropriate for solving their domestic
terror problems, even if membership prospects are reduced.
This study also reveals lessons for Turkey relying on its experience of
interactions with the EU. In recent years, Turkey has gained self-confidence with
its booming economy and increasing influence over regions in the Middle East,
Caucasus, the Balkans and African countries. Furthermore, it is considered a role
model for many Islamic countries, by combining democracy and Islamic values.
Therefore, Turkish political actors can benefit from norm diffusion mechanisms
similar to those of the EU to exert influence on countries in its vicinity. For
instance, since the PKK has been operational in Northern Iraq and Iran, Turkey
has been in tension with these countries, and wishes for them to change their
domestic policies towards the PKK. However, the fact that PKK camps are still to
be found in these countries, it seems that the Turkish arguments to convince
these countries have thus far failed. Therefore, if Turkey could provide strong
incentives to these countries on the condition that they support Turkeys
counter-terror struggle, or if they could engage in the intense socialization of the
political elite in these countries to change their political behaviour, the EU norm
diffusion mechanism can also work for Turkeys political objectives. In addition,
these norm diffusion mechanisms need not necessarily be used only for counter-
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terrorism, but they also could be used to diffuse liberal democratic norms to
those countries around Turkey in which the Arab Spring has created instability.
Lessons drawn from the EU influence on Turkey might also be useful for
other international political actors, such as the US and other international
organisations. They may also use similar strategies to transform the counter-
terrorism policies of other countries. For instance, as a global leader in counter-
terrorism, the US can use the conditionality (based on material incentives, rather
than membership incentive) and socialization mechanisms in countries such as
Pakistan, Afghanistan, or Egypt. They can do this by not only investing in the
security capabilities of these countries, but also by promoting democracy and
liberal democratic values. Moreover, when the US faces a dilemma in these
countries, between the stability of that country and the continuation of
democratic governance, they should also be much more supportive of
democratic governance. Even though such a choice might be painful for US
political actors to start with, in the long run enhancing democratization will bring
strong stability to these countries. Also, the UN, CoE and OSCE can use their
democratization efforts to transform the counter-terrorism policies of third
countries. In order to be successful like the EU, they should not only rely on the
socialization mechanism, but also develop attractive material incentives for
target countries to encourage them to abandon their current counter-terrorism
policies.
As for the final remarks of this study, in this research the EUs norm
diffusion role in the counter-terror domain was only analysed for Turkey and its
policies towards the PKK. This research perspective can also be extended to
other terrorist organisations in Turkey, such as the Revolutionary Peoples
Liberation Army/Front/Party, which is another terrorist organisation on the EUs
designated terrorist organisation list. In addition, the EUs norm diffusion role on
Turkey as a candidate country can be compared with other countries in the
vicinity of the EU, such as the ENP countries, and Russia, where terrorism is a
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serious problem for their security. By making such a comparison, a broader
picture can be gained of the EUs norm diffusion mechanisms in its
neighbourhood in the counter-terror context. Furthermore, the focus of this
research was to analyse the EU impact on Turkeys counter-terrorism policies
within the context of formal rule adoption. This could be considered as a
limitation of this research. In order to understand the implementation dimension
of rule adoption, further research is needed that focused on behavioural rule
adoption. Finally, the norm diffusion mechanisms of the EU and other
international organisations can be compared in the counter-terror context, and
an efficient norm diffusion mechanism can be developed for all of them by
looking at strength and weakness of these mechanisms.
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